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Abstract 
The phenomenon of school competition for middle-class children has been widely 
publicised as causing social inequity, as the more successful schools are led to exclude 
working-class children, who are not as profitable as their middle-class peers (Jordan, 
1996). Room and Britton (2006b) constructed a mathematical model of this process, 
investigating the “catastrophic downward trajectories” taken by schools failing to attract 
middle-class children. However, the limitations of equation-based modelling meant they 
were restricted to considering only two competing schools, and to including only the most 
basic factors of school choice. This project moved from their initial macro-level view of 
the problem domain to a micro-analysis of the individual behaviours leading to the 
inequitable outcome. The introduction of a production rule system for each agent caused 
severe performance problems and limited the number of simulations that could be run. 
Nonetheless, the agent-based approach gave us new insights into the area that enabled us 
to suggest an amendment to the original model. We were also able to replicate Room and 
Britton’s original results, and discovered that the fundamental factors they use determine 
an intrinsic social inequity that cannot be overcome by external influences.  
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1  
1 Introduction 
Room and Britton (2006b) created a mathematical model to investigate competition 
between secondary schools for middle-class children. This is widely known to lead to 
social inequity, with the more successful schools excluding working-class children 
(Davies, 1999). Due to the complexities of equation-based modelling, Room and Britton 
were restricted to considering only two competing schools, and to including only the 
basic factors of school admissions policies and parental preferences for successful 
schools. These preferences are argued to be stronger for middle-class parents, which 
serves to reinforce the social exclusion effect. However, in real life, many more factors 
come into play that we would now like to consider. We are also interested in moving from 
their initial macro-level view of the problem domain to a micro-analysis of the individual 
behaviours leading to the inequitable outcome. This would allow us to see how small 
changes in behaviour and in policy could trickle through to affect the macro outcome, and 
to deepen our understanding of the system in the process. 
A multi-agent model seems ideally suited to this purpose. We believe that it will be 
relatively straightforward to convert Room and Britton’s model into an agent-based 
version that is easily extended to incorporate new behaviours and factors of interest. In 
the process, we hope to gain new insights into the underlying processes of social 
exclusion. 
1.1 Aim 
The aim of this project was to develop and analyse a multi-agent simulation of the 
dynamics of social exclusion in the domain of school choice, initially equivalent to Room 
and Britton’s equation-based model, and subsequently incorporating some extensions to 
demonstrate the advantages of agent-based modelling. 
1.2 Objectives 
1. Produce an agent-based model that is equivalent to Room and Britton’s model, in 
that it produces the same two equilibrium states under the same conditions 
2. Evaluate the suitability of the technology used for the initial prototype, and 
choose another framework for a more flexible model iteration if necessary 
3. Develop a second, more flexible model (if necessary) and experiment with 
possible refinements or extensions, including agent heterogeneity. 
4. Analyse sets of simulation runs using appropriate statistical techniques. Analysis 
should focus on the dynamics of the system, i.e. the underlying behaviours and 
processes. 
5. Reflect on the advantages of agent-based modelling compared to the original 
model. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Socio-political background 
The Baker school reforms of the 1980s, beginning with the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
have been widely criticised (e.g. Davies (1999); Karsten et al. (2001); West and Pennell 
(2002)). The reforms radically transformed the British education system, transferring 
control over which school a child would attend from the education authorities to parents, 
and making school performance data publicly available, allowing the media to rank 
schools in ‘league tables’. Parents relied on these rankings heavily when choosing a 
school for their child (Davies, 1999). In addition, budgets have been delegated down to 
individual schools, making each school responsible for managing its own resources. 
The effect of these policy changes was to create a market-based system of “competitive 
assortative mating” (Room and Britton, 2006a). This describes a reciprocal form of 
competition where parents wish to send their children to the best-rated schools, while 
schools attempt to attract those pupils who bring with them the best net profit. Schools 
are encouraged to recruit children whose contribution in terms of state funding meets, at a 
minimum, the expense of educating them. These are the middle-class children, who tend 
to perform better at school (thereby boosting the school’s league table ranking) and are 
less likely to be expensive ‘problem children’ (Jordan, 1996) who bring with them no 
more funding than other children. This social divide is aggravated by the greater ability of 
middle-class families to move to a better school’s catchment area. “All parents could 
choose, but some could choose more than others” (Davies, 1999). In addition, working-
class parents are thought by Room and Britton to target these high-rated schools to a 
lesser degree than middle-class parents, perhaps because of placing a lower priority on 
quality of education, or out of a concern that the child would feel out of place surrounded 
by middle-class peers.  
This overall effect of class polarisation is commonly referred to as ‘social exclusion’. 
Perhaps because it refers to such a politically fraught issue, this term has no single 
standard definition. The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Scott and Marshall, 2005) 
identifies three main meanings; in this context, it shall be used in the sense of Room 
(1999), who talks of community-wide disadvantage in areas of social participation and 
integration, as opposed to focusing on a narrow income-based equivalent to the old 
concept of ‘poverty’, considering each household separately. This is closest in meaning to 
Scott and Marshall’s concept of “social rights and [..] the barriers or processes by which 
people are prevented from exercising these”, the social right in question being the right to 
a good education, in this instance. 
2.2 Existing research 
Previous work by Room and Britton (2006a) has investigated this market-based system 
by considering the interactions between institutional and household strategies. They take 
a quantitative system dynamics approach to the problem by modelling “runaway loops” 
in the system using differential equations. This involves identifying all influences 
amongst the system’s attributes, and finding those subsystems where the direction of 
influence feeds back on itself in a self-reinforcing loop. These are the areas of interest to 
them. Their model shows how an initial equity state of two schools with equal numbers of 
pupils can easily be unbalanced if one school is perceived to be better than the other, 
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leading inexorably to an “inequity state” where the better school excels at the expense of 
the other one, and a class polarisation emerges. 
Room and Britton adapt Schelling’s (1978) classic racial segregation model of “tolerance 
schedules” that describe willingness to live in an area depending on the ratio of black to 
white neighbours, to “preference schedules” that indicate parents’ preference for schools 
with a particular fraction of middle-class children. This preference is taken to be more 
pronounced in middle-class families for a variety of possible reasons, as discussed in 
section 2.1. 
The study considered two types of school strategy: either the school allocates places on a 
social class-blind basis, or it gives preference to middle-class children. The latter is the 
strategy believed to be encouraged by the Baker reforms. Room and Britton found that it 
tended to produce the class polarisation effect more rapidly and pronouncedly. 
Parental strategies were also two-fold in the study. This took the form of varying the 
strength of parents’ preference for middle-class schools (for parents from both classes). 
The model’s key finding concerns the interaction of these two strategies: those of the 
schools and those of the parents. When both parental preference for middle-class schools, 
and school preference for middle-class parents were strong, as in the current socio-
political climate, only a small increase or decrease in a school’s reputation led to the 
polarised inequity state with great likelihood and stability. If, however, only one of those 
conditions held, the other had to be very pronounced in order to achieve even a partial 
polarisation. A way of interpreting these results is to view the development of these 
strategies as a co-evolutionary process; to understand this, we must first visit the domain 
of complex systems. 
2.3 Complex systems 
Flake (1998) considers a system to be ‘complex’ if it consists of individual components 
whose interactions give rise to new, ‘emergent’ properties of the system as a whole that 
cannot be ascribed to the components themselves. Could the market-based school system 
be a complex system? Room and Britton (2006a) do not explicitly argue that it is as they 
do not use this terminology, but present some strong arguments in their paper that support 
this hypothesis. The class polarisation effect that can be observed in the system is 
presented as an emergent property: despite the simplicity inherent in the parents’ and 
schools’ actions, the cumulative effect of their interactions would “hardly have been 
possible” to foresee. In a complex system, it is impossible to make global inferences 
based purely on data about local choices (Albin, 1998).  
But more than this, Room and Briton investigate an attribute often ascribed to complex 
systems: self-organisation. A self-organising system is one whose elements can 
“spontaneously” organise themselves into new patterns and behaviours that were not 
designed by any individual (Mitleton-Kelly, 1997). They hypothesise that class 
polarisation was already present in the system to some degree before the Baker reforms, 
but that the reforms then acted as the necessary trigger for self-organisation to exacerbate 
it, drawing a parallel to “control variables” in a complex system that determine whether 
self-organisation can occur. 
Finally, the mathematical model they construct is a non-linear set of equations for 
modelling system dynamics. Nonlinear dynamics form the foundation of complex 
systems, and especially complex adaptive systems (Albin, 1998), which we shall examine 
next. 
Complex adaptive systems (CAS hereafter) are complex systems whose components, or 
actors, are reactive: they can adapt to a changing environment (Albin, 1998). We could 
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say that our system is a CAS in which each actor, for example head teachers as the 
representatives of schools, and parents as the representatives of their households, adapts 
to an environment that consists of current legislation and government policies regarding 
school choice, as well as the responses of all the other actors.  
All the actors’ strategies could be said to be ‘co-evolving’ with each other. Here complex 
systems borrow a term from biology that some biologists feel is over-used even in the 
field of biology itself (e.g. Janzen, 1980), having become a synonym for ‘interaction’ and 
‘symbiosis’. It seems appropriate because there is a true evolutionary response in one 
population (e.g. head teachers) to a trait of the other (parents), followed by a response by 
the parents of adapting their own strategy again, and so on, rather than a mere adaptation 
of actors to their environment. (‘Evolutionary’ is used here to refer to an evolving 
strategy, much like in the field of genetic algorithms). Again, Room and Britton (2006a) 
do not explicitly use the term ‘co-evolution’, but explain that, as well as institutions 
(schools) shaping the fate of households through social exclusion, “households 
themselves pursue strategies vis-à-vis these various institutions: shaping them, resisting 
them, bypassing them, extracting benefit from their operations.” 
2.3.1 Complex systems in sociology 
The status of the market system as a CAS can, however, be contested, depending on 
which definition of a CAS one uses. Vidgen and Wang (2004) view non-linearity as 
involving a series of positive feedbacks that can potentially push the system far along a 
trajectory. So far, their definition is in correspondence with our system moving towards 
class polarisation. However, the trajectory they mean is one that moves away from 
equilibrium, whereas Room and Britton’s model is clearly pushed towards an 
equilibrium; that of the ‘inequity state’. They draw on literature that emphasises 
complexity as taking place on “the edge of chaos”, a region in which the long-term 
trajectory of the system is fundamentally unpredictable. However, we have satisfactorily 
established that the school market system meets a definition of a CAS, even if it does not 
match everyone’s. 
Other researchers question whether it is appropriate to use the generic concept of CAS in 
a social system, as the social sciences may differ considerably from ‘hard’ sciences like 
physics. Vidgen and Wang (2004) warn that the application of terminology should be 
done in the sense of making a metaphor or an analogy, rather than assuming that proofs 
from mathematics and physics translate directly. Mitleton-Kelly (1997) agrees, suggesting 
that generic CAS theory is a useful starting point for the study of complex social systems, 
but that it will need to be adapted. Albin (1998) believes that it is acceptable to view a 
social system as a CAS, provided the researcher is aware that the interactions are taking 
place between conscious beings. The nature of human consciousness is outside the scope 
of this project, but it is worth bearing in mind that it may affect the validity of parallels 
drawn with generic CAS. 
Perhaps a more important question than whether a social system is a CAS is whether it is 
useful to categorise it as a complex system. 
McIntyre (1998) questions the validity of the entire concept of complex systems. He 
proposes that what we perceive as complexity is not truly due to the real nature of the 
system, but rather stems from our own inability to comprehend the world around us at a 
deeper level. It cannot be denied that there are limits to human knowledge and 
understanding. But if complex systems really are just an artefact of these limits, then 
perhaps they are just as useful a concept to us as if they were a ‘real’ phenomenon, 
because we can still use them as a way of furthering our understanding. They could be 
viewed as a ‘crutch’ on our path to understanding this new level of existence, much like 
the manner in which children are presented with simplified theories of physics at school.  
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Albin (1998), however, is concerned about the opposite possibility: that we might not be 
able to perceive the complexity inherent in social and economic systems, and will 
therefore assume that it is not present. He emphasises the importance of modelling such 
systems through a less complex “surrogate” system, in order to build our understanding 
of what we cannot represent directly. Similarly, although arguing from a different starting 
point, McIntyre suggests that the usefulness in labelling a system as ‘complex’ is to 
recognise that our explanation of it is lacking, and so to attempt to find a simpler one, 
which is just as valid.  
Vicsek (2002) sees the importance of complexity theory as our realisation that “the laws 
of the whole cannot be deduced by digging into the details”. We shall return to this point 
later when we consider the motivation for an agent-based model of the system, which will 
simulate this emergence of properties of the whole from the interactions of its parts 
without using deduction to derive them. Gilbert (2004) suggests that nearly all interesting 
features of human societies may be emergent, due to the many non-linear interactions 
people engage in. 
2.4 Social simulations 
Now that we have decided to view the market-based school system as a complex system, 
the motivation for this project becomes clear: to develop a more sophisticated model than 
the original differential equations, and to use it to investigate the underlying processes of 
emergence and co-evolution in the system. A computer simulation seems ideally suited to 
this purpose. It can be executed under various conditions of interest, producing results not 
only on the eventual outcome but also concerning the internal processes and trajectories. 
In contrast, Room and Britton’s earlier model was analysed structurally in order to draw 
conclusions about its equilibria. 
Most social simulation researchers adopt Ostrom’s suggestion (1988) that computer 
simulation is a “third way” of doing research, supplementing the existing techniques of 
verbal argumentation and formal representation through equations (e.g. Gilbert and Terna, 
2000). This new “symbol system” is more tractable than mathematical modelling, and 
more rigorous, albeit less refined, than natural language. Hypotheses about processes can 
be examined experimentally, and emergence can be observed directly (Brenner and 
Werker, 2006). This is especially useful when natural or even laboratory experiments 
cannot be carried out, such as in matters of social policy, 
To model a “target” system, an abstraction of it must be obtained, preferably motivated by 
theory (Gilbert and Terna, 2000), although a valid use of simulation is also as a “thought 
experiment” that explores a particular abstraction. We shall use Room and Britton’s 
model (2006a; 2006b) and related theories as a basis for our abstraction. Any reasonably 
complicated system probably has an infinite number of possible models, but some are 
more appropriate than others, depending on the research aim (Gulyás, 2005; Gilbert and 
Doran, 1994). Since our goal is to build on their work, aiming foremost towards greater 
understanding but perhaps also towards prediction, their model is the best starting point 
for ours. This model also has the advantage of being very simple, so that we need only 
add complicating features if they are genuinely needed, rather than inadvertently 
designing a model with unnecessary components from the beginning. 
We should consider that prediction may be too high an aim. Gilbert (1995) argues that the 
assumption that the best test of a theory is that it predicts successfully is not appropriate 
for non-linear systems, because even once their behaviour is understood, it is still 
impossible to predict. Batten (2000, p.259) does not see prediction as the primary purpose 
of simulation; he says that “inability to predict can be soothed by a growing ability to 
adapt and coevolve harmoniously – just like we find in nature”. There is also concern 
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stemming from the debate of whether sociology is a science; if it is not, then it may be 
asserted that it should not attempt prediction (Henshel, 1982). Henshel also references the 
long-standing position that social forecasting is “immoral” because it removes people’s 
motivation to try to control their own destiny. However, Room and Britton (2006a) hold 
that it would not have been possible to predict the effects of the Baker reforms without 
modelling the processes, and social policy is clearly an important area in which accurate 
predictions can lead towards better decisions. 
It is commonly thought that the aim of a social simulation model should be either towards 
prediction, or towards understanding (e.g. Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p.4). There is 
some methodological conflict in aiming towards both; Gulyás (2005) argues that 
predictive models require as much detail as possible to increase accuracy, while models 
aiming towards understanding, so-called “thought experiments”, might try to be more 
general. In addition, prediction requires a high degree of quantitative validation against 
empirical data, while thought experiments allow for qualitative validation. However, we 
could argue that the model will be more thoroughly validated if both forms of validation 
are used, so there is no real conflict. It might also be useful to have the rigour demanded 
by prediction imposed on us, to encourage precision of thought (Henshel, 1982).  
Social simulations are a comparatively new field of interest, compared to, for example, 
simulations in economics or the natural sciences. When simulation technology was first 
developed in the 1950s, it was not sophisticated enough to model realistic human 
societies. Instead, the power of computers was simply harnessed directly to solve 
mathematical models (Conte et al., 1998). Interest from social scientists faded and the 
field was quiet for around 25 years (Mosler, 2000). Recent developments in distributed 
artificial intelligence now overcome this barrier, introducing the concept of intelligent 
‘agents’ who can stand in for humans in simulations (Gilbert and Doran, 1994, p. vii). 
Gilbert and Terna (2000) suggest that this need for especially realistic models is due to 
the main value of simulation for social scientists lying in theory development, rather than 
prediction, so the underlying mechanics are often more important than the eventual 
outcome. 
2.4.1 Macrosimulation 
The most basic type of social simulation is macrosimulation, which was developed in the 
‘60s. It typically uses sets of differential equations to predict demographic variables based 
on feedback processes (Macy and Willer, 2002). This is essentially what Room and 
Britton’s systems dynamics model does. As a top-down approach, macrosimulation is 
useful for gaining an appreciation of the overall principles at work, but to gain a deeper 
understanding, it is useful to examine the smaller units behind the macro effects using a 
bottom-up approach such as microsimulation. 
2.4.2 Microsimulation and Markov processes 
Microsimulation was developed in the ‘70s for analysing the possible effects of social 
policy changes on a society (Gilbert, 1995). In other words, it is aimed towards 
prediction, which ties in with Gilbert and Terna’s theory that prediction is all that was 
feasible in early simulations. A microsimulation starts with a snapshot of sample 
population data from a certain point in time, and then iteratively simulates the effect of 
one year passing, examining each individual in turn. Demographic probabilities are used, 
e.g. the likelihood of a man aged 70-80 dying in any given year. 
Although a population-wide effect (for example, increased demand on state pension 
funds) is built up from individual circumstances, this effect should not be termed 
emergence, because it simply consists of aggregate data, and its origin can therefore be 
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deduced logically (e.g. if pensioners live longer, more people will be drawing on the state 
pension fund). In fact, microsimulation does not represent a very significant advance on 
macrosimulation as it is still oriented towards forecasting macro effects, although it does 
allow policies to be considered that are aimed at altering individual behaviour (Macy and 
Willer, 2002). Gulyás (2005) calls microsimulation the “middle step” between 
macrosimulation and agent-based simulation.  
He also identifies another type of model, Markov processes, which work on the macro 
level but incorporate stochastic elements like microsimulation does, and are therefore also 
closer to agent-based modelling than macrosimulation. However, they are only practical 
for systems with low complexity, and are therefore not suitable for representing the 
school market system; furthermore, we wish to examine the micro-macro link, as 
discussed later (see section 2.5.2).  
The major drawback of the microsimulation approach, aside from its simplicity (which 
could also be considered a virtue, as discussed later) is that it considers each individual in 
complete isolation, without interaction; nor, like macrosimulation, does it allow for 
adaptation. This means that it can give no insight into the underlying processes that 
generated the data. Because of this, microsimulation tends to be used only for prediction, 
not for improving our understanding of a social phenomenon  (Gilbert, 1995). 
2.4.3 Cellular automata (CA) 
Simulations based on CA address our criticism of microsimulation by modelling 
interactions between individuals. Schelling’s racial segregation model (1978) is the 
canonical CA model. The other prominent model is Latané’s much more recent model of 
social impact, which investigates the effects of social influence on attitude changes in a 
society (e.g. Latané, 1996).  
A CA model consists of a grid whose cells each contain an automaton. This grid might be 
a rectangle or, if no edges are desired, a torus; the size and shape of the grid selected can 
influence the results substantially, for example encouraging clustering in a corner. Each 
automaton has a state: a race and a “racial tolerance” in the case of Schelling’s model. It 
changes state in discrete time based on very simple, homogeneous rules concerning the 
states of neighbouring cells and its own previous state (Hegselmann and Flache, 1998). 
E.g. if 70% or more of my neighbours are of another race, I want to move.  
This idea of local interactions producing a macro effect approaches our idea of complex 
systems. Hegselmann and Flache (1998) outline the main advantages of using CA: they 
model the essential aspects of many real life social processes, especially unintended 
macro consequences of individual actions and choices, such as Schelling’s segregation or 
our class polarisation effect. They allow for quantitative explanations and predictions, as 
with traditional types of analysis, but crucially they also enable qualitative analysis. CA 
can even reveal flaws in a theory’s underlying assumptions, by showing the unanticipated 
consequences through the micro-macro relationship. 
Macy and Willer (2002) consider CA to be too rigid for many applications, as no two 
nodes can share the same group of contacts, yet there is no reason that could not occur in 
real life. Similarly, each node must have the same homogeneous pattern of relations, 
although it is possible to adapt CA to use irregular grids that overcome this constraint. 
Cederman (2005) notes that if, for example, a friendship network is being studied, then a 
static grid is too restrictive as well: it should be possible to dynamically alter the structure 
of the grid. 
The primary criticism Gilbert (1995) makes of CA is that they model individual people as 
over-simplistic units. Whilst acknowledging that they can provide valuable insights into 
processes, he feels that it “requires a lot of theoretical imagination to move from patterns 
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of cells on a grid to conclusions about societies”. A richer approach is found in multi-
agent simulations, which endow the automata with cognitive capabilities.  
2.5 Multi-agent simulations (MAS) 
MAS have only been in use for a short time: they were developed in the ‘90s (Sawyer, 
2003). They retain the bottom-up approach of treating the unit of observation as the 
individual, like CA and microsimulation, but model the individual (now termed ‘agent’) 
as a much more sophisticated entity. MAS evolved out of CA modelling, so earlier 
models tended to take place on a CA-like grid with local interactions only: they were 
essentially CA with more intelligent automata. Later models were more likely to break 
away from CA tradition, not necessarily even involving a grid at all (Gulyás, 2005). 
Object-oriented programming was another major influence on the development of MAS, 
providing the concept of self-contained objects with a natural correspondence to real-
world entities. Artificial Intelligence provided the next essential ‘ingredient’ of endowing 
each object with intelligence, but instead of the focus being on each individual’s 
intelligence, MAS is interested in the interactions between intelligent agents (Sawyer, 
2003). An intermediate field, Distributed Artificial Intelligence, incorporated this shift 
towards interactions, but the final step towards MAS was to decentralise control and give 
each agent autonomy (ibid). Decentralised control is linked to the idea of self-organising 
complex systems. Autonomy means that the agent can refuse to perform tasks requested 
of it (or negotiate the conditions). This is the main characteristic that differentiates agents 
from objects, which must carry out any task asked of them. 
2.5.1 What are MAS? 
Not every multi-agent system is a simulation, but a survey of multi-agents systems as a 
whole, which cover applications as broad as industrial process control, combinatorial 
auctions and network routing (Sawyer, 2003) is out of the scope of this review. Other 
types of multi-agent system tend to have producing the system as a goal, whereas MAS 
wish to analyse the system. MAS themselves cover a large range of application domains, 
not just social simulation: economies, biological populations, computer or road traffic 
networks and games, for example (Luck et al., 2004). 
Historically, there has been much disagreement on what exactly constitutes an ‘agent’; 
each paper presents its own list of necessary characteristics. Davidsson (2000) captures 
the fundamental problem when he talks of a “continuum” of agents; what Gulyás (2005) 
says “ranges from ordinary object tokens to full-fledged AI-type agents”. Bonabeau 
(2002) takes the extreme view of labelling even differential equations as agents because 
each describes “the dynamics of one of the system’s constituent units”, but this definition 
seems to cover so many things that it is no longer useful. For the purposes of this project, 
we shall define agents as objects, situated in some environment they are able to sense, 
that exhibit adaptive, autonomous, goal-directed behaviour and can communicate with 
other agents through some predefined communication language. They may or may not be 
mobile entities that are assigned a specific location in the environment, as long as they are 
situated somewhere in an environment, rather than being a ‘disembodied intelligence’ like 
an expert system (Jennings et al., 1998). ‘Mobility’ refers here to moving around in space 
within the simulated environment, rather than on a physical network like the Internet. 
Goal-directed behaviour (often termed ‘proactive’) refers to agents taking the initiative to 
satisfy their design objectives. This could be a head teacher starting a marketing 
campaign, or a household deciding to move to another catchment area. To be effectively 
goal-directed, an agent must also be reactive and adaptive; it cannot rely on 
environmental conditions remaining static, allowing it to blindly follow a single plan 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
9 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p.25). Wooldridge also warns that an agent should not be too reactive, 
or it will dither back and forth between plans as minor changes come and go in the 
environment, never accomplishing anything. This will not be as difficult a problem for 
our system as it is for ones with more continuous environments, as changes are expected 
to happen infrequently: for example, new data about school rankings will only be 
provided once a year. Finally, he notes that communication between agents should not 
simply take the form of exchanging data. There should be a social element to it, such as 
cooperation or negotiation. Our model will probably not extend very far in this direction, 
as the agents are not striving to complete tasks, so the need for interaction is less than in 
many MAS. The model may, however, consider social influence, which would certainly 
require social communication. 
This definition puts us somewhere in the middle of the continuum of agents; while purely 
reactive objects would be too simplistic, we must avoid Gilbert and Doran’s “trap of 
verisimilitude” (2005, p.12) whereby unnecessary sophistication is added to the model 
purely because it seems plausible, rather than being required. Most simulation researchers 
are in agreement that it is vital to give a model exactly the level of complexity required, 
and no more (e.g. Brenner and Werker, 2006; Macy and Willer, 2002) as superfluous 
detail (by definition) does not help, and may confuse. (Gulyás notes that a minority of 
researchers only consider simplicity necessary because better MAS tools have not yet 
been developed; whatever the reason, simplicity is seen as desirable at present.) It seems 
unnecessary to give our agents advanced AI planning capabilities; the lengthiest plan our 
model would consider is that a household might choose to relocate in order to change 
catchment area, but we will simply represent this as a choice, followed by a probability 
that the action is carried out successfully. However, it is also important not to over-
simplify the agents, invalidating the modelled dynamics’ realism, although Macy and 
Willer (2002) call on researchers to resist pressure to build realistic models if they would 
become as difficult to interpret as the target system itself. 
In modelling these agents, a paradigm must be chosen for encoding their intelligence. The 
paradigm chosen should depend on the complexity of the agent. Purely reactive agents 
tend to use production rule systems with rules of the form ‘if <condition> then <action>’, 
which fire upon receiving the necessary environmental input (Gilbert and Terna, 2000). 
This may be the most common type of agent used in the social sciences (Cederman, 
2005). At the opposite end of the continuum, ‘cognitive’ agents use more advanced forms 
of intelligence. They contain an internal representation of the environment, which they 
use to construct plans of how to achieve their goals (Sawyer, 2003). This is commonly 
done via the BDI (belief-desire-intention) architecture. Such complexity is not necessary 
for this project – since the desires of the agents are one-dimensional; we do not need to 
model cognition itself realistically; and long plans of action are not appropriate for a 
simple school choice – rather, it is the dynamic interactions of choices that need to be 
concentrated on. This could be represented adequately by a production system. 
Alternative possibilities for internal agent representations are considered in section 2.5.6. 
2.5.2 Why use MAS? 
MAS excels in models in which many heterogeneous agents interact, each perhaps 
behaving somewhat differently, creating dynamic, emergent system-wide effects. This 
makes it ideally suited to social sciences research (Davidsson, 2000). It suits the recently 
popular view that human societies are complex systems, non-linear and self-organising, 
much like flocks of birds, as it may be more useful to model such dynamics bottom-up 
through local interactions (Tesfatsion, 2003; Vicsek, 2002). Agents can adapt both at the 
individual and at the population level. The population level adaptation is evolutionary, 
through selection, social influence and so forth (Macy and Willer, 2002). MAS is also the 
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simulation technique in the best position to make use of the wealth of qualitative studies 
of social processes in the social sciences, namely when designing individual agent 
behaviour (Moss and Edmonds, 2005a).  
Many MAS researchers are interested in the potential of MAS for investigating the two-
way micro-macro link in emergence. It comes into play when simulating human societies, 
because unlike, for example, ants, humans can recognise and reason about institutions, 
and this “second-order emergence” may be crucial in understanding human societies 
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p.11). For example, a human being’s attitudes and beliefs 
might be affected by an emergent norm (Gilbert and Conte, 1995, p.11). Earlier forms of 
simulation were only able to investigate one-way emergence such as “vertical” 
emergence where, for example, microbehaviour generated macrophenomena. Similarly, 
“horizontal” emergence refers to spontaneous changes on the same level of scale in a 
model, what we might term co-evolution in the context of CAS. However, to study 
emergence comprehensively, “circular” emergence that cycles between micro and macro 
levels must be considered (Conte et al., 2001).  
In economics, there exists the notion of the ‘representative agent’, which is a single entity 
that stands for every individual in the economy; the idea is that individual differences are 
averaged out in a large dataset anyway. This notion is used in the systems dynamics 
approach taken by Room and Britton and works well for forecasting aggregate data, but 
can only facilitate limited understanding of the underlying processes. Albin (1998, p.22) 
sees two possible routes to take: either introduce several heterogeneous agents, or create 
several homogeneous agents that are copies of the representative agent, but do not give 
them all the same data. Heterogeneity and bounded rationality (limiting agents’ 
knowledge) are both central tenets of MAS. 
Heterogeneity allows the distribution of behaviour to be analysed, rather than working 
immediately with the averaged data (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999). Equation-based models 
can take this aggregate data to great detail, for example assigning a distribution of values 
for a property to the representative agent (Sawyer, 2003), but it is nonetheless aggregate 
data that does not allow individual behaviour to be analysed. This makes methodologies 
like MAS that support heterogeneity especially valuable for social simulations; physical 
systems tend to have more homogeneous components (Gilbert, 2004).  
The problem with perfect rationality, which is traditionally used in the social sciences, is 
two-fold, as first challenged by Herbert Simon. It is unrealistic to assume every agent will 
have all available knowledge, just as it is unrealistic to assume it has infinite time and 
resources at hand to find the mathematically optimal solution from the information it has 
(Albin, 1998, p.23).  
Bounded rationality addresses these problems by limiting each agent’s knowledge and 
processing capability so that the agent seeks only an approximately optimal solution. This 
is more realistic, at least in social domains, because people are often more interested in 
finding merely an acceptable solution rather than expending a lot of effort on finding the 
optimal one (Albin, 1998, p. 67; Bowe et al., 1994). If a person does try to be ‘rational’ 
and find the optimal solution, they are unlikely to truly possess all the pertinent 
information or necessary foresight (Axelrod, 1997; Fowler and Smirnov, 2005). While 
bounded rationality may sometimes underestimate the abilities of agents in the target 
system, it is likely to be a closer fit than perfect rationality, argues Makowsky (2006), 
although he adds that the real test lies in whether the model can be validated by empirical 
data. Validation is especially important for boundedly rational models because there are 
typically many possible ways of being less rational, but only one way of being perfectly 
rational (Gulyás, 2005). 
Some researchers say that perfect rationality can cope with exponentially difficult 
computations, while bounded rationality can go no higher than computations of 
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polynomial complexity (Axtell, 1999). The justification for this seemingly arbitrary 
partitioning is, however, questionable – Board (1994) explains it is due to the common 
definition of tractable algorithms in computer science as being bounded by polynomial 
time, but does not examine how this applies to human brains. However, agent-based 
models are easily able to enforce this constraint, as they directly implement the decision-
making algorithm (Gulyás, 2005).  
Axelrod (1997) does not believe that anyone thinks that perfect rationality is realistic; he 
thinks that its main value lies in allowing agents to use deduction. He considers the main 
alternative to perfect rationality to be adaptive strategies, rather than aiming for 
optimisation. Adaptation in this sense could involve individual learning or take place at 
the macro level through ‘survival of the fittest’, like genetic algorithms (see section 
2.5.6). The outcome of these interactive processes of adaptation is difficult to deduce 
formally, and so simulation is used.  
Researchers often incorporate bounded rationality into their models by limiting agents’ 
interactions locally, like CA do. There are many variations on this concept to make it 
more representative of real social interactions. For example, Mosler (2004) constructed a 
social influence simulation to examine the spread of environmentally responsible 
behaviour in a society; to incorporate realism, he limited interactions between agents to a 
set number of friends and a single stranger in each time step. In a perfectly rational 
model, the agents would have been fully connected and therefore able to consider the 
distribution of opinions throughout the population before deciding whether it was worth 
their while to conserve environmental resources. Mark (1998, cited in Macy and Willer, 
2002) instead limited interactions by giving a higher probability to social interactions 
between agents with greater cultural similarity. Our model could simplify cultural 
similarity to be class-based, as it is likely that people of the same social class would mix 
outside their immediate pool of neighbours but nevertheless more often with people in the 
same circumstances. We could reduce the probability of interaction with distance as well, 
to take account of different catchment areas being dominated by different classes, so if a 
working-class family were in a middle-class area, their interactions would be more likely 
to cross class boundaries. Limiting agents’ information like this causes each to develop a 
“subjective reality” as they assume that the sample of data made available to them is 
representative of the whole (Makowsky, 2006). This effect is especially suited to 
Makowsky’s simulation of urban crime, but may well apply on a more general level to 
societies as well. 
Another approach limits agents’ knowledge more directly by placing a limit on their 
memory, varying it between agents to create heterogeneity as well (Tesfatsion, 2003). 
Fowler and Smirnov (2005) use a memory parameter in their simulation of elections to 
determine how new information is interpreted depending on past information on voter 
preferences and turnout. 
Herbert Simon also suggested limiting computational accuracy, not just ability 
(Makowsky, 2006), but this does not seem appropriate for our model, in which the 
calculations performed by agents are not especially difficult, and so they would not be 
expected to make mistakes in real life. 
Moss and Edmonds (2005a) identify a further advantage of MAS: it represents a 
compromise for sociologists who are critical of generalising from case studies, as varying 
the initial conditions of the simulation can generate a large amount of different data, and 
yet qualitative analysis is still possible, through examining the behaviour of individual 
agents.  
Mosler (2004) admits that there is a large gap between a MAS and its target systems, but 
argues that there is no other alternative. If we want improve our understanding of 
fundamental social processes, we must build simplified, bottom-up models of them, and 
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MAS possesses the greatest realism out of all the techniques available to social scientists. 
Starting from a world that closely resembles the target world, MAS directly “grows” the 
simulated phenomenon, showing that we know how it was generated (Epstein and Axtell, 
1996). It provides a “bridge” between the micro and the macro levels (Macy and Willer, 
2002). 
2.5.3 MAS vs Equation-Based Modelling (EBM) 
The differences between MAS and EBM are of particular interest to this project, since we 
are proposing to improve upon an EBM with a MAS. Both support the exploration of 
system dynamics, but MAS allow the mechanics of the micro-macro relationship to be 
studied, as well as the trajectories taken towards equilibira, not just the equilibria 
themselves (Batten, 2000, p.21). MAS are the more intuitive tool: “many social scientists 
find [equations] either impenetrable or incredible as descriptions of social reality” 
(Tesfatsion, 2003). 
Parunak et al. (1998) compare these two types of model. They argue that often, an agent-
based model of policy implications can seem more natural, and even a simple MAS can 
exhibit surprisingly illuminating behaviour. They consider the main differences between 
agents and equations to be two-fold.  
Firstly, a set of equations is focused on modelling relationships between observables, 
while an agent-based model explicitly models behaviour, so that any relationships 
between observables that emerge are the output of the model, not its input. This means 
that if we can build agents with behaviours that generate the same end effect as Room and 
Britton’s model, we can examine how the dynamics of the interacting behaviours work to 
produce the cumulative effect, such as a trajectory towards equilibrium. It is easier to run 
direct ‘what-if’ experiments by manipulating the agents’ behaviour directly, and 
consequently easier to draw policy implications from the results of the experiments, as 
the causal behaviour will be known. (A drawback of this is that the modelling of 
behaviour is more complex, and therefore more error-prone.) 
Secondly, equations tend to work with system-level observables rather than individual 
attributes. A multi-agent model would allow for boundedly rational heterogeneous agents 
with different attributes, strategies, and information, which is not possible in a set of 
mathematical equations (Axtell, 1999). Although it could be argued that individual 
differences are effectively averaged out when the outcome is analysed, it would be 
interesting to be able to examine the behaviour of individual agents in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the process behind the social exclusion effect. 
Parunak et al. also point out that MAS are capable of expressing much more complex 
situations than EBM. This could be said to be a question of scalability: it is easy to inject 
another agent into a simulation – no new code need be written – but adding another 
variable to an equation increases the analytic tractability, and decreases transparency. The 
same principle applies to adding new behaviours (Gilbert and Conte, 1995). Room and 
Britton had to constrain their model to only consider two schools because of this, and so 
one use of a MAS implementation would be to examine the consequences of involving 
additional schools. Having multiple schools could allow us to consider multiple 
catchment areas, and would allow the option parents hold of moving house to another 
catchment area, currently included as one of the contributing factors to middle-class 
parents’ higher preference for the middle-class oriented schools, to be included explicitly 
as a behaviour that middle-class parents are more likely to carry out. Not being confined 
to easily manipulated symbols widens the options considerably. Axtell (1999) adds that 
physical or social networks, such as might be needed to represent catchment areas and 
social influence in our model, are difficult to incorporate into an EBM. 
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On the other hand, the greater elaboration of MAS means that drawing conclusions is 
more technically demanding, as rigorous statistical tests must be applied (Gilbert and 
Doran, 1994, p.3). Equations also have the advantage of allowing provable mathematical 
conclusions to be derived about, for example, the stability of the equilibria (Room and 
Britton, 2006a). Gilbert also notes that since MAS typically have a larger number of 
parameters and underlying assumptions than EBM, difficulties can be encountered in 
finding empirical data to justify them, as well as in the computational load of performing 
a sweep of the entire parameter space (see section 2.6). Of course, once these assumptions 
have been justified, the theory may be better understood as a result. A related risk is that 
verification and validation can be a lengthy process, as they must proceed experimentally 
rather than constructing a mathematical proof, as for an EBM. 
Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999) address some other practical issues. MAS can be designed in 
a modular fashion, so that differing theories can easily be compared by changing one part 
of the model without needing to modify the others. These subsystems also provide an 
intuitive way of dealing with concurrent processes. Bonabeau (2002) adds that MAS 
enable a more sophisticated form of stochasticity, while an equation must content itself 
with the addition of a “noise term”.  
Edwards et al. (2003) compare a MAS and an EBM implementation of a particular 
theory, concluding that the greater power of MAS is not always necessary. If the global 
behaviour is the same as with the aggregate EBM, then the shorter computation times, 
and the useful insights offered merely by examining the structure of an equation before it 
has even been run on data, indicate that EBM should be used. This is arguable (although 
it is true that the value of EBM should not be minimised) because the understanding 
gained from seeing how micro-behaviour generates macro effects can be valuable. MAS 
is “the canonical approach to modeling emergent phenomena” (Bonabeau, 2002). One 
could also say that it is actually desirable for a MAS to generate the same macro effects 
as an EBM because that is a form of model-to-model validation (see section 2.6).  
Batten (2000, p.249) puts forward that “economic development depends critically on 
path-dependent principles of self-organisation and coevolution, unfamiliar processes that 
have remained largely untouched by traditional analytical tools”. This is precisely the 
motivation for re-implementing Room and Britton’s EBM as a MAS. 
2.5.4 Issues in using MAS 
One issue to address is how to represent the target environment in the simulation. It does 
not necessarily need to be spatial, giving each agent a location, although in our case we 
will need, at a minimum, a crude spatial division according to catchment area. The 
environment will need to be given an extent to accomplish this, specifying its size, 
boundaries and perhaps its shape (Odell et al., 2003). Each square in the grid could be 
related to others through a direction (e.g. ‘diagonal’) rather than an absolute address; this 
kind of relationship is useful if agent interactions are based on proximity (Odell et al., 
2003). An alternative to a spatial network of agents is a social network that specifies 
possible interaction partners independent of location (Gilbert, 2004). This network may 
have relational rather than absolute links, so that one agent is related to another agent, 
which in turn is related to several others – these links could be followed for a set depth. 
Our model could use both a physical and a social network if social influence or other 
relationship-dependent forms of interaction are to be modelled.  
In a deterministic environment, the next state of the environment is uniquely determined 
by the current state and the actions selected by the agents (Odell et al., 2003). This 
model’s environment will be non-deterministic because of the stochastic elements it will 
contain. But even if the environment were deterministic, it would still not be predictable 
or controllable by any one agent, because the agents have no control over, or 
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foreknowledge of each other’s actions (including whether their own actions will have the 
desired effect).  
The environment is often modelled as another object with attributes like time and other 
global data, and possibly a buffer for messages (e.g. Gilbert, 2004; Odell et al., 2003) 
although if a MAS framework were used, it would handle message-passing. However it is 
represented, it should be modelled explicitly, even though agents are not external to it: 
they are “embodied” in it (Helleboogh et al, 2007). Forcing agents to communicate via an 
abstraction like the environment (for example, by requesting a list of neighbours, or by 
posting messages on a shared noticeboard) rather than directly simplifies the design 
(Gilbert, 2004). The simulated target environment should always be decoupled from the 
simulation environment (i.e. the infrastructure running the simulation) as another 
principle of good design (Helleboogh et al, 2007). 
An interesting question is whether to have a single centralised environment, or an 
environment for each region (here, catchment area) that oversees all the environmental 
processing that takes place within its bounds (Odell et al., 2003). The centralised 
environmental design is probably more suited to our model because there will be 
significant communication and movement between boundaries. 
As well as the representation of the environment, the representation of emergence should 
be considered. Conte et al. (2001) present a symposium where a number of modellers 
argue their case. Moss’ position is that only dynamic system properties should be 
modelled indirectly through emergence; static properties should be explicitly built in. He 
also argues that if the purpose of the model is to show interaction with norms or other 
global properties, as opposed to showing how such properties are generated in the first 
place, then a top-down approach of specifying these global properties explicitly is most 
suitable. Sawyer argues more strongly that the top-down approach is often necessary, not 
just most appropriate, by drawing on sociological theory which suggests that the 
assumption that macrosocial entities do not truly exist in their own right has limited 
explanatory power. Regardless of whether they do exist, it can be useful to ‘pretend’ that 
they do. Edmonds disagrees, saying that it is “more profitable” to take a bottom-up 
approach when first building understanding, and that top-down models can then follow 
once it is clearer what they should be modelling. This is what Sawyer denounces 
elsewhere (2003) as not modelling true emergence but rather only partial, horizontal 
emergence. Conte prefers an approach that mirrors real life, where an emergent 
phenomenon first appears naturally, and must then be modelled explicitly in order to 
investigate the two-way interactions between it and the micro-level. Sawyer (2003) later 
proposes the same idea, explaining that the model would need to be capable of 
dynamically restructuring itself at run-time in order to represent the newly emerged 
macro phenomena. Such a simulation platform has not yet been developed, and could 
pose significant difficulties. Modelling second-order emergence convincingly is generally 
held to be an unsolved problem in MAS (e.g. Sawyer, 2003; Gilbert, 1995). 
Less controversial is the idea that macro phenomena can affect individual agents even if 
they have no internal representation of them, as long as they are context-aware (Sawyer, 
2003). However, some researchers (e.g. Cederman, 2005) do disagree, and see this as an 
outstanding issue in the MAS community: that richer cognitive models need to be 
developed for agents. 
2.5.5 Event scheduling 
MAS shares similarities with discrete event simulation (DES). In DES, a list of scheduled 
events advance the state of the system, depending on its previous state. An event may 
modify the event list itself. A DES may be time-driven in discrete steps, or alternatively, 
if the simulation is not to be monitored in real-time by humans, it can be event-driven, 
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which effectively ‘fast-forwards’ to the next scheduled event on the basis that we know 
nothing will happen in between (Davidsson, 2000). The hybrid approach combines 
continuous and discrete phases (Helleboogh et al, 2007). It seems that a school 
admissions simulation could benefit from a discrete or hybrid approach, as it would be 
inefficient to simulate every time step when most – perhaps all – of the activity will be 
concentrated around the time when applications for places are submitted. Hegselmann 
and Flache (1998) warn that discretisation can produce modelling artefacts if the target 
environment is continuous, but this does not seem to be a danger for our model. 
Davidsson expresses scepticism that MAS is particularly suited to event-based 
simulation, arguing that there would need to be a central coordinator to keep track of 
events, which he sees as being contrary to the design principles of MAS; or highly 
synchronised agents, which would impose performance penalties. However, it seems that 
MAS toolkits may provide an acceptable solution, as they provide advanced capabilities 
like parallel discrete event scheduling. In another application domain, with more highly 
autonomous agents, Davidsson’s argument would appear more relevant, but in this case, 
the idea that parents must submit applications for school places at a certain time of year, 
and that head teachers will then process these applications upon receipt, will already 
require a degree of central coordination. There is a direct parallel to this in real life, as the 
Council might send all parents a letter reminding them to apply for a school place. 
However, it could be that having designed an initial prototype simulation for this project, 
Davidsson’s view will need to be revisited if unanticipated problems are encountered with 
event-based simulation. 
While it may be useful to borrow the concept of event-based scheduling from DES, the 
MAS approach still has the advantage over DES for our purposes. It is much more 
scalable than DES, as new agents can easily be added, even dynamically (Davidsson, 
2000). Additionally, a DES modeller is forced to place restrictions on the choices entities 
can make in order to fit them smoothly into the DES framework, although this can be 
overcome by ‘hacks’. It would, therefore, not support the simulation of co-evolving 
strategies well. More generally, it also does not use the agent metaphor that facilitates 
communication with non-programmers. Dubiel and Tsimhoni (2005) show how these 
limitations can be overcome (to a certain degree) by incorporating an agent module into a 
DES. However, their main motivation for this seems to be to allow them to build on 
existing DES models, so it does not provide this project with any reason to pick DES or a 
merging of the two over MAS.  
2.5.6 Other adaptive simulation techniques 
Evolutionary algorithms, such as genetic algorithms (GA), are a natural technique to 
consider for modelling co-evolutionary processes. GA assigns a ‘degree of fitness’ to each 
individual in a society according to some metric. Each individual is represented by a 
string of code that forms a strategy, according to some encoding scheme of possible 
behaviours (Macy and Willer, 2002). In Room and Britton’s model, the parents whose 
children attended the highest-rated schools, and those schools’ head teachers, would be 
the ‘fittest’ individuals, so they would be ‘interbred’ with others of their kind to produce 
new combinations of strategy that might improve on the original ones. In addition, 
random ‘copying errors’ are introduced to provide heterogeneity. Over several 
generations, the overall fitness of the population would increase as it adapted to the new 
socio-political environment (Gilbert and Terna, 2000). This co-evolution of parental 
strategies on the one hand, and head teachers’ on the other, could be expected to lead to 
the same class polarisation indicated by Room and Britton’s model.  
GA are typically used to search for either optimal or likely solutions. If we were 
interested in finding a social policy to optimise social welfare, a global approach could be 
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used where each strategy is aware of every other strategy, and ‘mates’ with them with 
equal probability. This project is instead aimed at understanding the likely (rather than 
optimal) effects of the situation, so it would limit each string’s knowledge and 
interactions locally by placing them in a spatial network, like CA (Macy and Willer, 
2002). 
Another type of adaptive simulation is a neural network, which was used by a recent 
social mobility and inequality simulation (Meraviglia, 1996). This technique, like GA, is 
well suited if strategies need to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Neural network simulations use the metaphor of connections between neurons in the 
brain. They contain many simple neurons that are linked by weighted connections, and 
work together towards the simulation goal in interconnected layers that process the input 
according to their weighting, and then pass it on (Gilbert and Terna, 2000). The neurons 
are capable of adaptive behaviour by means of changing these weightings through the 
application of a “learning rule” (Meraviglia, 1996). This may, for example, take the form 
of “training” the network towards some pre-defined outcome, if the exact process leading 
to an outcome – such as class polarisation – is unknown. However, the process identified 
by the neural network cannot be expected to correspond to the real-world causes. 
While Meraviglia’s findings agree with those obtained through more traditional 
techniques being applied to the data, showing that neural network simulations can work 
for sociological questions, breaking down the school system to networked variables does 
not seem like a very intuitive method to further our understanding of the underlying 
processes. It seems that a MAS, with self-contained agents following rules 
understandable on a high level, is a better match for our purposes. Gilbert and Terna 
(2000) also point out that for both GA and neural networks, a particular level of interest 
has to be set at which to work, for example individual children, households, regions and 
so on, as a single neural network could represent any one of those. If an entire society is 
modelled, then it becomes difficult to give each individual in the society the 
sophistication that an agent in MAS can have.  
Instead, a MAS could provide the scalable agents infrastructure, but not fix the agents’ 
decision module implementation. GA and neural network libraries are available for MAS 
that could be ‘plugged into’ a decision module. This would still not provide a good high-
level view of the strategy being followed like traditional production rules would, but it 
might nevertheless be an elegant solution. However, Moss and Edmonds (2005a) point 
out that not having an intuitive correspondence from the agent implementation to the real 
life equivalents they represent brings a more serious problem with it than losing the 
benefit of intuitive understanding: it also makes it very difficult to validate the model 
qualitatively, as individual behaviour cannot be analysed. Since our model is geared 
towards furthering our understanding of the underlying processes, not just prediction, 
qualitative analysis will be an essential tool towards that end, and so we must look for 
alternatives to GA and neural networks for the agents in this model. 
2.6 Validation and verification of MAS 
Validation and verification are important for any software product, but they are especially 
crucial for simulations in order for their output to be regarded with any seriousness, and it 
is in their output that their usefulness lies (Gulyás, 2005). This is because of the inherent 
difficulty of distinguishing unexpected results from software faults, so the effects of a bug 
could easily be misinterpreted as an emergent phenomenon (David et al., 2002). 
Moss and Edmonds (2005b) allege that “in the social sciences there is typically little or 
no attempt to validate theory”. If this is true, then one purpose of simulation could simply 
be to validate a theory, although Moss and Edmonds point out that if a simulation relies 
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upon a previously unvalidated social theory, it cannot be viewed as validated itself – a 
difficult condition to satisfy if their earlier allegation is correct. 
In the cross-disciplinary field of social simulation, it is important to define what 
‘verification’ and ‘validation’ mean, as computer science and the social sciences attribute 
different meanings to the terms (David et al., 2005). Program verification in the social 
sciences often takes the form of persuasive verbal argumentation (ibid), but we would 
like something more rigorous to vouch for the correctness of our simulation according to 
its specification. At the same time, validation of a social simulation must incorporate the 
interpretative approach of the social sciences to judge how well the simulation represents 
reality (ibid). 
David et al. (2002) divide validation and verification of simulations into static and 
dynamic activities, while most other modellers, e.g. Balci (2003) and Bryson et al. 
(2006), consider only a subset of them, as they do not distinguish between checking the 
simulation against the conceptual model and against the target system.  
1. Static validation is concerned with validating the underlying theories and 
assumptions of the model; Graham Room’s research and that of other sociologists 
covers this. We will simply take note that if the theory is wrong, then our model may 
simply confirm the error (Gilbert and Doran, 1994, p.4), and that the possibility that 
another theory could explain the results equally well, or even better, can never be 
fully eliminated. 
2. Static verification entails checking that the simulation is an accurate representation of 
the conceptual model (which in our case corresponds to the model described by 
Room and Britton); this is akin to checking that an ordinary computer program meets 
its specification in standard software engineering, and to what Balci calls 
“transformational accuracy”.  
3. Dynamic verification checks the simulation outputs against those of the conceptual 
model.  
4. Finally, dynamic validation aims to determine that the simulation outputs are correct 
according to the target system, like Balci’s test of “behavioural or representational 
accuracy”.  
Both the dynamic techniques correspond to testing in software engineering. David et al. 
note that successful validation hinges on successful verification, i.e. if there are severe 
enough errors in the code, the validity of the model must be questioned even if validation 
tests succeed. 
Like David et al., Küppers and Lenhard (2005) think that the three levels involved in 
simulation – the target system, the conceptual model and the simulation itself – have an 
impact on the way simulations should be validated. They identify a common view that 
since simulations are equivalent to theories, they should be validated the same way 
theories are in the social sciences. They disagree, saying that simulations, rather than 
being models, are “models of models” that mediate between theory and reality, and as 
such should be treated differently: as an attempt at imitation of the underlying dynamics 
of the conceptual model. This attempt should be carried out with a “quasi-empirical” 
evolutionary programming approach of refining the model to better fit empirical data: 
since simulations are not direct numerical solutions of theories, they cannot be validated 
by showing that they can be derived from theory. Rather, empirical data must be drawn 
upon.  
Unfortunately, judging the goodness of fit against empirical data is complicated if the 
model contains stochastic elements, although methods of statistical analysis can 
overcome this (Karlsson, 1969). Comparing simulation results with empirical data also 
requires a greater degree of rigour when specifying parameters: rather than only the signs 
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and relative magnitudes of parameter values being important, when “calibrating” the 
model to fit empirical data, the parameter values must be tuned exactly to correspond 
with historical data (Makowsky, 2006). Finding such exact parameter values may be too 
demanding a task for this project; they would perhaps require specific field data to be 
gathered.  
Zeigler (1975, cited in Küppers and Lenhard, 2005) identifies a stronger form of validity: 
structural validity, which applies when a model’s basic interactions mirror the way in 
which the target system generates the behaviour. Clearly, MAS is currently the most 
suitable method for achieving structural validity, as agents can be designed to make 
decisions analogously to the way human beings do, but even so a MAS will require 
simplifications to be made to avoid building a system that is just as complicated as the 
target system. Küppers and Lenhard (2005) acknowledge that social simulations cannot 
achieve Zeigler’s strict definition of validation. 
Dynamic validation and verification are closely related to actually running the simulation 
to gain data for analysis. In both cases, a “parameter sweep” must be undertaken, 
examining the effects of varying each parameter over their ranges, including the 
interaction effects between parameters; in the case of validation, this will be to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis. Conducting a comprehensive parameter sweep requires non-viably 
high computational resources if the simulation is non-trivial, especially if non-linear 
parameter relationships are involved, as these are difficult to detect if parameters are only 
modified in isolation (Miller, 1998). This is further exacerbated by stochastic models, as 
the random seed should be varied for each parameter set as well, for example using the 
Monte Carlo technique. A more tractable approach must either manually identify which 
parameter regions are “interesting”, and which are most likely to “break” the model, 
which risks missing out important areas (although well designed hypotheses and null 
hypotheses should help with this); or use another program to identify the regions of 
interest automatically, according to some fitness function. Brueckner and Parunak (2003) 
took the second route with an adaptive multi-agent program designed just for this 
purpose. Similarly, Miller (1998) constructed a search algorithm to find parameter 
combinations that “break” a model’s implications by trying to maximise the deviation 
from the expected results. Unfortunately, such advanced techniques are beyond this 
project. 
A model can never be guaranteed to be free of bugs, and so the possibility that the results 
of the simulation are merely artefacts of bugs must always be considered. Rather than 
saying a model is “validated”, one should say it is “better-validated” the more tests it 
passes (Bryson et al., 2006). MAS may be more susceptible to undetected bugs than other 
computer programs because of their distributed, self-organising nature, and the fact that a 
small anomaly in an individual’s action may not have a significant impact on the macro 
phenomenon (Gilbert and Terna, 2000; Axtell, 1999). Herein lies the value of a sensitivity 
analysis: to highlight anomalous behaviour arising when non-critical parameters are 
varied. However, Gilbert and Terna stress that models of complex systems may be 
inherently sensitive to initial conditions, and so high sensitivity might actually be 
desirable. 
Another validation technique, model-to-model analysis, has recently gained strong 
support in social simulations (Küppers and Lenhard, 2005). Edmonds and Hales (2003) 
report that model alignment is “very difficult, but very revealing”. They found it exposed 
a number of bugs when they re-implemented an arbitrarily selected model that had 
already been published, and was generally accepted as valid, and expect that the same 
would apply to most published models (this is backed up by Axelrod (1997) who 
replicated eight different models). These bugs might not change the overall “statistical 
signature” of the simulation results, but the original verification process could still be said 
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to be lacking. Edmonds and Hales do not consider this surprising because they see 
verification as being of limited use when emergent phenomena are being studied, as it is 
questionable to specify them in advance as requirements that can be verified. David et al. 
(2002) argue that such emergent phenomena must be identified in retrospect and then 
verified anyway, it seems referring only to their concept of dynamic verification (defined 
above), which does not rely on a specification as static verification does, instead checking 
only outputs. Edmonds and Hales also found that model-to-model analysis had the ability 
to expose “hidden parameters” that had been unwittingly missed out from one of the 
models, when output was compared. Merely attempting to re-implement the model also 
revealed that the original model specification was ambiguous. 
Our model has the advantage that there is already a model in existence that could be 
“aligned” with it using model-to-model analysis, to increase confidence in its validity. 
Equally, Room and Britton’s model could enjoy greater validity if it agrees with another 
implementation of the theory, although it could be argued that their model is merely 
acting as the specification for our model, and so of course the results will agree. However, 
Hales et al. (2003) report unanimous agreement in a recent MAS workshop that aligning 
top-down models like EBM with bottom-up models like MAS is useful, with the cases 
where the models do not agree being of especial interest. 
Edmonds and Hales recommend that a re-implementation of a simulation should use 
different types of programming language, and preferably be programmed by different 
people, to avoid simply repeating unfounded assumptions and mistakes. We go one step 
further and use an entirely different methodology as well, although the fact that one 
model (in Ostrom’s terminology) uses an entirely different symbol system may make it 
more difficult to align them. However, it may be that due to limitations of the 
programming environment chosen for the initial prototype, a different framework must be 
chosen for a second implementation, in which case these issues will become more 
relevant. 
Balci (2003) also suggests that a simulation should be certified by an independent expert 
to increase confidence in its credibility. While not independent, Graham Room, who has 
undertaken joint supervision of this project, may be able to fulfil this role to an extent, 
although, as with all stakeholders in a project, confirmation bias is a risk. Mosler (2000) 
considers such expert opinions to be especially important if sufficient empirical data is 
not available to validate against.  
MAS offers an additional level of validation over more traditional simulation techniques, 
and also over more advanced techniques that do not try to imitate real individual 
behaviour, such as neural networks. Every type of model can be validated at the system 
level, by comparing the output against the expected output (perhaps empirical data), but 
agent-based models also allow local observations of agent behaviour to be validated, 
perhaps against qualitative accounts of target behaviour, preferably by domain experts 
(Parunak et al., 1998). Moss and Edmonds (2005a) call these techniques 
“macrovalidation” and “microvalidation”, respectively, and declare a model that has been 
validated in both ways “cross-validated”. A cross-validated model is more likely to 
display genuine emergence, rather than the ‘emergent’ properties being somehow built in, 
although Moss and Edmonds caution that the individual behaviour still only provides one 
possible explanation for the macro effect. This is of course a problem common to all 
scientific explanations, not just simulations. 
Gilbert (2004) differentiates between qualitative macrovalidation, in which the general 
pattern of data is in agreement with the expected results, and the stronger measure of 
quantitative macrovalidation which requires the data to be in agreement according to tests 
of statistical significance. The latter measure will not be feasible if it is not possible to 
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obtain detailed empirical data for comparison. He also suggests running cross-sectional 
and longitudinal analyses as part of microvalidation. 
2.7 Related simulations 
School choice simulations have been run for a long time, although none that are multi-
agent based, that the author is aware of. Hoyle and Robinson (2003) constructed a 
mathematical simulation in which they investigate the effects of school league tables on 
schools’ performance and social class composition, and unlike us, the accuracy of the 
league tables in reflecting school performance. They do not, however, examine the two-
way ‘competitive assortative mating’ effect where schools cherry-pick students: they only 
consider parental choice. Their model is more complex than Room and Britton’s, in that it 
actually constructs league tables from pupils’ exam results, but it is nevertheless 
fundamentally a mathematical model, and so does not bring the insights into the co-
evolutionary process that it is hoped our MAS model will. 
Manski (1992) constructed another mathematical simulation of school choice that is 
closer to our aims in nature, as it views schools as competitive firms and uses the market 
metaphor. Interestingly, Manski considers bounded rationality: he is concerned that “ill-
educated” parents might lack the ability to properly interpret information on school 
choices. Many sociologists share his concern (e.g. Lauder and Hughes, 1999, p.43; 
Karsten et al., 2001). However, the restrictions of equations do not enable him to model 
the issue, as we hope to using MAS. 
An even earlier mathematical simulation by Birdsall and Meesook (1986) on Brazilian 
educational and income inequalities similarly regrets the low degree of heterogeneity it is 
able to express among families. Yair (1996) takes a “network analysis” approach to the 
Israeli education market, which appears to be a form of microsimulation, but his study too 
suffers from the limitations of the methodology. The need for a school choice simulation 
that addresses these issues using a more powerful technique is apparent. 
Fowler and Smirnov (2005) present an example of how this might be done with their 
MAS of political parties and voters, analogous to our schools and parents. The political 
parties even adopt niches based on the current climate, as schools can (Plank and Sykes, 
1999). They limit the voters’ information about population preferences to that of their 
local neighbours’, embedding them in a social network. Social network considerations 
may be highly relevant in the domain of school choice as well (Lauder and Hughes, 1999, 
p.44). 
2.8 MAS architectures and toolkits 
Having established that MAS is the methodology most suited to extending Room and 
Britton’s work, the question of what supporting framework to use remains. There are a 
wide range of MAS toolkits and libraries freely available, although many are still in the 
early stages of development (Luck et al., 2004), and so commercial products will not be 
considered. Since there are such a large number of platforms that support simulation in 
particular, more general multi-agent frameworks such as JADE will not be explored. 
There are some fundamental requirements that the agent architecture must meet. It must 
provide an environment into which the agents can be injected, and given a physical 
location, as well as supporting more abstract social networks. It must also provide a 
communication infrastructure, and scheduling of events. It would also be useful for the 
analysis if the framework automated functions such as running multiple simulations with 
varied parameters; inserting “probes” to examine the internal states of agents, and the 
dynamics of agent interactions; as well as various logging and statistical analysis 
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techniques, but such analysis can be supplemented by “add-on” programs if necessary 
(Brueckner and Parunak, 2003). 
Swarm
1
 is the best-established agent simulation tool, and has the advantage that a Swarm 
simulation is more easily replicable by other researchers, who will be familiar with the 
development paradigm (Gilbert and Terna, 2000). It supports MAS written in either 
Objective C or Java; these are both object-oriented programming languages, which are 
the natural choice for a MAS due to the close correspondence of agents with objects. 
MAML is a high-level macro-language for Swarm designed for users without strong 
programming skills (Gulyás, 2005). However, Swarm is a general-purpose artificial 
intelligence simulation package (Tobias and Hofmann, 2004), and since Repast and 
MASON (below) are essentially based on Swarm but oriented towards the social 
sciences, they seem more suitable than Swarm, and therefore MAML, for our purposes.  
Repast
2
 appears to be the most suitable candidate for an initial prototype, as it is 
specialised towards our application area, relatively mature with a well-developed user 
base, and is easy to use (Tobias and Hofmann, 2004). Several researchers view it as “the 
most suitable package for modelling complex social systems” (Gulyás, 2005, p.155). If, 
having evaluated the initial prototype, it appears that Repast does not provide sufficient 
flexibility for further refinement of the model, a more open and extendible framework 
such as AgentScape
3
 could be considered for a second iteration. AgentScape is not being 
used initially because it does not provide any of the built-in data graphing and logging 
tools that Repast does; its immaturity also poses a greater risk with lack of documentation 
and probable bugs. Nor is it specific to social simulations. Both Repast and AgentScape 
require agents to be implemented in Java, again an object-oriented programming 
language. 
The agent’s decision-making ability could be implemented using a logic programming 
add-on to Java such as JBoss Rules
4
 (formerly known as ‘Drools’). This production 
system would allow for a more natural representation of their reasoning.  
Another toolkit that was considered is MASON
5
, which is modelled after Repast (Tobias 
and Hofmann, 2004), or the extension BOD MASON
6
, but they are geared towards 
reactive artificial intelligence and visualisation of mobile agents, and so Repast seems a 
better choice. Experience at this University with Repast on similar projects makes it a 
favoured candidate as well. SymBioSys
7
 (McFadzean and Tesfatsion, 1999) is a C++ 
library for evolutionary simulations, but supports genetic concepts too explicitly for our 
purposes; we prefer to use them as a metaphor for more general behaviour. 
Many researchers advocate using a new software development model, “agent-oriented 
software engineering” when developing multi-agent systems (e.g. Zambonelli and 
Omicini, 2004; Wooldridge et al., 2000). Since we are not creating cognitive planning 
agents with complicated communication protocols and so forth, it seems that a more 
standard evolutionary programming approach will suffice for this project. 
                                                     
1 Available from http://www.swarm.org (accessed 23 April 2007) 
2 Available from http://repast.sourceforge.net/index.html (accessed 23 April 2007) 
3 Available from http://www.iids.org/research/aos (accessed 23 April 2007) 
4 Available from http://www.jboss.com/products/rules (accessed 23 April 2007) 
5 Available from http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/ (accessed 23 April 2007) 
6 Available from http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~jjb/web/BOD/BOD-MASON.html (accessed 23 April 2007) 
7 Available from http://www.kumo.com/~david/SimBioSys/ (accessed 23 April 2007) 
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2.9 Conclusion 
We have seen that there is significant interest from sociologists in the mechanisms and 
dynamics of social exclusion that come into play during school choice, but that existing 
mathematical models are unable to provide them with sufficient insight into these 
dynamics, as well as issues such as population heterogeneity and bounded rationality. 
Given that the market-based school system can be classified as a complex system with 
co-evolving, self-organising strategies, it is time to harness the recently discovered power 
of MAS and analyse these processes from the bottom up, rather than contenting ourselves 
with a “black box” whose inputs and outputs we can examine.  
The addition of this new level of elaboration will make it harder to analyse the data, to 
justify the new assumptions that will need to be made, and to validate the model to any 
degree of confidence. It is hoped that even if the model cannot achieve the rigour of 
validity required for successful prediction, that it will nevertheless aid our understanding 
of how the strategies of parents and schools interact to produce the class polarisation 
effect that is characteristic of the Baker reforms. 
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3 Software development 
3.1 Requirements 
Due to the exploratory nature of the project, precise requirements could not be specified 
in advance. However, the following key requirements describe some constraints upon the 
envisioned simulation. Use of the term “shall” indicates a mandatory requirement, while 
requirements denoted by “may” are desirable but optional. 
3.1.1 Required functionality 
1. A multi-agent simulation model shall be developed which is functionally equivalent 
to the equation-based model described by Room and Britton (2006b). 
2. The simulation model shall use two main types of actor: head teachers, who pick a 
particular allocation policy; and middle-class or working-class parents, who choose 
which school to send their child to. 
3. The agents shall be heterogeneous; that is to say, different head teacher agents may 
choose a different allocation strategy, and parents differ in the strength of their 
preferences, and in their reasoning. 
4. The model may introduce extensions such as new parameters and new options, in 
order to evaluate their possible effect. It should be designed with extendibility in 
mind. Possible extensions include: 
a. Considering more than two schools, perhaps in different catchment areas 
b. Allowing parents to move from one catchment area to another 
c. Explicit representation of ‘aggregate parameters’ whose effect was previously 
only cumulatively considered, such as parental investment and teacher 
morale 
d. Investigating the effect of siblings already attending a candidate school 
e. Influence of a social network of neighbours on school choice, for example if 
neighbours wish to car-share 
5. The model shall encourage experimentation through straightforward manipulation of 
parameters. 
6. Analysis of the model shall consider explanations for the system-level patterns that 
emerge from agent behaviour.  
7. The model may also be used for predictive purposes, depending on time constraints. 
8. The model shall be verified and validated using appropriate simulation and agent-
based programming techniques. Its predictive capabilities may also be measured 
against real life data, depending on availability. 
3.1.2 Configuration requirements 
1. The simulation shall initially be developed in an environment that encourages rapid 
prototyping. The second phase of the simulation may necessitate switching to a more 
flexible, open framework. 
2. The development tools chosen shall be compatible with Eclipse if possible, assuming 
the use of Java as the primary development language. Since Eclipse is the dominant 
Java IDE (Geer, 2005), its use should make it simpler to change tools during the 
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development process if necessary, as we cannot establish in advance which tools will 
be needed. 
3. Version control software shall be used, to facilitate the experimental development of 
extensions to the project 
3.1.3 Functionality that is outside the scope of this study 
1. The agents shall employ some form of learning so that the model is not too simplistic, 
but this may be closer to the concept of, for example, utility functions than complex 
machine learning models, as adding such functionality is too large a task for a project of 
this scale.  
3.2 Design 
The project was divided into two phases: first, building a model equivalent to Room and 
Britton’s; and second, refining and exploring the model by incorporating new parameters 
and decision processes. The initial model may be built using a different technology 
platform than the second, as explained in the configuration requirements (section 3.1.2).  
3.2.1 Initial prototype 
The main purpose of the initial prototype was as a proof of concept, and for gaining some 
experience with agent-based simulation, so that more suitable technology could be chosen 
for the more refined model if necessary. It was therefore developed in a rapid prototyping 
environment, using incremental, evolutionary techniques. An agent toolkit with a large 
library of common functions, and a simple, easy to use framework for running 
simulations, was essential for rapid prototyping. The literature review already identified 
the social simulation framework Repast as a suitable candidate for this task (see section 
2.8). 
No production rule system was used at this stage, because a simple procedural translation 
of Room and Britton’s equations seemed more straightforward. The agents’ decision 
procedures could be rewritten as rules once it had been established that the basic concept 
worked as an agent-based model. 
Adapting the macro equations for agent-level decisions 
The original equations consider only two types of entity: parents and schools. Middle-
class parents’ preferences are described collectively by a function m giving the fraction 
m(x) of middle-class parents who prefer to send their child to the school where the 
fraction of middle-class students is x, as opposed to sending it to the other school
8
: 
)(
2
1
)( θ−+= xaxm  
Equation 3.1 - fraction of middle-class parents choosing school with middle-class fraction x 
where θ stands for the fraction of middle-class children in the population as a whole, and 
is assumed constant. Working-class parents’ choices are represented similarly by the 
function l: 
)(
2
1
)( θ−+= xbxl  
Equation 3.2 - fraction of working-class parents choosing school with middle-class fraction x 
                                                     
8 Where the fraction of middle class children is θ – x.  
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where a and b are the strength of preference coefficients such that a, b > 0. It is also 
assumed that a > b, since middle-class parents are likely to favour a middle-class 
dominated school more strongly than working-class parents (Room and Britton, 2006b).   
Thus, equations are used to describe population-level parental choices. 
Only a single equation is necessary to describe the system-level behaviour of how many 
children of each class are allocated to each school. If a school has too many applicants, it 
must choose between them; too few, and it is forced to take them all, as well as the 
children rejected from its rival school. The system-level equation incorporates both the 
parental choices described above, and the schools’ allocation policies, describing what 
fraction of middle-class children end up in each school as a result. Both schools are 
assumed to share the same policy: either class blind, where they choose students 
irrespective of social class; or class sensitive, where each school accepts as many middle-
class children as possible, accepting working-class children only when no more middle-
class children are left. The interested reader can find the formula in Room and Britton 
(2006b).  
However, this model could not use the system-level equation, because it was intended to 
generate that outcome bottom-up out of choices made by individual schools and parents. 
It could, however, use the parental choice equations, and the informally stated ‘allocate 
places at random’ vs. ‘accept all middle-class children first’ school strategies. Its decision 
procedures are therefore much simpler than the equations presented in the original model, 
since they need only deal with local choices made by a single entity. 
The parental choice formulae could not be used in their original macro-level form, of 
course: they required adaptation. Room and Britton’s equations give the fraction of 
parents making a choice, but we wished to translate this summary of events into a 
decision procedure that each individual parent agent could apply. The simplest way of 
doing this was to turn the concept of a fraction of parents making a certain choice into the 
probability that each individual parent will make that choice. Approximately the same 
result should be obtained, albeit with added ‘random noise’ stemming from the particular 
sequence of random numbers used.  
Schools were assumed to contain six year groups, so that the fraction x of middle-class 
children in a school is effectively the mean middle-class intake over the past six years. 
Actors 
Instead of using parent and school actors, the simulation used children and schools. This 
is essentially equivalent, but has a nicer semantic feel to it when a school is considering a 
child’s attributes on application, rather than examining a ‘parent’ object for suitability. An 
alternative would have been to include both parent and child objects, forming a family 
unit, but the details of how a decision is arrived at, such as whether one parent has more 
say than the other, or if the child has any influence, is only of tangential concern to us. 
Rather, we are primarily interested in what decision they arrive at, and why. It is therefore 
more appropriate to abstract the family unit into the single concept of a ‘child’. 
Schools have the attribute league table rating instead of exposing a school’s fraction of 
middle-class students directly, as Room and Britton’s model does. The design allows for 
future expansion, but at present it is merely an average of the school’s fraction of middle-
class students over the past four years, since school league tables in the UK tend to 
include recent historic data as well. In reality, school league tables are of course based on 
exam results, but the school’s social make-up is considered to be a rough approximation 
of this, since middle-class children tend to perform better in exams; additionally, their 
peers’ results are positively influenced by a high percentage of middle-class children in 
their class (Lauder and Hughes, 1999).  
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The only attribute of interest held by children in the initial prototype is their social class. 
This has only two possible values: working-class or middle-class. A finer-grained model 
of social classes such as the eight-, five- or three-class versions suggested by the Office 
for National Statistics (2004) was considered, but not implemented, because other 
extensions seemed of greater potential interest. It could also have been challenging to 
correctly define the expected behaviour and preferences of the different classes, since 
only the eight-class version can be interpreted as hierarchical tiers – the other models 
would not naturally lend themselves to a decreasing preference function, for example. 
Structure of the model 
Repast provides not only a simulation backbone, but also simulation templates for 
common model types that require minimal adaptation. If these templates are to be used – 
which suits a prototype very well – there is a choice of subclassing either the Java class 
SimpleModel, or SimModelImpl. (Alternatively, a model could implement the SimModel 
interface directly, providing all of the basic functionality itself, but this is unnecessary.) 
Each is built around the basic concept used in Repast (and other simulations) of 
scheduling events at certain time steps, or perhaps on every step. Repast manages the 
scheduled events and progresses the time step automatically.  
Each run of the simulation begins with a setup stage, followed by the progression of time 
steps, and the events associated with them. For this model, a time step was taken to 
represent the passing of an academic year; so on each step, a new set of children would 
apply for school places. 
SimpleModel provides basic functionality, based around the core methods preStep, step 
and postStep, which are executed before, during and after each step, respectively. 
Alternatively, ‘auto-step’ mode can be used, in which each agent implements the 
Steppable interface, providing its own versions of the above methods that are 
automatically invoked on each time step.  
However, since more advanced functionality, such as batch runs to explore the parameter 
space was required, the more advanced SimModelImpl was subclassed instead. This also 
allowed for a less restrictive scheduling mechanism, as it requires the model to construct 
its own schedule. Since the same set of actions are carried out on each time step, all that 
was necessary was to provide a single method to run on every step. This first cycled 
through all the children, asking each to apply for a school place, and then iterated through 
all the schools, asking them to accept as many children as they could from those who 
applied, and to reject the rest. These rejected children then had to begin the process again, 
until each had found a place. It was guaranteed that each child would eventually find a 
school place, since the schools are assumed to each have an equal number of places, 
determined by the number of children needing to be placed each year. In the worst case, a 
child would need to make as many applications as there were schools, but this would only 
usually be expected to occur for a minority of children on each step
9
.  
The initial model class, SchoolChoiceModel, was soon refactored to have two subclasses, 
SchoolChoiceInteractive and SchoolChoiceBatch, to more clearly separate out the 
code that pertained only to the batch model. It was also somewhat more efficient than 
checking whether the model is in batch mode before executing any operation relating to 
an on-screen graph.  
Both interactive GUI mode and batch mode were set up to log data about the fraction of 
middle-class children in each school at each time step. As well as taking screen shots of 
                                                     
9The most extreme example of this would be if all children applied to the same school: then half of them could not be 
given a place and so they would need to apply to the second school as well. However, this is only expected to happen in the 
strictest class polarisation experiments, when all children strictly prefer the leading school. 
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the graphs created using Repast library classes, custom data analysis was possible through 
importing the standard format comma-separated text file into, say, Microsoft Excel. 
Parameters 
Repast supports parameter setting in batch mode through parameter files, and in 
interactive mode through a basic GUI that is created for every simulation. If the model 
class, in this case SchoolChoiceModel, uses the Accessor design pattern for methods, so 
that (for example) the numSteps parameter has associated methods int getNumSteps() 
and setNumSteps(int), then those parameters are automatically made available to the 
user in the Repast GUI, if they are also included in the model’s list of modifiable 
parameters.  
The parameters chosen to be modifiable in the initial prototype were: 
1. FractionMiddleClassPopulation – this corresponds to θ in the equations above; 
2. MiddleClassPreference – this corresponds to a in the middle-class parental choice 
equation: the coefficient for how much they prefer a middle-class oriented school; 
3. WorkingClassPreference – the same preference coefficient for working-class parents, 
which corresponds to b in the working-class parental choice equation; 
4. NumChildren – the overall number of school applicants per year; 
5. NumSchools – the number of schools to choose from; this was initially left at 2 in the 
simple replication of Room and Britton’s model; 
6. NumSteps – how many time steps to execute before halting; 
7. SchoolStrategy – a binary parameter: either ‘class blind’ or ‘class sensitive’. 
Zeigler (1976, cited in Kleijnen, 1995) distinguishes between input variables and 
parameters to a simulation, where a variable is an attribute that can be directly observed, 
such as the number of schools, but a parameter cannot, so its value must be drawn from 
observations. An example of a parameter in Zeigler’s sense would be the preference for 
middle-class-oriented schools held by parents. Kleijnen (1995) adds to this the concept of 
a module that can be varied between runs, giving different behaviours: for example, the 
module determining school strategy. However, we will use the umbrella term ‘parameter’ 
for each of these types of input to the simulation, since this is in keeping with Repast 
terminology. 
It is in our case perhaps more useful to distinguish between parameters that are expected 
to significantly affect an experiment’s outcome if varied, and ones that are present more 
out of convenience than necessity. The numChildren and numSteps parameters could be 
viewed as such ‘convenience’ parameters, since the larger the values, the more certain we 
can feel about our results, as the size of the sample will have increased. However, they 
need not be treated as rigorously as the other parameters in a parameter sweep used to 
investigate the model. 
3.2.2 The full model 
Once the initial prototype had been established to replicate Room and Britton’s model 
satisfactorily, the technology and techniques used were assessed for suitability for the 
development of the full model. Despite some issues with the use of Repast library classes 
breaking the replicability of experiments (see section 3.3.2), which were soon overcome 
once identified, Repast seemed well suited not only to the development of the initial 
prototype, but also to the full, extendible model of the second phase of this project. 
Repast imposes certain restrictions on the main model class (such as having to use the 
Accessor design pattern, and scheduling events against time steps), but apart from that, 
arbitrary Java code can be used, which results in great flexibility. The agents can 
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implement the Steppable interface that structures their actions into pre-, during, and 
post-step phases, but this is not mandatory. The minimal restrictions that Repast does 
impose are therefore fully reconcilable with this project’s requirements. It would also be 
compatible with the use of a production rule system. 
Since the initial prototype did not expose any real weaknesses in the technology used, 
rather than starting from scratch, evolutionary development continued directly on the 
prototype. 
3.2.3 More than two schools 
The first extension to be added to the model was the ability to cope with more than two 
schools competing for children. 
Equation 3.1 (p. 24) must be adapted to: 
)(
1
)( δ−+= xa
n
xm  
Equation 3.3 - fraction of middle-class parents who prefer the school with fraction middle-class 
x over all other schools 
where n is the number of schools (previously 2), and δ is no longer the fraction of middle-
class children in the population, but the fraction in the population among those schools 
who have not yet rejected this child. The reason the schools that have already rejected the 
child must be ignored is that if there is one excellent school A and two atrocious schools 
B and C, the child is likely to give m(xB) <= 0 and m(xc) <= 0. Then, if it is rejected from 
the only school it has any interest in attending, A, it has no way of choosing between 
schools B and C since it does not want to attend either of them to any degree (having 
assigned a negative preference to each). But if B and C are only compared to each other 
once A is out of the running, then at least one of them will be given a positive 
fraction/probability of choice; this is important if one is performing less badly than the 
other. 
The children’s decision procedure therefore needs to be consulted after every rejection to 
determine the new probabilities for choosing amongst the remaining schools. This 
increases the complexity of the algorithm by a factor of n. 
When more than two schools can be considered, the translation of m(x) and l(x) into 
probabilities is also less straightforward. In the simple case of two schools using Equation 
3.1, m(x) and l(x) can easily be truncated to fall between 0 and 1, giving a natural 
correspondence to probabilities. For example, if m(xA) = 4.5 and m(xB) = -3.5
10
, it can be 
truncated to school A being picked with probability 1, and B with probability 0 without 
any loss of information. m(xA) + m(xB) = 1 in every case, if truncation is used  (Room and 
Britton, 2006b). But this only holds for the two-school case, where the middle-class 
admissions of one school are the mirror image of admissions to the other school – a child 
must attend either one school or the other. 
                                                     
10 e.g. if θ = 0.5, a = 20, xA = 0.7, xB = 0.3 
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Figure 3.1 - Example of two schools necessarily 'mirroring' each others' middle-class intake 
fractions along y = θ = 0.5. 
If, however, a third school C becomes involved, values > 1 are suddenly distinguishable 
in Equation 3.3 since more than one can occur at once. (Any values < 0 are, however, still 
considered equally undesirable and are all set to 0.) For example, m(xA) = 2.33, m(xB) = 
2.4 and m(xC) = -3.67
11
 cannot be truncated to 1, 1 and 0. But this problem is easily 
solved by converting these weightings into probabilities in the interval [0,1]. 
Multiple schools bring another factor into play: they necessitate the use of synchronised 
application rounds. When only two schools are considered, this is unnecessary, because 
all children rejected from one school are guaranteed to be accepted by the other: the order 
of applications is irrelevant. If, however, there are (say) three schools – one leading 
school, one middle-ground school and one failing school – then it would be unfair to give 
children applying to the middle-ground school only because they were rejected from the 
leading school the same consideration given to applicants who made the middle-ground 
school their first choice. Furthermore, this introduces an unwanted element of 
randomness where the order in which schools consider applications now has a noticeable 
effect on the outcome: if a school processes its applications after one or more other 
schools, it may also be considering some applicants rejected from those schools alongside 
its initial applicants. The solution is to introduce application rounds, where second-round 
applicants can only be considered once all schools have completed their first-round 
admissions process. Then, in the second round, each school gives equal precedence to 
each child who made that school its second choice, and so on. Unfortunately, the author 
only realised this late into the project, and so this change was only made to the Drools 
model, due to time constraints. Running multiple-school simulations in the Java model 
therefore still produces results that suffer from the effect described above. 
3.2.4 Stochastic shocks 
It would be interesting to investigate the effect of ‘stochastic shocks’ on the stability of 
schools’ positions – both whether such a shock could trigger schools into a stable state 
                                                     
11 e.g. if θ = 0.5, a = 20, xA = 0.6, xB = 0.6, xC = 0.3 
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they would not otherwise have reached, and whether they could be permanently knocked 
out of a stable state. 
A stochastic shock is an additional bonus or penalty to a school’s league table rating on 
top of the rating calculated from the school’s middle-class population. A positive shock 
might be due to a new headmaster with a good reputation arriving, or a winning school 
football team, while a negative shock could be due to news coverage of an undesirable 
incident at the school, or a poor OFSTED report. 
Three new parameters were added to the model: NumStochasticShocks, MinShock and 
MaxShock. MinShock and MaxShock are constraints on the minimum and maximum 
possible stochastic shocks, and may be positive or negative. Typically, MinShock = 
MaxShock in an experiment, for greater control over the effect. It is randomly decided 
when the shock happens, and for each school whether it is affected by the shock – a more 
refined model would allow full control over this as well, but for current purposes, it 
sufficed. Of course, reusing a random seed will replicate the sequence of events exactly, 
as always. 
A stochastic shock could only really be expected to have an effect when the schools are in 
a non-polarised state: if one school normally has a 100% middle-class intake and the 
other receives none, a modest shock should not make much of a difference. Therefore, the 
schools would need to use a class-blind strategy, and the families would need to have a 
sufficiently high preference to result in an inequity between the schools. However, it was 
instead proposed to give the schools a variable preference for middle-class children, 
rather than the simple binary ‘yes/no’ preference used previously. Varying this alone 
should allow a degree of control over the inequity between schools. Making the schools’ 
strategies more fine-grained improves the potential for drawing social policy conclusions 
from the experiments, since schools’ preferences can be controlled through policy, but 
families’ cannot (or perhaps they can be influenced, but to a lesser degree). 
3.2.5 Decision rules 
The most significant change made to the initial prototype was to redesign it to use 
decision rules instead of the more procedural approach previously adopted. This was 
suggested for two main reasons: 
1. The model had become difficult to read, as pieces of logic were encoded in each 
object, so that they needed to be analysed carefully in order to discern their 
interactions with each other. Additionally, this logic was intertwined to an extent with 
less important code relating only to simulation mechanisms. Rules would make the 
logic more readable, especially to a non-technical domain expert. 
2. Having the decision rules in a central location would make the model much more 
flexible and extensible – both in future, and for the continued evolutionary 
development during this project, which required continual refactoring. 
Additionally, rules would make it easier to understand why a certain outcome was 
reached, as the trace of rules that were applied can be followed. This could prove 
invaluable in the analysis of micro-level behaviour that this project aims for. 
A production rule system evokes a declarative, fact- and rule-based programming style. 
The fundamental concept is that ‘facts’ (Java objects, in this case) are ‘asserted’ into a 
processing area called ‘working memory’. The condition-action rules forming the 
program are continually checked against the facts in working memory, and if there is a 
match with the rule’s condition, the rule ‘fires’, which means that its action is run. 
Actions typically involve a combination of modifying facts in working memory, and 
running small chunks of procedural-style code (often written in Java for Java-compatible 
frameworks; but some extend this to integrate other languages, most commonly Lisp).  
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At its core, a production rule system simply consists of many rules of the form 
if <condition> then <action>. 
If multiple rule conditions match at once, a conflict resolution strategy must be applied. 
This could be as simple as following textual ordering in the file. 
Initially, the suggestion was to use JBoss Rules (‘Drools’) as the obvious choice due to 
existing familiarity on the project, but some alternatives were considered in case a more 
suitable choice existed. 
The primary constraints on the choice of rule package were that it should be: 
1. Freely available software; 
2. Compatible with Java; 
3. Stable and reliable. 
Secondary constraints were that it should be: 
4. Integrated with Eclipse, this project’s existing IDE; 
5. Compatible with Java 1.5, to avoid having to refactor the program to make it 
backwards-compatible with an older version of Java; 
6. Relatively fast to learn; 
7. Reasonably efficient (for a rule-based language, which is necessarily slower than 
Java alone); 
8. Open source software, for flexibility of future extension, and ease of debugging. 
The options considered were as follows (excluding the most unsuitable ones): 
1. JBoss Rules
12
 (hereafter known as Drools, its more familiar name) 
Drools uses an object-oriented version of the Rete pattern-matching algorithm. This 
works by caching partial rule matches so they do not need to be re-evaluated unless 
object attributes change (Codehaus Foundation, 2006). This means that more memory 
is used, but computation is performed faster. An experimental Leaps algorithm is also 
supported which can identify rules to fire without evaluating the entire condition 
network, but it is not considered reliable yet, so it was not considered for this project. 
Drools has the following advantages: 
• It uses intuitive, minimalist syntax that can be redefined by the user to a 
specific domain; 
• It is established, open-source software with a large following; 
• It is exceptionally well-integrated with Eclipse; 
• It is designed for speed and scalability; 
• It supports SQL-like queries for returning data in a loop, unlike JESS; 
• The author was already acquainted with an earlier incarnation. 
2. JESS
13
 
JESS, the Java Expert System Shell, also uses an adapted version of the Rete 
algorithm, but it looks very different to Drools as it uses a Lisp-like syntax. It is an 
extended version of CLIPS, a popular expert system. It has an established support 
base, and the project is still in active development, again like Drools. JESS is not 
open-source software. 
                                                     
12 Available from http://labs.jboss.com/portal/jbossrules/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
13 Available from http://herzberg.ca.sandia.gov/jess/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
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3. Mandarax
14
 
Mandarax is an open-source backwards-chaining system that uses less memory than 
forward-chaining frameworks like JBoss Rules and JESS, but is slower as a result. 
Backwards-chaining is better suited to query-driven than event-driven applications 
(Dietrich (2003); Proctor et al. (2006) section 1.1.1). This project will only rarely 
need to query the working memory for facts, or work towards a goal; more usually it 
will need to respond to incoming events, so Mandarax does not seem like an ideal 
match.  
Prova
15
 was recently built on the Mandarax engine to include Prolog-like syntax, but 
it is still a relatively untested technology 
4. JLisa
16
 
Jlisa is again based on the popular Rete algorithm. JLisa is very similar to JESS; both 
are based on CLIPS. But while JESS provides Lisp-like syntax, JLisa makes all 
features of Common Lisp available. Furthermore, unlike JESS, JLisa has an open-
source license. A major drawback is that there is no apparent documentation; it is a 
relatively recent project (begun late 2003) with only ‘pre-version 1’ releases. 
5. OpenRules
17
 
The OpenRules system is integrated with Eclipse, and works alongside Microsoft 
Excel. Whilst Excel is available to this project, and used for data analysis, it would be 
preferable not to use proprietary software in the code itself for the sake of 
replicability and reuse by other researchers. OpenRules itself, however, is open 
source. 
OpenRules was also designed with scalability and performance in mind, but it only 
has a small userbase at present. 
6. Algernon
18
 
Algernon, an open-source plug-in for the ontology editor Protégé, again exposes Lisp 
functionality, and has a complex syntax. It is flexible, supporting both forward- and 
backward-chaining, but again has only a small userbase. 
7. SweetRules
19
 
SweetRules supports the OWL standard for semantic Web ontologies; it is oriented 
towards integrating semantic web rules and ontologies, which is not really a concern 
for this project. It is interoperable with JESS (although unlike JESS, it is open-
source); and like Algernon, supports both forward- and backward inferencing, adding 
flexibility on both counts. As with most of the systems considered, probably because 
they are all relatively new technologies, it has a small userbase. 
Only Drools and JESS satisfy all three primary criteria. Drools was chosen over JESS 
because the existing familiarity presented a strong advantage due to tight time constraints; 
its open source license was also attractive, although JESS is freely available for academic 
purposes. It is also exceptionally well integrated with Eclipse, the project’s development 
environment, allowing interactive parsing and syntax correction of the rules as they are 
written, thus speeding up development. The only potential concern was that there might 
not be enough RAM to cope with very large numbers of agents. However, this risk 
applies equally to JESS, as it uses the same fundamental algorithm. 
                                                     
14 Available from http://mandarax.sourceforge.net/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
15 Available from http://www.prova.ws/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
16 Available from http://jlisa.sourceforge.net/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
17 Available from http://openrules.com/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
18 Available at http://algernon-j.sourceforge.net/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
19 Available at http://sweetrules.projects.semwebcentral.org/ (accessed 22 April 2007) 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
33 
Structure of the rule-based simulation 
An initial attempt at converting the simulation to use Drools involved creating a single 
rule base and a shared working memory, but this was soon revealed to be unsatisfactory. 
Instead, each agent was treated as a small expert system with its own rules and an 
independent working memory. This meant that the rules could be rewritten more 
succinctly, as interference from other agents’ activities no longer needed to be considered. 
In particular, objects could be removed from working memory when no longer needed, 
rather than having to be shared between agents, which had required the introduction of 
‘link’ ontology objects like SchoolRating to indicate that a particular Child was still 
considering a given School as a possible destination. The drawback was the overhead of 
having as many working memories as agents, but this was outweighed by the many 
advantages. 
The rules were initially split into separate school and child rule collections, reusing the 
same rule set for each school or child respectively; but it would be easy to specify several 
different versions of a rule set for children or school agents, thereby introducing a more 
sophisticated type of heterogeneity among agents. Additional simulation parameters could 
specify what fraction of the agent population should use a particular rule set. It is also 
possible for more specialised agents to reuse this base rule set and add custom rules to it, 
as the ‘co-evolutionary’ versions of the agents do (see section 3.2.6). 
The use of rules allowed the simulation’s schedule to be simplified to remove all 
knowledge of how the agents interact with each other, except that children must act 
before schools (the old version is shown in Appendix B, section 10.1). Instead, only the 
following sequence was executed by the model on every step: 
 SimUtilities.shuffle(childList); 
for (Child child : childList) {    // Prepare for step 
child.preStep(); 
} 
for (School school : schoolList) { 
school.preStep(); 
} 
for (Child child : childList) {    // Do step 
child.step(); 
} 
for (School school : schoolList) { 
school.step(); 
} 
for (School school : schoolList) { // Clean up after step 
school.postStep(); 
} 
Environment.getInstance().advanceYear(); 
It would have been neater to include a call to postStep for the children as well, but it was 
left out for efficiency reasons, since that method is currently empty. 
The children’s prestep method initialises a new child, since Child objects are reused on 
every step rather than creating new objects each time, purely for the much-needed 
performance gain. A school’s prestep populates its working memory with all the new 
applicants that might potentially apply, and its poststep method clears any from working 
memory that remain at the end of the step (children who are no longer under 
consideration are removed from working memory during processing). Each agent’s step 
method simply contains a call to its working memory’s fireAllRules method, which 
initially appears very elegant. 
Unfortunately, it is not quite this simple: Drools’ fireAllRules method fires all rules that 
have been activated by the current state of the agent, as desired, but once these have all 
fired, activity ceases. Rules that are activated while fireAllRules is still running are 
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added to its schedule, but those activated afterwards are not. This leads to the following 
kind of problem: 
1) 150 children apply to school A and 250 apply to school B 
2) School A calls fireAllRules and accepts the 150 children, leaving 50 places free 
3) School B calls fireAllRules, accepting 200 children and rejecting 50 
4) Those 50 children now apply to school A 
5) School A’s fireAllRules has already completed, and so it takes no action. 
This means that additional calls to fireAllRules need to be inserted in the code. It is not 
inelegant to insert a call to fireAllRules in each agent’s receiveMessage method, so 
that it inserts the message into working memory and then checks if any action need be 
taken. However, it is perhaps less obvious why in the Environment class, every time a 
school informs the environment that its current application round has ended, all schools 
have to be cycled through, calling fireAllRules on each. The reason is that a school 
might not be able to process a message immediately upon receiving it, if it is for a later 
application round than the current one. This mechanism could be removed if Drools 
supported a mode where all rules were continually executed as they were activated, which 
could be enabled in step, and disabled in postStep. However, it would no doubt reduce 
Drools’ performance significantly, and so the current design seems preferable. Before the 
introduction of application rounds, the calls to fireAllRules had to be inserted in the 
children’s rules; but the current solution at least places all such mechanisms in a single, 
meaningful place. 
Again in the interest of performance, Drools does not continually poll the objects in its 
memory for changes; rather, it relies on the user program to inform it when something 
relevant has changed. This can be done either by capturing Drools’ reference to the 
object, called a FactHandle, and passing this to Drools in a call to its modify method; or 
by following the Java bean-style PropertyChangeListener design pattern. This means 
that the object allows Drools to subscribe to its property change events, and is responsible 
for telling Drools whenever properties it deems to be of potential interest to observers 
change. The latter design is much more in keeping with the object-oriented program 
paradigm, placing the responsibility related to an object’s attributes within the object 
itself, rather than scattering calls to modify throughout the program, and so it was chosen. 
The fact that objects monitored by Drools in this fashion must use Java bean-style ‘getter’ 
and ‘setter’ methods for their properties is not problematic, given that Repast already 
requires the use of this programming style for the main simulation model’s parameters. 
The objects monitored by Drools for the two types of agent are shown below: 
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Figure 3.2 – Working memories used in the rule-based system. The top memories belong to the 
two schools, and the bottom one represents one of the n children in the simulation. Each working 
memory needs to know about the agent it is monitoring, as well as agents it interacts with directly. 
They also all have a reference to the Environment singleton, so the environment can be monitored 
for changes. 
As shown in Figure 3.2, Drools has to externally monitor the agent for which it acts as an 
expert system, rather than being privately embedded within it in some way. This has an 
unfortunate side effect: any methods Drools needs to access in the object whose ‘brain’ it 
is need to have public visibility, so they are also accessible to any other object. Even 
though rule files can share the same package name as a Java class, this only has the effect 
of automatically importing all classes from that package; it does not give the rules 
package-level access to the classes. Thus, a fundamental principle of multi-agent systems 
is violated: the agents do not have control over whether they wish to carry out an action. 
To give over control to their ‘expert system’, they must also expose the functionality to 
any other object in the system. So, for example, there is nothing to stop a child agent from 
bypassing the application process and just telling the school to accept it directly. This was 
not a real problem in this system, because the agents are not competing with rival agents 
belonging to a different, perhaps malicious ‘owner’ who might try to ‘cheat the system’, 
so the author was easily able to avoid abusing the public visibility of the methods; but it 
is nevertheless a fundamental design flaw. 
The rules 
The rules used in the initial, model are described briefly below. The full source code is in 
Appendix C, sections 11.1 and 11.3. To communicate with other Drools agents, message 
types defined in the package uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.ontology are used.  
1. Child rules 
a. “Research school place application” 
This rule fires when the child is in a position to apply for a school place, but 
has not yet made a decision. It tells the child to ‘research’ the schools, i.e. 
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calculate its preference levels for each, and then set up a probability 
distribution for selection. 
b. “Make application for school place” 
This rule fires next. The school selected by probability above is sent an 
‘application’ message. 
c. “Process rejection of school place application” 
The child has received a rejection message from the school it applied to, so 
we must re-initialise the child so it can make a new application. 
d. “Process acceptance of school place application” 
The child has received a message from the school it last applied to, allocating 
it a place at the school. Therefore, put the child into a dormant state – it need 
take no more actions. 
e. “Clean up schools once child has a place” 
Drools can automatically tidy up its working memory by removing any 
remaining schools that were asserted at the beginning of the year, in readiness 
for the next academic year. 
f. “Catch messages that were not understood” 
Print an error message if the child was sent a message (ontology item) by 
another agent that is not caught by any other rule. 
2. School rules 
a. “Research school place application” 
The equivalent of the child rule of the same name – all children who have 
applied to the school are ‘researched’ to determine their suitability, and a 
probability map is created from this. 
b. “Accept school place application” 
Send the applicant who was just selected by probability an acceptance 
message, and get ready to pick the next applicant. 
c. “Reject applicants for whom we have no space” 
Once the school is full, every application is sent a rejection message. 
The schools could not be given equivalent rules for the children’s clean-up rules 1.e and 
1.f because their rules are repeatedly fired by external sources; messages or data that are 
not currently needed may be required at a later point. This necessitates a clean-up 
operation in School’s postStep method.  
3.2.6 Co-evolutionary behaviour 
Co-evolutionary behaviour was defined in section 2.3 as a response in, say, the child 
population to a particular trait of schools, followed by the schools consequently adapting 
their own strategy again, and so on, rather than a simple adaptation of agents to their 
environment. So far, no adaptation has taken place at all by either agent type, even to the 
environment; we now attempt to model very basic adaptation that could perhaps be 
termed ‘co-evolutionary’. However, since the only strategies available to any agent are 
predetermined by those encoded in its decision rules, it could be argued that we are 
merely modelling adaptation at this stage, rather than true co-evolution. A more truly co-
evolutionary model might employ a genetic algorithm-like technique of evolving entirely 
new strategies, or imitating the most successful strategies of its competitors. 
Nevertheless, this project will refer to such behaviours as ‘co-evolutionary’, since the 
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agent populations are continually adapting to each other, as well as the school agents 
adapting to their competitors. 
Class blind preference 
The first co-evolutionary behaviour that was added was to broaden the range of school 
attributes that interest families. As described by Lauder and Hughes (1999), schools that 
are less successful in the league tables might diversify, taking on a niche position in the 
market. A possible niche position for a less high-performing school would be promoting 
an inclusive atmosphere, i.e. their class blind admissions policy. 
To simplify the co-evolutionary design, school strategies were reverted to their original 
restriction: they can be either class blind or class sensitive, not somewhere on the 
spectrum between the two. This seemed to make more sense than saying prefer a 
‘somewhat’ inclusive school over a ‘slightly’ inclusive school – either way, the school is 
ultimately not being properly inclusive. The exact degree of discrimination is surely 
irrelevant to families; only its presence or absence matters.  
An alternative would have been for children to look directly at the social make-up of the 
school, rather than indirectly at the school’s strategy. However, this would have placed 
the two factors of an inclusive atmosphere and league table position in direct opposition, 
since both would have effectively been measured by the same criterion – the school’s 
middle-class intake – with their ideal values for this criterion in direct conflict. It would 
also have meant that a low-performing school would not gain any advantage from a class-
blind policy, as its social class make-up would be skewed to favour working-class 
applicants; it would rate poorly on both factors. A school adopting a class blind policy is 
announcing its intention to foster an inclusive atmosphere, and those who agree with this 
intention can join it, thereby enabling it to achieve its objective. If the middle-class 
applicants were to wait to apply until the school had already achieved a representative 
social mix, this mix could never come about since there would be few middle-class 
applicants. 
To include multiple attributes in a decision, the model was refactored to use ‘factors’; all 
factors considered by a child must implement the SchoolFactor Java interface. Each 
such factor provides a method that, for a given school, calculates the child’s preference 
level for that school based solely on the factor in question. An equivalent design could be 
used for schools’ consideration of applicants, but this was not included in the current 
design since children were given no attributes other than that of social class which a 
school might wish to take into consideration.   
Using multiple factors meant that each had to be given a weighting. Rather than 
arbitrarily assuming each family assigns a weighting of, say, ⅓ to whether a school is 
class blind, and ⅔ to its league table performance, a normal distribution was used to 
create agent heterogeneity and add a touch of realism. The normal distribution’s mean 
and standard deviation are configurable simulation parameters. As well as the weighting 
given to the factors, the numerical preference assigned by families to a class blind school 
was also designed as a configurable normal distribution, since no empirical data was 
readily available to suggest suitable values. (It would of course have been extremely 
difficult to extrapolate a numerical value from such a dataset, even if it had been 
available). 
Having added this basic preference of families for class blind schools, rules were added to 
allow the agents to adapt their strategies dynamically. It seemed logical that families 
would be more drawn to class blind schools if the available schools were highly polarised 
in social class intake, and conversely that they would not care as much about the school’s 
policy if all schools had a very similar intake, and so rules to accomplish this preference 
adjustment were inserted. 
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Schools were first given the obvious rule of a class sensitive school adopting a class blind 
niche if it is not performing well in the league tables. It would not necessarily want to 
become class blind otherwise, even if that would increase its rating with families, because 
it would then lose the ability to improve its league table performance above the 
population average. This strategy is a defence mechanism against total polarisation: a 
school might be able to retain some fraction of its middle-class intake if it switches to a 
class-blind strategy before falling too far in the league tables. 
The ‘mirror’ rule of a class blind school becoming sufficiently highly rated in the league 
tables that it could afford to adopt a class sensitive strategy without losing its popularity 
then followed naturally. This could allow it to approach total polarisation more closely 
than if it remained class blind. 
Finally, a rule was added for schools to try to break out of the scenario where every single 
schools is class blind, and none is able to distinguish itself sufficiently well to gain a 
permanent advantage. This is of course not morally admirable, but as discussed in section 
2.1, schools aim to maximise their middle-class intake. We theorised that a possible 
solution was for a single school to bravely become class sensitive, in the hope that it 
could grasp a small initial advantage and turn it into a higher league table rating quickly 
enough before its poor ‘inclusiveness’ rating caused it to fall below the rest. However, 
this could easily backfire and nominate that school as everyone’s least preferred school if 
it happened to do badly in terms of league table ratings that year, instead handing its 
competitors an indirect advantage through its failure. 
School specialisms 
School strategies and league table ratings already provide a number of interesting 
strategic interactions, but we wanted to include another type of school attribute that was 
completely independent from school league tables to investigate a fuller spectrum of 
multi-attribute choices. The problem with the existing two school choice factors is that 
they are not independent: a class blind school will have a lower league table rating than a 
(successful) class sensitive one. A school can either have an exceptionally high league 
table rating, or employ a class blind strategy, but both at once are impossible
20
.  
Therefore, a third factor was added to the mix that was entirely independent of the other 
two factors: school specialisms were introduced. This is similar to the Specialist Schools 
Programme in the UK (DfES, 2003a), except that questions of raising funding from the 
private sector were not addressed at all (this might yet be an interesting avenue to 
explore, since presumably more successful schools would find it easier to attract 
funding). It was assumed that any school can simply adopt any one of a list of possible 
specialisms as it pleased, but that it could only change this choice once every ten years, as 
continual switching would most likely be counter-productive, merely wasting resources. 
The UK DfES defines ten distinct specialisms which schools can apply for. The number 
of possible specialisms was made a configurable parameter in the simulation, since it 
might be interesting to see how the possible diversity (or lack of it) affects the outcome. 
Each child was given an interest level for each of these specialisms according (as usual) 
to a normal distribution, with specialisms first ranked in a random order, and then given 
an interest level approximately proportional to the ranking assigned to it. This then 
determines how highly the child rates a school with that particular specialism. Section 
3.3.7 uses the example of adding the school specialism factors to show how the model 
can be extended in detail. 
                                                     
20 Unless of course working-class children were to suddenly prefer class sensitive schools over class blind ones, while 
middle-class children continued to favour high-performing class blind schools as expected, but that would make no sense, 
so it was not explored.  
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Section 102 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 declares that any specialist 
school may select up to 10% of its intake based on the applicant’s aptitude in the school’s 
specialism (DfES, 2003b). This would add an extra twist to the simulation, giving child 
agents more than one attribute of interest to schools. Unfortunately there was no time to 
add this to the simulation, but ChildFactors could easily be introduced that worked 
analogously to the existing SchoolFactors. The DfES also states that a school whose 
performance is declining is unlikely to gain approval for its application for specialist 
status; this could have provided some interesting interactions with other factors, had there 
been time to incorporate this extra condition. 
The rules added to the system for schools to decide upon their specialism were twofold. 
Firstly, if a school has a more successful competitor who has chosen the same specialism, 
it will switch to another type if possible, since that might open up a new corner of the 
market, and it is not gaining any advantage from its current specialism. Secondly, a 
ruthless rule was added for successful schools: they can choose the same specialism as a 
less successful competitor in order to steal that school’s niche. This would leave the other 
school with the same poor league table performance as previously, but bereft of the 
unique offering it had. All children who previously preferred that school because of their 
personal interests will now join the other children who preferred the leading school 
precisely because it was so successful. All the children who would have chosen the 
leading school because they were interested in its old specialism will now rate the leading 
school less highly; but the specialism attribute has effectively been eliminated from the 
equation (being equal for both schools), so it does not matter. The interactions between 
more than two schools would be more complex; it remains to be seen whether the rule 
still pays off in that scenario. 
Since the children change every year, and therefore the applicants’ favoured specialisms 
do as well, there is no advantage in schools trying to cater to specialisms they perceive as 
being popular. It might be more realistic (and more interesting) if trends were added to 
children’s interest levels, where perhaps their older siblings and other members of the 
community could conceivably influence their interest levels to positively correlate with 
the existing interests in that area. However, this would be most useful if data could be 
found on how high such correlations are. Again, the basic problem of quantifying such a 
subjective issue as ‘interest’ in a subject would be a major issue, even if the ideal dataset 
were available. As it is, the children’s linear decrease in preference among the ranked 
specialisms is no doubt inaccurate; but it seemed preferable to use an easily 
comprehensible preference assignment than to guess at a more complex function that 
would inevitably also be wrong. 
Structure of working memory 
After adding the co-evolutionary behaviour, the agents’ working memories needed to 
consider more facts, as shown below:  
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Figure 3.3 – Working memory contents of the co-evolutionary model. This expands upon 
Figure 3.2. The children’s working memory remains unchanged, but each school now needs to 
know about its competitor(s), as well as the domain knowledge of what specialisms it could 
potentially adopt. Note that the children are much less sophisticated than schools: they do not 
reason about their competitors. Schools, however, need to take account of their competitors’ 
strategies and specialisms. 
 
The rules 
The ruleset added to the basic rules outlined in the previous section are summarised 
below (continuing the previous numbering to give each rule a unique number, used in the 
experiments). The rules’ source code can be found in Appendix C, sections 11.2 and 11.4. 
3. Co-evolutionary child rules 
a. “Increase preference for class blind schools due to polarisation” 
Since the schools the child is considering are severely polarised by social 
class (the leading school must have a middle-class intake of 170% or more of 
the population average), the child is told to inflate its natural preference for 
class blind schools since the situation is more extreme than usual. 
b. “Decrease preference for class blind schools due to typical distribution” 
The differentiation between schools is not very significant – each school has 
a middle-class intake that is within 15% of the population average – so the 
child is asked to lower its natural preference for class blind schools, since 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
41 
even class sensitive schools are currently well-balanced. This rule is the 
complement to the previous one. 
c. “Remove class blind factor if all other schools are class blind” 
d. “Remove class blind factor if no schools are class blind” 
These two rules tell the child to remove its class blind preference factor from 
consideration, since it would make no difference: all schools would be 
equally preferred according to this factor. The weighting previously given to 
this factor can now be redistributed among the other factors, giving more 
significance to the differences between the schools. 
e. “Remove specialism factor if all schools have the same specialism” 
This rule is in the same spirit as the two previous ones: if there is no 
difference between schools’ specialisms, the child should not take its interest 
levels into account when evaluating the schools. This could also occur if the 
schools had no specialisms. 
4. Co-evolutionary school rules 
a.  “Adopt class blind niche” 
If the school is not doing very well in the league tables (10% or more below 
the population average), and its successful competitors are mostly using class 
sensitive strategies, it should switch to a class blind strategy to adopt a niche 
market. Children may overlook its poor league table rating in light of its 
inclusive admissions policy. 
b. “Popular enough to become class sensitive” 
This is the converse of the previous rule – if a class blind school is doing well 
in the league tables (10% or more above the population average), it should 
gamble that children’s class blind preferences are not extremely high, and 
switch to a class sensitive strategy to allow it to climb even higher. 
c. “Everyone else is class blind and we are all doing roughly the same” 
This rule was added to break schools out of the stable state in which all 
schools are class blind, and no leader can emerge since parental preferences 
are too low. One school takes the risk of becoming class sensitive so it can 
concentrate on accepting as many middle-class applicants as possible. This 
rule could backfire if the children’s preference for class blind schools is too 
high, but it also opens up the opportunity for the school to excel where it 
could otherwise only have remained average. 
d. “Change specialism to gain edge over leading school” 
If the school has a competitor who is rated higher in the league tables, and 
shares the same specialism, it should switch to a different specialism in the 
hope of attracting a niche market for that specialist subject instead. 
Otherwise, any children with a high interest in the subject would apply to the 
higher-rated school. 
e. “Change specialism to that of lesser school to take away its edge” 
This is again the converse of the previous rule; a ‘sabotage’ strategy. If  the 
school has an unsuccessful competitor with a different specialism, it should 
switch to that specialism as well in order to destroy the school’s specialist 
niche. All children who would previously have favoured that school now 
apply to this school instead since it is higher-rated. The school can take the 
risk of losing its own specialist niche market since it already caters to 
performance-oriented children anyway. 
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3.3 Implementation 
3.3.1 Parameters  
The following parameters are present in the final model: 
1. Fundamental parameters 
a. NumSteps – how many years the simulation should run for. 
b. NumSchools – the total number of schools used in the simulation. 
c. NumChildren – the total number of children applying for school places every 
year. The number of school places will be determined from this number, 
giving an equal number of places to each school. If the number of children 
does not divide evenly by the number of schools, the number of places in 
each school is rounded up, so a school could be left with up to numSchools - 
1 unfilled places every year. 
d. MiddleClassPreference – the preference coefficient given by middle-class 
children to high-performing schools. This is equivalent to a in Room and 
Britton’s model. 
e. WorkingClassPreference – the preference coefficient given by working-class 
children to high-performing schools. This is equivalent to b in Room and 
Britton’s model. 
f. SchoolPreferenceForMiddleClass – how much schools prefer middle-class 
children. A preference of 1.0 is equivalent to a class-blind strategy, while the 
maximum integer value (shown in the screenshot) is equivalent to a fully 
class-sensitive policy. 
2. Basic extensions 
a. InitialTwoSchoolInequity – the initial league table inequity two schools begin 
with at the start of the simulation. This only takes effect if only two schools 
are involved. 
b. NumStochasticShocks – how many stochastic shocks should be injected. 
They will occur in a random year, and hit random school(s) within that year. 
c. MinShock – the minimum value stochastic shocks can take. 
d. MaxShock – the maximum value stochastic shocks can take. Like 2c), only 
valid if NumStochasticShocks > 0. 
3. Co-evolutionary behaviour 
a. NumSchoolsClassBlind – the number of schools out of NumSchools that use 
class blind allocation strategies. For these schools, 
SchoolPreferenceForMiddleClass will not be used. This provides a crude 
mechanism for initialising schools with different strategies. 
b. ClassBlindPreferenceMean – the mean used in the normal distribution from 
which a child’s preference for class blind schools is picked. This is only valid 
if co-evolutionary behaviour is activated. 
c. ClassBlindPreferenceStdDeviation – the standard deviation used for the same 
purpose as 3b). 
d. LeagueTableWeightingMean – the mean used in the normal distribution used 
to generate the weighting given by a child to schools’ league table positions. 
The remaining weighting from 1.0 is divided equally between the other 
factors. 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
43 
e. LeagueTableWeightingStdDeviation – the standard deviation used for the 
same purpose as 3d). 
f. NumSpecialisms – the distinct number of specialisms between which schools 
can choose. 
Appendix B, section 10.1 gives an example of a batch parameter file, and instructions for 
running the simulation. 
3.3.2 Replicability of experiments 
Replicability is a vital attribute of any experiment. The results of an experiment cannot be 
trusted unless they can be replicated under the same conditions. For a computer 
simulation, this means that any stochastic elements must be deterministic. Repast allows 
this to be accomplished through its encapsulation of various functions from the Colt
21
 
pseudo-random number library. A pseudo-random number generator will always generate 
the same sequence of ‘random’ numbers if passed the same ‘random seed’ for initial 
configuration.  
In addition to the custom parameters detailed above, Repast automatically makes the 
RandomSeed parameter available to the user. This should be controlled carefully in 
experiments. 
Replicability is violated if any randomness that does not depend on the random seed is 
introduced, such as use of standard Java’s java.util.Random class. That is easy to avoid, 
but randomness introduced by an unordered data structure, like a hash table, whose 
contents are iterated through sequentially, is harder to detect. Such an ordering will not 
necessarily stay constant from one run to the next. Strangely, the Repast libraries 
themselves make use of this coding practice on occasion, and so those particular library 
classes could not be used. For this model, only uchicago.src.sim.network.Uniform- 
Reinforcement had to be replaced by a custom class, DeterministicProbabilityRule. 
This did have the advantage that the project code was simplified, since only the basic 
functionality of UniformReinforcement was needed, and so ‘dummy’ arguments to the 
method calls could be removed.  
The fact that Repast library code cannot be relied upon to act deterministically, despite 
the developers’ obvious recognition of the need for repeatable results (evidenced by the 
provision of the RandomSeed parameter, and remarks in their tutorials
22
), is 
disappointing. It appears to break the concept of encapsulation that Repast library classes 
cannot safely be used without first reading the source code to check for violations of 
determinism. 
3.3.3 Ordering within the rule body 
Another problem encountered was that the ordering of multiple actions within a rule body 
(or ‘consequence’) was very sensitive. One might naïvely assume that in a declarative 
environment like a production rule system this would not be the case, but the problem lies 
in the fact that one rule firing may trigger another – and this can occur before the original 
rule has finished executing. So if a rule body contains two actions, each of which 
modifies a property of an object, another rule may fire as soon as the first property was 
changed, even though the second property modification would have suppressed it again. 
The problem with this is that the side effects of an action are not always immediately 
                                                     
21  “a set of Open Source Libraries for High Performance Scientific and Technical Computing in Java” – available from 
http://dsd.lbl.gov/~hoschek/colt/index.html (accessed 11 March 2007) 
22 The definitive random numbers tutorial for Repast is available at http://repast.sourceforge.net/how-to/random.html 
(accessed 23 April 2007) 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
44 
apparent, especially when one of a cohesive group is considered in isolation. A 
synchronisation mechanism such as that used in database transactions would have been of 
help here. Fortunately, while this was an issue during evolutionary development, 
refactoring simplified the final version of the simulation so that it was no longer a 
problem. Nonetheless, future extensions of the simulation could complicate the design to 
a point where it became an issue again. 
It should be noted that this would not be an issue if the property change listener design 
pattern was not used to notify Drools of changes to agents’ properties (see section 3.2.5). 
If this were replaced by a Drools call to modify(agent) at the end of each rule’s body, 
the ordering within the rule body would no longer matter. However, additional calls to 
modify would need to be scattered throughout the Java code, which we wished to avoid. 
3.3.4 Memory leaks 
Running many simulations back-to-back in batch mode, sometimes for days on end, 
meant that even a small memory leak, which might ordinarily go undetected, was 
catastrophic. A large portion of the debugging effort was therefore spent on this type of 
bug, despite Java’s provision of garbage-collection (these bugs were typically due to 
static references, which cannot be garbage-collected). One in particular was noteworthy; 
it appeared when the Java prototype was converted to use Drools. Drools supports the use 
of a PropertyChangeListener helper class, which informs the working memory when 
any Java bean-style property thought to be of potential interest has changed (see section 
3.2.5). This is a common design pattern, and so an implementation of 
PropertyChangeListener is provided in the standard Java library code 
(java.beans.PropertyChangeSupport). This class was found to not be garbage-
collectable. Fortunately, an open source alternative was available
23
 since the problem had 
been encountered by others before. However, the trade-off for obtaining a memory-safe 
class is that it is no longer serializable. This issue would need to be addressed if the 
model were to be developed into distributed software. 
3.3.5 Performance 
The performance of Drools programs can vary widely depending on whether the rules are 
written with efficiency concerns in mind (Proctor et al., 2006, section 7). Caching the 
compiled rule packages removes much of the initialisation overhead of using one working 
memory per agent. However, it was the performance of the agents during the simulation 
run that proved a serious issue for this project. While the Java model took 1 minute and 
24 seconds to run a basic two-school scenario for 200 years
24
, the Drools model took 38 
minutes, or 53 minutes if all co-evolutionary behaviour was enabled. The use of Drools 
clearly adds huge overheads to the simulation: a working memory needs to be set up for 
each of 402 agents, each of which maintains references to many of the other agents and 
objects, and handles its own sophisticated rule-firing mechanism. The co-evolutionary 
behaviour causes an additional drop in performance because its rules have greater 
complexity than the standard ones. Drools cannot cache some of these more sophisticated 
conditions; this has a big impact on efficiency.  
The class blind niche adoption rule is the worst culprit: it includes a Drools function call 
in the rule’s condition, for checking whether ‘most’ of the school’s competitors are class 
sensitive. The woolly concept of ‘most’ is not one that can be expressed using Drools 
                                                     
23 Under IBM’s Common Public License; available from Simmons(2004). 
24 These three tests were each run on alis.cs.bath.ac.uk, a Linux machine with four 2.66GHz CPUs and approximately 
1.5GB of RAM. Approximately 34% of alis’ memory was used in the most demanding test, and one of the CPUs was used 
at around 99% capacity throughout, to the best of the author’s knowledge. A distributed program would have been able to 
take advantage of alis’ multiple CPUs, which would have led to a large performance improvement. 
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primitives, and so a Drools function must be used to enable the condition to be defined 
through arbitrary Java code. Naturally, the result of this function call cannot be cached by 
Drools, since it has no way of knowing what data is referenced, and therefore when the 
return value might change. It might, however, be possible to express a ‘most’ relationship 
using the new Drools conditional element ‘accumulate’, which can be used for set 
operations (JBoss, 2007).  
The other major factor in the simulation’s poor performance is that the addition of co-
evolutionary behaviour required schools’ working memories to hold references to the 
school’s competitors, as well as to the school itself. To identify the school agent for whom 
the working memory is acting, a global variable ‘myID’ is used, which is matched to the 
schools’ ID property. Use of ‘myID’ would require a check like this in every rule: 
school : School( placesLeft > 0, ID == myID). 
Unfortunately, Drools does not currently support the use of global variables in this 
manner. There is no apparent technical reason why this cannot be done. The rule engine 
already assumes that global variables remain constant throughout execution, so it cannot 
be a question of how Drools could tell that the variable had been modified; it seems that it 
has simply not been implemented yet. Instead, the check must be wrapped in a call to 
eval: 
school : School( placesLeft > 0, ID == myID) 
eval(school.getID() == myID). 
Drools cannot cache anything inside an eval statement, so this places a huge run-time 
overhead on the rule engine. 
This burden was propagated to the basic school rules, which, being sometimes used by 
co-evolutionary schools, needed to be able to cope with several different schools being 
present in working memory. Fortunately, the check could be bypassed in many cases: 
namely, where the school was considering a child’s application. The application message 
is only sent to the school it is being made to, which it references directly in a property, so 
a rule containing e.g. 
school : School( placesLeft > 0) 
Application(appRound : applicationRound, schoolInvolved == school) 
does not require an additional check against myID, since the only school in working 
memory matching the constraint of being referenced by the application will be the school 
which the rules are operating on. 
The negative impact of rule conditions that cannot be cached can be lessened by placing 
them last in the list of rule conditions; then they will not be evaluated unless all other 
conditions match. More generally, rule conditions should always be ordered so that the 
condition least likely to match is listed first; this will save unnecessary evaluation of the 
other conditions whenever it does not match. When the rules were refactored in order to 
improve performance, significant gains were found here.  
The Drools manual (Proctor et al., 2006, section 7) suggests that disabling the indexing 
done automatically can help performance in some cases, although the savings are 
generally seen in memory usage rather than in speed. However, typically indexing should 
be left enabled, as it is of course designed to improve performance in most systems. Left- 
and right-indexing of node matches can be enabled and disabled independently. We found 
that disabling left-indexing brought no performance gain; and unexpectedly, disabling 
right-indexing caused the system to no longer function correctly! The less favoured 
school was not filling all its places, leaving some children unallocated; this indicates that 
its application acceptance rule was not firing in the second round of applications. This 
could mean that the rules inadvertently rely on some aspect of right-indexing that they 
should not, strictly speaking. To determine whether this was the case would require an in-
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depth investigation of Drools’ indexing mechanism, but this discovery was only made at 
the end of the project. However, the Drools development team does not believe this is 
possible
25
. In any case, the effect of disabling indexing various enormously from rule set 
to rule set, as it is only a ‘tweak’ for unusual rule combinations, so it would be of little use 
in a project where the rule set itself is an experimental parameter, and keeps changing. 
Were this project to be continued on a larger scale, the simulation’s poor performance 
would need to be addressed more seriously. The forthcoming release of Drools does claim 
that it is “much faster than before, and uses less memory”; however, it is currently 
“unstable” and was therefore not tested (JBoss, 2007). 
3.3.6 Tracing and logging 
Any non-trivial simulation will soon become so complex that a detailed analysis of its 
output must examine exactly which behaviours or rules were fired when; to guess using 
intuition is insufficient, because it is easy to overlook an interaction between rules. The 
next version of Drools will offer debugging facilities for examining working memory and 
the activation stack directly; this would be useful, but it is not sufficient. Since the 
experiments take so long to run, each should have an associated log of which key rules 
were used, and at what time. 
Drools offers an ‘audit’ facility that produces a log of which rules were fired; it monitors 
one working memory at a time. The volume of data this produces is immense, although 
filters can be set up; what is perhaps more problematic is that a log is created for each 
working memory in isolation, whereas we are also interested in which agent acts first, and 
how their actions affect each other. For example, if one school changes its strategy, a 
competitor may also change its strategy, in response. The output is also not especially 
human-readable (a small selection is shown in Appendix B, section 10.3). 
Instead, we used our own basic logger that writes both to the console and to one single 
file per run. A print statement can be put inside any rule in which the researcher is 
interested; like any print statement, it can of course also reference other variables if 
desired. This allows the exact order of events to be tracked, and to be separated by 
academic year. It was sufficient to understand the underlying behaviour in the 
experiments undertaken in this project. This approach was also more efficient than giving 
each agent its own logger that has to constantly monitor working memory. 
3.3.7 Extendibility 
The Java model is not especially extendible, but the Drools model supports evolutionary 
development very well: it is generally very straightforward to add new functionality. If 
the system is simply to behave in a different way using existing data, it is likely that only 
the Drools rules will need to be modified. Since the rules are re-compiled every time the 
simulation is run, the rules files can be edited as plain text without even needing to 
recompile the Java application, making it suitable even for non-programmers. 
Adding new functionality does, of course, require modifications to be made to the Java 
model as well. By way of example, here is a description of the steps taken to add a new 
attribute to schools that children take into account during school choice: school 
specialisms, to be matched against children’s interests. 
1. Add a new parameter to the simulation: the number of possible specialisms schools 
can adopt. This merely requires adding a variable to the main model class, 
SchoolChoiceModel, with Java bean-style getter and setter methods, and adding the 
                                                     
25 See the ongoing support discussion at http://www.nabble.com/Disabling-indexing-causes-error-
tf3668001.html#a10254888 (accessed 30 April 2007) 
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name of the parameter to the list of parameters in the getInitParams method. Repast 
now automatically adds the parameter to its list of configurable values, both in the 
user interface and via parameter files. 
2. We must now give each school a specialism. We decide that specialisms are a type of 
co-evolutionary behaviour, and so we add this to School’s subclass Evolutionary-
School, rather than to School itself. A third alternative would be to create an entirely 
new subclass of School, with its own ‘add-on’ rule file that extends the base set of 
rules like the co-evolutionary rules do. Since we may later wish to expand upon the 
concept of a specialism, we create a Specialism class rather than just using an 
integer identifier, which would suffice at present. 
EvolutionaryChild is assigned an interest level in each specialism, according to a 
normal distribution centred on decreasing values for each specialism in the list. To 
increase heterogeneity among the agents, we must randomise the list of specialisms 
before assigning preference values. Since interest levels are assumed to be different 
for each child, we reset them every year in the child’s preStep method (remembering 
that the Child objects are reused every year for efficiency, but represent a new child 
each time). 
3. Give EvolutionaryChild the ability to consider a school’s specialism, by creating a 
new subclass of SchoolFactor, SpecialismFactor, with a simple decision 
procedure of querying the child for its interest level in a given specialism. This new 
factor is now added to the weighted list of factors in EvolutionaryChild’s 
setupSchoolChoice-Factors, It seems that the league table performance is probably 
still the most important factor of the three, but the exact importance is arguable, so 
the parameters for its normal distribution (mean and standard deviation) are added as 
simulation parameters as in step 1). For now, the remainder of the weighting is 
divided equally between a preference for class blind schools, and the school’s 
specialism.  
4. Optionally, new rules can be added to work with the new data. Here, rules were added 
for schools to change specialism under certain circumstances, and for children to 
reassign the weighting they gave specialisms if all schools have the same specialism. 
In order for Drools to know about data in the model, it must be ‘asserted’ into the 
appropriate working memory; agents have the convenience methods assertConstant 
and assertVariable for this purpose. assertConstant should be used for efficiency 
purposes if the data is immutable or any change is irrelevant; if assertVariable is to 
be used, the data class must support property listeners as described in section 3.2.5. 
3.4 Testing 
As for any simulation, the primary form of testing was through validation of experimental 
output. The fundamental aspects of the model could be validated against Room and 
Britton’s original model, as detailed in chapter 5, but the extensions could not be tested as 
thoroughly, having only the author’s predictions and common-sense reasoning to be 
compared against. All features of the model were subject to a sensitivity 
analysis/parameter sweep as discussed in chapter 4, in the hope of uncovering anomalous 
behaviour, but due to the vast parameter space, only a small subset of possible parameter 
combinations could be tested. The model can therefore certainly not be said to be 
‘correct’; only that it conforms to those tests that were chosen. However, any non-trivial 
simulation suffers from this criticism to an extent. 
Since the model was constantly evolving during the project, regression tests were used 
throughout to verify that the addition of a feature had not compromised previously 
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working functionality. Due to the nature of the model, which contains many stochastic 
components, these tests could not be automated by test harnesses such as JUnit which 
check against expected results, such as might be used in conventional software 
development. Even a minor change to the program generally caused the output to change, 
even using the same random seed, because the pseudo-random numbers were used 
slightly differently in the two versions. The overall pattern of the output therefore had to 
be manually checked, which limited how often such tests could be performed, especially 
given the system’s long running times. The most comprehensive set of tests of this kind 
were run when the system was converted from the initial Java prototype to the Drools 
version, as detailed in section 9.3. These were re-run many times throughout the 
development of the Drools model, and then detailed in this report for the final version of 
the program. The fact that the definitive set of regression tests could only be run once all 
development had finished, yet the program was designed to progress incrementally, meant 
that the parameter space could not be covered as thoroughly as it should. Instead, the 
most representative tests were chosen. 
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4 Design of Experiments 
4.1 Experimental variables 
Independent variables 
For the initial prototype, the only direct parameters (defined in section 3.2) thought to be 
significant to the experimental results were: 
1. FractionMiddleClassPopulation; 
2. MiddleClassPreference; 
3. WorkingClassPreference; 
4. SchoolStrategy 
For the full model, the following additional parameters (defined in section 3.3.1) were 
viewed as significant: 
1. SchoolPreferenceForMiddleClass – this replaces the SchoolStrategy parameter 
2. NumSchools 
3. InitialTwoSchoolInequity 
4. NumStochasticShocks 
5. MinShock and MaxShock 
6. NumSchoolsClassBlind 
7. ClassBlindPreferenceMean  
8. ClassBlindPreferenceStdDeviation 
9. LeagueTableWeightingMean 
10. LeagueTableWeightingStdDeviation 
11. NumSpecialisms 
Program behaviour – specifically, the presence or absence of Drools rules – presented 
another kind of parameter that could be manipulated. 
Dependent variables 
In the class blind case, the dependent variables were: 
1. Whether schools take on stable, differentiated positions with regard to the 
fraction of middle-class intake; 
2. If so, how soon this occurs; and 
3. How large the inequity is (z* in Room and Britton’s paper). 
In the class sensitive case, the dependent variables were: 
1. Whether the schools take on completely polarised roles where the leading school 
accepts as many middle-class children as exist and it has places for, and the 
‘second-rate’ school receives only those middle-class children for whom there is 
no space in the leading school; 
2. If so, how soon this occurs. 
However, in each experiment other aspects of the output could take on significance, such 
as patterns observed in some cases but not others. This type of qualitative analysis could 
not be predicted in advance, especially for a model of a complex system. 
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Confounding variables 
The choice of random seed introduces ‘noise’, so several runs of an experiment should be 
run in order to gain confidence that the results obtained are not dependent on the 
particular sequence of random numbers used. Comparison of these runs involved looking 
at overall patterns and trends rather than local ‘random noise’ that would be impossible to 
replicate with a different random seed. An achievable number of repeat runs in a project 
of this scale was set at 100, although of course more repeat runs would increase the 
reliability of the results. It was initially set at 10 with the intention of repeating most 
experiments 10 times, but this was found to be unworkable, both due to the large number 
of experiments with long running times, and the large variability that was often found 
within only 10 runs. Instead, it seemed preferable to choose some representative runs and 
repeat them 100 times to ascertain more accurately the variability present for each distinct 
type of experiment. The same random seed, 1171139146239, was used in every other 
experiment unless stated otherwise. 
The number of children could act as a confounding variable if there are too few agents to 
form a representative sample. Similarly, the number of ‘steps’ or years the simulation 
runs for could conceal interesting or anomalous behaviour if set too low. These issues are 
addressed in the next section. 
There was also a risk of even minor program changes acting as a confounding variable. 
This is because when adding, removing, or even just reordering uses of the random 
number generator, different results should be expected. The results would not be expected 
to differ to any degree greater than that of using a different random seed, of course. 
Nevertheless, it was important to be aware of this source of extraneous randomness, and 
to eliminate it where possible by keeping the program constant. Since the project 
progressed in an evolutionary manner, with experiments being run in parallel with 
development throughout, it would have taken too long to repeat every single experiment 
right at the end of development to ensure they all used the same program. A workable 
compromise was to run all experiments up to 6.1 (inclusive) against the final version of 
the Java model, and all results dependent on the Drools extensions against the final 
version of the Drools model, allowing the first set of experiments to run while 
development progressed on later extensions. A thorough validation of the Drools model 
against the Java model was also performed in experiment 6.2, to give an indication of the 
level of agreement between the two sets of experiments. 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The first set of experiments to be conducted should be a form of sensitivity analysis, to 
give confidence in the model: in other words, to confirm that it is not unreasonably 
affected by minor alterations in parameters. The caveat that it is modelling a complex 
system, so entirely predictable results would also be a cause for concern, should however 
be borne in mind.  
It is unfeasible to investigate the full parameter space of any nontrivial model. At least the 
digital nature of the simulation means that we cannot consider the infinite domain of real 
numbers (only those that can be represented by the computer); but even so, an intractable 
number of different combinations would result if every possible parameter value were 
combined with every other.  
Instead, the experimenter should rank the parameters in order of expected significance, 
and initially undertake a relatively comprehensive investigation of the most important 
parameter’s space. Other parameters should be set to values felt to be representative or 
‘sensible’ based both on intuition, the existing analytical study of Room and Britton’s 
model, and a little informal experimentation with our model. This should reveal 
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‘sensitive’ areas where that particular parameter has a significant effect on the simulation. 
It could be, for example, that a parameter has the same impact for all values >= 10. This 
would allow us to prune the parameter space search tree of all branches on which that 
particular parameter is greater than 10, leaving us with a representative test where it is 
equal to 10. 
Next, the parameter assessed as being second in importance should be varied alongside 
the first parameter, keeping the first parameter within the ‘sensitive’ set of values 
identified for it previously. Next the third parameter will be varied alongside the first and 
second, and so forth. 
This approach has drawbacks: the ranking of parameters is subjective and prone to 
expectation bias. More significantly, our assumption that parameters producing the same 
experimental result can be compressed into a single parameter, representative of that 
result, ignores the fact that in a complex system, unexpected interactions may occur 
between parameters. However, time constraints prevent a more thorough method being 
used, such as the automated parameter search techniques described in section 2.6. 
The question of how fine-grained the parameter increments should be remains. A simple 
linear increase by a small, constant value would be one option; or alternatively, a 
logarithmic scale could be used. Logarithmic variations suit two types of parameter 
especially well: 
1. A parameter whose domain starts at a constant value (say 0) and increases into 
infinity, since the larger the parameter becomes, the less variation between intervals 
one would expect; 
2. A parameter that is defined by a strict upper and lower limit (say 0 and 1), but has a 
particular value of interest, around which interesting results are expected to cluster. 
Those types of parameter appear in this model among the significant set: parental 
preference (of either class) for middle-class schools is of type 1, and the fraction of 
middle-class children in the population is of type 2, with the most polarised behaviour 
expected to take place at 0.5 according to the analysis of Room and Britton’s model. 
Therefore, an efficient set of values for analysing this type 2 parameter was the series 
0.18 0.34 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.82 
that centres logarithmically around 0.5, the most interesting value.  
Alongside SchoolStrategy, which is a simple binary value in the initial prototype, those 
three parameters form the set of significant parameters in the model. In the more 
advanced model, SchoolStrategy was converted into a type 1 parameter, 
SchoolPreferenceForMiddleClass, which was expected to produce similar behaviour to 
the parental preferences, so logarithmic parameter adjustment seemed appropriate in all 
cases. 
The SchoolStrategy parameter alters the significance ranking of the remaining 
parameters, so the two cases ‘class blind’ and ‘class sensitive’ were considered entirely 
separately. The ranking of the remaining three parameters felt to be most appropriate was 
as follows: 
1. In the class blind case: 
1. Middle-class parental preference for schools 
• Set working-class preference = ½ middle-class preference 
• Set fraction middle-class population = 0.5 
2. Working-class parental preference for schools 
• Set fraction middle-class population = 0.5 
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3. Fraction middle-class population 
1. In the class sensitive case: 
1. Middle-class parental preference for schools 
• Set working-class preference = ½ middle-class preference 
• Set fraction middle-class population = 0.5 
2. Working-class parental preference for schools (predicted by Room and 
Britton’s model to be irrelevant in this case) 
3. Fraction middle-class population  
Even though the fraction of the population that was middle-class was held to be more 
important than the working-class parental preference, it was considered preferable to 
eliminate the need to consider the working-class preference parameter as early on as 
possible, which is why it was investigated earlier. In retrospect, this was probably a 
mistake, and the order of the last two parameters should have been reversed. Although 
informal tests (as well as common sense reasoning) had indicated that the working-class 
parameter also had no impact on unusual values of the middle-class fraction, this was not 
investigated formally as it should have been. 
The greater the number of children used, the more accurate the experimental outcome; or 
rather, the closer it would be expected to lie to the results of the mathematical model, 
since statistical anomalies would be averaged out in a larger dataset. However, large 
numbers of children would require more computing power, and not be as realistic. In fact, 
statistical anomalies do occur in real life; therein lies some of the interest of empirical 
experimentation. It seemed from discussions and experimentation that 200 children per 
school, per year was a reasonable number. An experiment investigated the effect of 
varying this number.  
The number of steps required varied from experiment to experiment – in the class blind 
case, 500 steps were initially chosen to ensure that no unexpected behaviour emerging 
later on in the simulation was being overlooked. However, the rapid emergence of the 
final pattern, and its obvious stability, soon led to this being reduced to 200 steps; even 
this seemed ‘generous’. In the class sensitive case, the most appropriate number of steps 
was less clear, since in the most borderline of cases, we might wait indefinitely for 
polarisation to occur. The somewhat arbitrary cut-off point of 1500 years was chosen, 
since most activity of interest seemed to occur within 1500 years even in the borderline 
cases. A few experiments required this number to be increased; this was judged on a case-
by-case basis after initially using 1500 years. Of course, no social policy would even 
contemplate the adoption of such a long-term view, but we nevertheless investigated the 
model to this depth to enable us to better understand its behaviour. 
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5 Experimental Results: Replicating the original model 
The initial Java-based prototype must first be shown to replicate Room and Britton’s 
findings, as a basic form of validation. This was accomplished, although section 5.1.1 
details a discrepancy that we argue necessitates an adjustment to Room and Britton’s 
model. All of the experiments involve only two schools, as in the original model. 
Throughout this chapter and the next, “middle-class preference” is used to refer to the 
preference of middle-class families for schools rated highly in the league tables (a in 
Room and Britton’s model), and “working-class preference” equivalently (b).  
5.1 Class blind case 
5.1.1 Sweep of middle-class – working-class preferences for successful schools 
As explained in section 4.2, middle-class families’ preference for high-performing 
schools is taken to be the most significant parameter. Experimentation showed that 
logarithmically increasing values of 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32 and 0.64 all 
produced essentially the same effect, being too low to produce any significant 
differentiation. Values from 1.28 onwards produced increasingly greater differentiation. 
Therefore, the middle-class preferences chosen for this experiment were 0.64, 1.28, 2.56, 
5.12, 10.24, and 20.48. Each was paired against the working-class preferences 0.01, 0.02, 
0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64, 1.28, 2.56, 5.12, 10.24, and 20.48.  
Room and Britton assume that the working-class preference is always less than the 
middle-class preference, so pairings that do not satisfy this constraint cannot be validated 
against their model (they are also not realistic, as Room and Britton argue, but 
nevertheless interesting to consider briefly).  
As was also discussed in section 4.2, the fraction of middle-class children in the 
population was kept constant at 0.5; each school was given 200 places; and the simulation 
was run for 500 years. The experiment produced three kinds of result:  
a) If the preference values were too low, or identical, no differentiation occurred: 
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Figure 5.1 – Class blind schools with middle-class preference 0.64, working-class preference 
0.01. These preferences are too weak to produce differentiation 
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b) If the middle-class preference was suitably high, and the difference between it and the 
working-class preference large enough, the two schools divided into a leading and 
‘second-rate’ role: 
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Figure 5.2 - Middle-class preference 5.12 and working-class preference 0.01 for middle-class 
schools produces a marked differentiation between the schools’ middle-class intake 
 
c) In the speculative case where working-class preference exceeded middle-class 
preference, an odd pattern emerged: 
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Figure 5.3 - Middle-class preference of 2.56 with a much larger working-class preference of 
20.48, causing continual switching of school league table positions 
The effect in c) is due to any slight increase in either school’s middle-class intake making 
it vastly more attractive to working-class families, but only mildly more attractive to 
middle-class families. This school therefore experiences a boom in working-class 
applications; this however brings its middle-class intake down again, since any middle-
class family choosing this school will be competing against an unusually large pool of 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
55 
applicants. The rejected middle-class applicants therefore re-apply to the other school, 
joining the ones who already chose the ‘second-rate’ school in the first round. The 
schools therefore switch roles continually. The small lag between switching roles is 
because league table ratings are an average of the middle-class intake over the past four 
years, so differences in the school’s composition take a little while to have a strong effect. 
This effect was observed in all cases where the working-class preference exceeded the 
middle-class preference, provided the working-class preference is high enough to produce 
significant (temporary) differentiation. Since this seems logical, we will view this as 
further informal evidence that the model is functioning correctly. But this phenomenon 
does not seem to warrant further attention, since it lacks realism. 
Case b), in which differentiation between schools emerges, can be validated more 
thoroughly with regard to Room and Britton’s model. Their Mathematical Annex (Room 
and Britton, 2006b) includes a calculation 
,
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Equation 5.1  - Predicted inequity z* for class blind schools 
where, as before, θ is the fraction of the population that is middle-class (currently fixed at 
0.5), a is the middle-class preference for middle-class schools, and b is the equivalent 
working-class preference. This gives the expected ‘gap’ or inequity between two class 
blind schools. 
If their model does not predict any significant differentiation between schools, the 
formula produces a negative value, which has here been truncated to 0, to allow 
comparison with simulation results. 
z* was calculated for each of the simulation runs in this test, producing the following 
prediction: 
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0.64 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1.28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2.56 0.2140 0.2093 0.2000 0.1818 0.1470 0.0833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5.12 0.6062 0.6031 0.5968 0.5846 0.5606 0.5147 0.4305 0.2875 0.0729 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10.24 0.8029 0.8011 0.7976 0.7906 0.7769 0.7500 0.6985 0.6041 0.4437 0.2031 0.0000 0.0000
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Figure 5.4 - Inequity between class blind schools, as predicted by Room and Britton’s model. 
The vertical axis shows the predicted inequity between the schools’ fraction of middle-class 
pupils. The bars are grouped by working-class preference running along the horizontal axis (0.01-
20.48), with each shade of bar representing a different middle-class preference (0.64-20.48). The 
actual data values are shown below to draw attention to all the 0 values. 
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Their model predicts no inequity will occur with middle-class preference 1.28 or lower; 
and if the working-class preference is ≥ middle-class preference. Next, the actual 
inequities obtained in the simulation runs were measured: 
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Figure 5.5 - Actual inequity observed between class blind schools, following the same format 
as Figure 5.4. 
These were much lower than expected for high middle-class preferences, but relatively 
accurate for low values of middle-class preference. None of the cases show a difference 
of exactly 0, but that is to be expected, due to the effects of randomness. Figure 5.6 shows 
the differences between the expected and actual values: 
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Figure 5.6 – Differences between the predicted values of Figure 5.4 and the actual values of 
Figure 5.5. It follows the same format as they do, so that the horizontal axis represents categories 
of working-class preference, while each bar shade stands for a different middle-class preference. 
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It is clear that our model does not correspond well to the equations’ prediction with high 
values of middle-class preference. A second experiment takes a closer look at its 
correspondence with lower, less extreme middle-class preferences, ranging from 1.25 to 
2.45 (and using only a subset of working-class preferences, 0.01, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64 
and 1.28): 
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Figure 5.7 – Differences between predicated and simulated school inequity, focusing on 
‘normal’, non-extreme middle-class preferences. The model corresponds much more closely to 
expectation within this range, with a mean difference magnitude of only 0.0130. (Note that the 
scale of this figure is 10x that of Figure 5.6). 
Based on this evidence, we can conclude that the model performs according to 
expectation with normal values of middle-class preference, but that it does not produce as 
high a differentiation with extreme values as Room and Britton’s model predicts. Either 
this model is not reliable with very high values of middle-class preference, or Room and 
Britton did not intend such high values to be described by their model, perhaps deeming 
them unrealistic. 
The only restrictions Room and Britton placed on their model’s middle and working-class 
preferences a and b are that a > b and a, b > 0. However, it is suggested here that the only 
reason they placed no upper bound on the preferences was perhaps that an arbitrary value 
would have to be picked. For high enough preference values, their predictions become 
inaccurate, evidenced as follows: 
Firstly, according to Room and Britton (2006b), referring to the class blind case, “The 
model does not predict that one school will monopolise all of the middle-class students. 
Rather, the size of the ultimate inequity is z*” (see Equation 5.1). Yet, for sufficiently 
high a and low b, we get z*≈1, i.e. complete polarisation. E.g. a=100, b=0.01 gives 
z*=0.98. This seems at odds with their intentions. 
Secondly, working through the mechanics of school admissions, it seems clear that for the 
above example, z*=0.98 cannot be the case. Suppose we have two schools, A and B. A is 
in the lead, and because the middle-class preference is extreme, every single middle-class 
family selects A. So far all is well. However, even though working-class families have 
only a very slight preference for school A, they do not disfavour it either; and so 
approximately half of them select school A, choosing between A and B almost arbitrarily.  
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Since school A is class blind, it selects among its applicants completely randomly. 
Suppose there are 400 children in total; then school A will have exactly 200 middle-class 
applicants, and approximately 100 working-class applicants, with fluctuations year-on-
year due to randomness. Then school A will select randomly from its pool of 300 
applicants, resulting in a roughly 2/3 middle-class school population. There is no reason, 
apart from an unusual sequence of pseudo random numbers, that any school should ever 
be more than 2/3 or less than 1/3 middle-class in this scenario. In other words, z* = 1/3 
using a typical sequence of random numbers. 
The above version of events supports the results obtained in this experiment fully. Thus, 
assuming no error has been made, it seems that the simulation has already been of use in 
exposing a hidden assumption in Room and Britton’s model: that it only predicts 
accurately for non-extreme preferences. However, it seems useless to pick a number x 
based on experimentation and say it defines the boundary between extreme and non-
extreme preferences, since x + 0.01 would probably produce little difference to x’s result.  
Room and Britton define z*=x1*-x2*, where x1* and x2* describe the middle-class 
composition of the schools 1 and 2 respectively. Suppose school 1 has the advantage. 
Then, based on the reasoning described above, we can say that   
,
)1(2
2
*
NN
N
x
θθ
θ
−+
≤1  
Equation 5.2 – maximal middle-class fraction a class blind school can contain, assuming N is 
large enough to average out local random number spikes 
where N is the number of places in available in each school, i.e. x1* could never exceed 
numMiddleClassApplicants/numTotalApplicants
26
. (The higher the difference between 
middle and working-class preference, the bigger x1*.) Room and Britton already state that 
x2*=2θ-x1*.  
Room and Britton’s z* equation (Equation 5.1) could easily be adapted to accommodate 
this extra consideration we have discovered if it were truncated so that 
 
},2*)max(2*,min{* 1 θ−= xzz  
Equation 5.3 - adapted definition for z* that supports extreme preferences as well as ‘normal’ 
ones 
using the ‘max’ function to refer to the maximal value x1* can take on, as newly defined 
in Equation 5.2. The right-hand component is simply a reordering of existing equations, 
since  
z* = x1* - x2* = x1* - (2θ - x1*) = 2x1* - 2θ 
The use of the min function to truncate z* serves to enforce our observation that x1* has a 
maximal value
27
. 
From here onwards, the calculation of z* can be assumed to incorporate this truncation. 
                                                     
26 2θN corresponds to the total number of middle class children in this district, 2 * 0.5 * 200 = 200 in this case, which 
is the maximum number who could apply; (1-θ)N corresponds to half the total number of working class children, which is 
the minimum who could apply, assuming typical random numbers and the lowest working class preference possible (i.e. 0). 
(1-θ)N = 0.5 * 200 = 100 in this case, giving us x1* ≤ 2/3 as desired. 
27 Continuing the earlier example, we have already calculated x1* ≤ 2/3; now we can calculate that z*=2*2/3 - 
2*0.5=1/3, as desired.  
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5.1.2 Sweep of middle-class fraction of the population 
Next, the original model’s prediction that the closer the middle-class fraction of the 
population is to 0.5, the larger the inequity between schools z* shall be tested. 
The case middle-class preference = 2.56, working-class preference = 0.01 was chosen, so 
that z* would be relatively high, and not fall away too rapidly as we move away from 0.5. 
The results are shown in Appendix A (Figure 9.1). They show an average error of 0.016; 
this seems reasonable, given that the values could range from 0 to 0.66. Therefore, having 
established that the results are relatively trustworthy, let us look at the actual inequity 
measured in the simulation run: 
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Figure 5.8 - Inequity between the two schools' fraction of middle-class intake, while varying 
the fraction of middle-class population. (Note that the intervals between bars are logarithmic, 
centred on 0.5, rather than being evenly spaced.) 
Interestingly, Room and Britton’s claim that the inequity will be larger the closer the 
fraction middle-class population is to 0.5 seems to hold for values > 0.5, but not for 
values < 0.5 (apart from for fraction 0.18, which exhibits no inequity). Upon examining 
their predictions in more detail (see Appendix A, Figure 9.2), it seems that their equations 
do not support their statement that a value of 0.5 will produce the greatest inequity; 
rather, a small peak is predicted around 0.46, which falls off to either side, but far more 
steeply in the < 0.5 direction. The simulation’s output seems to therefore be validated by 
Room and Britton’s more formal prediction. 
The simulation was repeated with an extreme middle-class preference of 20.48 to see 
what would happen, and to further test our amendment to their original z* formula. The 
working-class preference was kept at 0.01 to increase the ‘extreme conditions’. This 
resulted in a very close match of the expected with the actual data, with an average error 
of only 0.0017. Without the adjustment to their formula suggested here, the error would 
have been 0.58. 
5.1.3 Class blind variation found using different random seeds 
For all the simulation runs so far, a constant random seed has been used, to enable fair 
comparison between them. However, the results have little reliability if it cannot be 
demonstrated that using a different random seed would not have produced a substantially 
different result. Therefore, three representative cases were run with 100 different random 
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seeds each. The simulations were run for 500 years to minimise variation due to initial 
conditions. 
No differentiation between schools 
First, the case where no differentiation between schools appears was examined. Ignoring 
random effects, one would expect each school to have a mean middle-class intake of 0.5 
exactly, assuming the fraction of middle-class children in the population is 0.5. The more 
children and time steps that are used, the closer the mean should approach this value. 
100 simulation runs were performed using middle-class preference 0.32 and working-
class preference 0.01; the mean middle-class intake ranged from 0.496 to 0.504, i.e. it 
was very closely centered on 0.5 as expected. The standard deviation between the twenty 
schools’ mean middle-class intakes was very low at 0.0008, further supporting the 
conclusion that the runs all followed the same essential pattern. 
Having established that the schools all followed the same broad pattern, we turn towards 
local comparisons. As Figure 5.1 illustrated, local spikes can be relatively high, even 
though the intake averages out at roughly 0.5 overall. 
The minimum middle-class intake during any single year in any of the 200 schools was 
0.385. The standard deviation between each school’s overall minimum middle-class 
intake was still very low, at 0.0096. Naturally, the statistics for the maximum intake in 
any year mirror this. 
Mild differentiation between schools 
Next, the case where differentiation between schools is found was considered, using 
middle-class preference 2.56 and working-class preference 0.08. 
The schools can no longer all be compared against each other; instead, each top school 
should only be compared to the other nine top schools, and the same for each of the ten 
lower-rated schools. 
Here, more variation was to be found, with the smallest minimum middle-class intake 
during any one year among the ten bottom schools being 0.29, and the highest minimum 
intake being 0.35. This resulted in a larger standard deviation than before between these 
minima of 0.012, and similarly for the local maxima. While these standard deviations are 
higher than in the previous case, the spread between results that they imply is still 
acceptably low to allow us to pick any one of these ten runs and call it a ‘representative 
sample’, as we have been doing so far. Furthermore, the standard deviation between the 
top schools’ mean intakes was also low at 0.011, indicating that they differ only in local 
spikes. (The standard deviation for the bottom schools’ intakes was identical, since each 
top school is the mirror image of each bottom school – see Figure 3.1.) 
Pronounced differentiation between schools 
Finally, the ‘extreme’ case having a middle-class preference of 20.48 and a working-class 
preference of 0.01 was considered. This resulted in a 0.0099 standard deviation between 
the local minima and maxima of each school type (leading or ‘second-rate’), and a 
standard deviation of 0.0013 between their respective mean middle-class intakes. This 
exceptionally low spread between the results of different runs is probably because the 
middle-class preference is so strong that every middle-class child applies to the leading 
school, whereas in the less pronounced cases the number of middle-class children 
applying year on year fluctuates slightly due to randomness.  
5.2 Class sensitive case 
We now consider the second of the two cases addressed by Room and Britton, in which 
schools unconditionally choose middle-class applicants over working-class applicants. 
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5.2.1 Sweep of the middle-class preference for middle-class schools parameter 
This preference parameter was clearly identified by Room and Britton as the decisive one 
in the class sensitive case. If sufficiently high, complete polarisation is expected to 
emerge between the two schools, with one accepting every single middle-class child, 
leaving the other with none. Stronger preferences are expected to lead towards this 
inequity state sooner. 
Room and Britton clearly identify the exact conditions under which this polarisation is 
expected to occur, centred on the critical value of aθ = ½ (as before, a refers to the 
middle-class preference for middle-class schools, and θ is the fraction of the population 
that is middle-class). If aθ < ½, they predict that any inequity between schools will reduce 
over time (see experiment 6.4.10); if aθ > ½, it will grow over time, (the larger a is, the 
faster the growth). 
As discussed in section 4.2, working-class preference will be set to ½ of the middle-class 
preference for middle-class schools in these tests. In this experiment, we shall also fix θ = 
0.5 as usual. This means that the critical value cut-off point aθ = ½ occurs at a = 1. We 
shall therefore sweep both logarithmically increasing and logarithmically decreasing, 
starting at a = 1. This resulted in the sequence a = 0.36, 0.63, 0.84, 0.92, 0.96, 0.98, 0.99, 
1, 1.01, 1.02, 1.04, 1.08, 1.16, 1.32, 1.64, 2.28, 3.56, 6.12 and 11.24 being tested. 
The number of years the simulation was run for needed to be increased from 500 to 1500, 
since patterns took much longer to emerge than in the class blind case. 
The results reflected the prediction very precisely: polarisation was only encountered 
from a = 1 onwards; a = 0.99 was not sufficient. The time taken to reach total polarisation 
(and stay there) followed a pattern of exponential decay with increasing middle-class 
preference. Each time step was also simulated in Excel according to the formulae of 
Room and Britton’s model, and the results mapped against those of our simulation: 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Middle class preference
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
y
e
a
rs
 u
n
ti
l 
to
ta
l 
p
o
la
ri
s
a
ti
o
n
Simulated Predicted
 
Figure 5.9 - Exponential decay of the number of years taken for complete class polarisation to 
be reached, as the middle-class preference for middle-class schools increases. Note that the 
predicted data series lacks the first (top) point in the simulated data series, because it predicts no 
polarisation for a = 1.  
These calculations clarified the fact that a = 1 is in fact not supposed to produce 
polarisation, only a > 1, so the simulation’s output was not completely accurate after all. 
More seriously, in every case the simulation took longer than predicted to reach 
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polarisation, although the overall pattern of exponential decay matches (multiplying the 
predicted values by e.g. 2.7 produces a much closer correspondence). Examining an 
individual simulation run provides some insight into why this difference occurs: 
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Figure 5.10 - The path predicted by Room and Britton's model for middle-class preference 
1.02, and the path taken during the simulation run. 
Stochastic effects appear to produce local instabilities where the trajectory temporarily 
proceeds downwards. This was to be expected to some extent, but it was not expected by 
the author that would occur to this degree. However, the higher the middle-class 
preference, the smaller the difference between the predicted and the simulated paths, 
because there is less room for random effects in a 95% likelihood than in a 70% 
likelihood. 
With a sufficiently low preference (e.g. 0.84), the output resembles that of an 
undifferentiated class blind scenario very closely. The borderline case preference of 0.99 
exhibits an interesting effect: 
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Figure 5.11 - Middle-class preference of 0.99 is not quite sufficient to produce total 
polarisation. 
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The preference is not quite high enough to produce total polarisation: local peaks can be 
observed, but no stable state can be reached. The state predicted by Room and Britton’s 
model is a stable 0.5/0.5 equality; this would in theory be equivalent to the class blind 
case, but we are seeing more extensive local peaks than we do in the class blind scenario. 
If the middle-class preference is increased to the critical value of 1, polarisation occurs, 
but it takes an extremely long time, and follows some failed, unstable attempts: 
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Figure 5.12 - Polarisation emerging with the critical value of middle-class preference = 1. 
In fact, if the simulation is only run for, say, 500 years, it appears as though polarisation is 
impossible, as Room and Britton’s model suggests. 
In contrast, a higher preference produces much more rapid polarisation, as predicted (see 
Appendix A, Figure 9.3). The highest middle-class preference, 11.24, produced total 
polarisation in the fifth year. The minimum number of years it could take is intuitively 
three: in the first year, the schools are initialised with no differentiation. Consequently, in 
the second year, everyone chooses randomly; in the third year, every single middle-class 
family chooses whichever school emerged as a slight leader in the previous year, due to 
the Matthew effect described by Room and Britton (2006b). In fact, it could conceivably 
take only two years, if coincidentally every middle-class family picked the same school in 
the second year, but that would only be an artefact of randomness which would not occur 
in real life, which is made less likely the more children are used. 
In summary, the test of varying the middle-class parameter in the class sensitive case was 
relatively successful; the results all followed the pattern predicted by Room and Britton. 
The unpredictable and variable nature of the results is probably inherent to stochastic 
simulations, and it could be argued to approach reality more closely than the equations. In 
real life, patterns are not mathematically perfect, especially where choices made by such 
complex systems as human beings are involved. For example, a family might wish their 
child to attend a school close to another relative’s house for childcare arrangements. 
5.2.2 Determining variance due to different random seeds 
Especially the case a = 0.99 is intuitively suspicious in the previous experiment, in that 
one suspects that the potential for polarisation might yet be there, were it only to run a 
little longer. 
The experiment was therefore re-run under two conditions: 
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a) Giving it more time – yet even after 5000 years, no polarisation occurred. Nor was 
either school able to retain a leading role permanently: they switched roles eight times. 
b) Using 100 different random seeds, over 500 years. None of these additional runs 
exhibited polarisation – however, some approached it more so than others. In some cases, 
on average, a clear inequity between the two schools was present (0.28 in the most severe 
case); in others, the average middle-class intake fraction was 0.5 for both schools. The 
average inequity among the 100 runs was 0.11, with a standard deviation of 0.07. 
Examining the individual cases in more detail reveals that the cases with little average 
inequity tend to have several smaller ‘pockets’ of inequity instead, with the leading 
school varying from pocket to pocket, thereby cancelling out the local inequities. 
However, all runs had a similar maximum height of local spikes in the middle-class 
intake of a school, ranging from 0.64 to 0.70, indicating that the same local patterns were 
followed in each case.  
Despite the variability in inequity, all 100 runs produced the same overall result of no 
polarisation occurring. While Room and Britton’s model does not predict polarisation in 
this case, it does not say that inequity cannot nevertheless occur to a less marked degree; 
and indeed this intuitively seems to be logical. It therefore seems that the simulation is 
performing to expectation in exhibiting this volatile inequity under these borderline 
conditions.  
A middle-class preference of 3.56 was also chosen to be rerun 100 times with different 
random seeds, to see how sensitive the amount of time taken to achieve polarisation was 
to initial conditions. On average, it took 12 steps to reach polarisation, with a standard 
deviation of 3. This shows that the variability is still present even in a non-borderline 
case. It is, however, much more prevalent near the critical value of 1.0, as is to be 
expected. Runs using a middle-class preference of 1.01 were also rerun 100 times; in 
seven of the cases, polarisation was not even reached within 1500 years. In the remaining 
cases, it was reached on average after 820 years, but with a huge standard deviation of 
276 years. Results ranged from 369 to 1449 years. This indicates that for these borderline 
cases, there simply is no ‘representative run’. 
5.2.3 Verify that working-class parental preference has no significant impact  
Room and Britton predict that the working-class preference is irrelevant in determining 
the eventual outcome of class sensitive school admissions. This makes intuitive sense 
because a middle-class child is essentially guaranteed a place at its first choice school, 
unless the school has more middle-class applicants than there are places. The working-
class children simply fill up whatever spaces remain, regardless of their choices. 
The difficulty in this test lies in the fact that varying the working-class parental 
preference is nevertheless expected to have a basic effect of changing which random 
numbers are used for what purpose in the simulation (using the same stream of pseudo-
random numbers), which will inevitably introduce a certain amount of random noise 
variation. However, it should still be possible to ascertain whether the overall pattern is 
the same, in the same way that runs of the same parameters using different random seeds 
were compared in experiment 5.2.2. 
The range of interesting values of a (the middle-class preference) was identified 
previously as ranging from 1.0 upwards, and so the representative parameters 0.84, 0.99, 
1, 1.64 and 11.24 were chosen. Regardless of which working-class parameters they are 
paired with, the same pattern as found in experiment 5.2.1 should be found. This ranges 
from conditions where no polarisation is expected, over the boundary condition of the 
first value of a in which polarisation is tentatively expected, to values of a in which 
polarisation is most certainly expected. In each case, the usual logarithmically increasing 
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working-class preferences were used, from 0.01 to 10.24 (including cases where it 
exceeded the middle-class preference). 
As expected, much more variation was found in the borderline cases 0.99 and 1 than in 
the others. When a = 0.84, none of the eleven working-class preferences caused 
polarisation to emerge, as predicted for a value of a that lies well below the critical value. 
In each run, the schools’ average fraction of middle-class intake was clustered around 0.5 
with a low standard deviation of 0.0030, showing that little differentiation emerged. From 
these statistics alone, one could easily imagine a repeat of the class blind case in which 
only very brief, local spikes were seen, but in fact the spikes here could last around 100 
years. However, the inequity is averaged out over the 1500 years we examined. 
When a = 0.99, again no polarisation was found, as predicted. However, both the inequity 
between schools and the variability in trajectories between runs was much more volatile 
than in the previous case. In all but two of the eleven runs, a marked inequity was 
observed between the two schools on average (although still subject to switches in roles, 
as before). The mean inequity was 0.12, very close to the 0.11 observed from 100 
different random seeds earlier, although twice the standard deviation was found (perhaps 
excused by the significantly smaller sample used). This could give us some cause for 
concern that the working-class preference has an effect on the outcome after all, but there 
is no discernible relationship between it and the mean inequity (see Appendix A, Figure 
9.4).  
Therefore, even though somewhat more variability was seen between runs than when 
merely varying the random seed, we can still say with confidence that the test passes, 
especially since this case covers a borderline test where a lot of variability is expected.  
Next, the case a = 1 was investigated. This case had already caused problems earlier 
when it exhibited polarisation after an extremely long time, even though none was 
predicted, lying as it does precisely on the boundary between polarisation and non-
polarisation. In two of the eleven cases, total polarisation occurred; however, another 
showed signs that it could have reached polarisation, given more time, and the same may 
hold for the others. One run was particularly interesting: 
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Figure 5.13 Interesting run of middle-class preference 1 with working-class preference 0.08, 
where it appears there is a tendency towards total polarisation, but this completely subsides again. 
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It illustrates nicely that it can appear as though total polarisation is being worked towards, 
but in this borderline case, a stable polarisation is not assured until it has been fully 
reached. 
The next test involved a = 1.64, in which polarisation is definitely predicted to occur. The 
dependent variable here is the number of years this takes. This is again represented as a 
scatterplot in Figure 9.5, Appendix A. As before, there is no discernible relationship, and 
so we can conclude that the working-class preference plays no role in the outcome of the 
simulation. However, clearly the variability between runs was still relatively high: the 
mean number of years was 40.5, with a standard deviation of 9.6. By way of comparison, 
the working-class preference 0.01 case was chosen to be re-run with 11 different random 
seeds, producing a mean of 32.4 years with a standard deviation of 11. Taking into 
account the small sample size, it seems that the variability obtained from varying the 
random seed and that obtained from varying the working-class is approximately the same, 
i.e. the working-class preference has no significant impact.  
Finally, the extreme case a = 11.24 was run. Being far from the borderline case, very little 
variance was exhibited, as expected. In fact, polarisation occurred in the same year, year 
5, for every working-class preference used. As one might expect, the trajectory taken still 
differed between runs, but only very weakly: studying the first five years only, a low 
standard deviation of 0.0049 was found between the mean intake of the leading schools, 
based around a mean of 0.691. 
In summary, the experiments run indicated that the working-class preference does indeed 
have no significant impact on the simulation’s results. However, repeating more of the 
experiments, and widening the parameter space investigated, would lend greater 
confidence to the finding. 
5.2.4 Varying the fraction of the population that is middle-class 
For the class sensitive scenario, Room and Britton make no prediction about a specific 
value of θ (the fraction of the population that is middle-class), as they did for the class 
blind scenario; rather, their predictions regarding θ are embodied in the concept of the 
‘critical value’ of aθ = ½ at which polarisation begins to occur. We previously 
investigated varying only a (the middle-class preference) in experiment 5.2.1; we now 
vary θ for certain representative values of a. For θ = 0.5, these representative values were 
chosen as 0.84, 0.99, 1, 1.64 and 11.24 since the critical value was 1; more generally, we 
now use 1/(2θ) – 0.16, 1/(2θ) – 0.01, 1/(2θ), 1/(2θ) + 0.64 and 1/(2θ) + 10.24 as our 
representative values of a.  
Having demonstrated that the working-class preference has no significant impact on 
results, it was set at 0.01 for simplicity
28
. Since no special importance is attached to any 
particular value of θ, it was varied linearly from 0.1 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1. 
                                                     
28 Calculating it at ½ the middle class preference requires multiple parameter file specifications to be used for a single 
experiment, since Repast does not support the description of one parameter in terms of another (unless a custom parameter 
file reader were to be written). See section 8.3.6. 
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Theta
Simulated Predicted Simulated Predicted Simulated Predicted Simulated Predicted Simulated Predicted
0.1 / / / / 1038 / 105 27 19 5
0.2 / / / / 1358 / 77 16 7 4
0.3 / / / / 527 / 92 10 5 4
0.4 / / / / unstable / 30 13 10 4
0.5 / / / / / / 43 9 5 4
0.6 / / / / unstable / 23 7 4 3
0.7 / / / / / / 15 5 3 3
0.8 / / / / unstable / 15 4 3 3
0.9 / / / / unstable / 9 (blips) 3 3 3
1/(2*theta) + 10.241/(2*theta) - 0.16 1/(2*theta) - 0.01 1/(2*theta) 1/(2*theta) + 0.64
 
Table 5.1 – Years taken for total polarisation to be reached. Rows show values of θ (middle-
class fraction of population) being varied; the double-columns represent increasing values of 
middle-class preference, calculated from θ. The left-hand side of each double-column gives the 
simulated number of years, while the right gives the number predicted by Room and Britton’s 
model. ‘Unstable’ means that polarisation was approximately reached, perhaps with many little 
jittery blips; and that it was then left again. ‘Polarisation’ was defined as four or more successive 
years where the leading school has a 100% middle-class intake, since a league table spans four 
years in the simulation. 
It should first be noted that the prediction based on Room and Britton’s equations never 
predicts an unstable state. When initialised with the random choices made by families in 
year 1, it either decreases steadily towards a fixpoint of precisely θ if no polarisation is 
predicted, or it increases steadily towards a fixpoint of precisely 2θ (or towards 1 if θ > 
0.5, since of course a school cannot contain more than 100% middle-class pupils). 
Examining the case of θ = 0.9, middle-class preference = 1/(2θ) + 0.64, shown below, 
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Figure 5.14 – Polarisation when fraction middle-class = 0.9, middle-class preference = 1/(2θ) + 
0.64 = 1.2. The ‘blips’ mentioned in Table 5.1 are enclosed by rectangles. This is a previously 
unseen phenomenon. 
it is clear why, even with such a high middle-class preference, having such a large value 
of θ means that the schools are not differentiated enough to prevent the occasional ‘blip’ 
where the leading school cannot quite achieve a 100% middle-class intake. It is because 
even when the school has a full league table history of a 100% middle-class intake, the 
other school is nevertheless also an excellent candidate with a 90% middle-class intake. 
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Thus, with the given middle-class preference, only a 62% probability can be allocated to 
families preferring the leading school. In the mathematical model, this is more than 
enough to produce total polarisation – exactly 62% of the 360 middle-class pupils will 
apply to the leading school (assuming 400 children in total as usual), which results in 223 
middle-class applications; plenty to fill its 200 places. However, in the simulation, 
theoretically every single family could happen to fall into the 38% likelihood category 
that the other school will be chosen, since their choices are independent of other families’ 
choices in that year, unlike in the macro model. Of course that is extremely unlikely
29
; 
what is more probable, and indeed what occurred in the simulation run, was that 
occasionally less than 200 middle-class parents would choose the leading school, 
resulting in the so-called ‘blips’. If only 199 applications were made to the leading school 
in a given year, then the 62% probability would have been played out as 55%, which is 
not unreasonable as an occasional occurrence. Experiment 5.3.1 shows how using a larger 
number of children results in less such random noise.  
It is unsurprising that the greatest discrepancies between the simulated and the predicted 
results occurred during the borderline case. Unfortunately, apart from the random 
fluctuations already explained, the simulations are also subject to floating point 
inaccuracies. Room and Britton’s predictions themselves show how sensitive the outcome 
is to the exact value used; for θ = 0.9, 1/(2θ) = 5/9 which does not predict any 
polarisation since leads directly to a fixpoint, but if this is rounded to a finite 
approximation, polarisation is mistakenly predicted (the more accurate the approximation, 
the slower the move towards polarisation). 
The remaining cases were as expected, given that we have already established that the 
simulation takes a proportionally longer time to reach polarisation than the mathematical 
model. It can therefore be concluded that the simulation operates as well with varying 
values of θ as it does for θ = 0.5. 
5.3 Confounding variables 
5.3.1 How many children are used 
Finally, an experiment was undertaken to confirm that the number of children used in the 
simulation was not too low to act as a representative sample, and therefore acting as a 
confounding variable by distorting the results.  
An average class blind case of middle-class preference 5.12, working-class preference 
1.28 was chosen, since the difference when varying the number of children was most 
obvious in this type of case, where a clear inequity, but not total polarisation emerges. 
Usually, 200 children per school were used in the experiments. We tested the effect of 
using 10, 100, 500, 1000, 2000 and 5000 children per school instead. 10 children were 
clearly too few, and no stable state could be achieved. The run using 100 children did 
experience differentiation between schools, but this was lower than the other runs’, at 
only 0.18 compared to their mean inequity of 0.21. Among the other runs, the variability 
among their mean inequities was very low, with a standard deviation of only 0.00092. 
Nonetheless, using more children did make a difference: 
                                                     
29 The statistical likelihood is 0.38360, where 1 is absolute certainty and 0 represents an impossibility.  
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Figure 5.15 – Two class blind runs are superimposed here; in dotted black, the original 200 
school places run, and in red, the same experiment using 5000 places per school. The middle-class 
preference is 5.12, and the working-class preference is 1.28. 
As seen above, using more children smoothes the schools’ trajectories noticeably. This is 
because a larger sample size causes statistical abnormalities to be averaged out to a 
greater degree. Room and Britton’s mathematical model predicted a completely static 
inequity from one year to the next; the simulation should in theory also attain this result if 
an infinite number of children could be used. However, the local spikes caused by using a 
low sample size of only 200 children per school is in fact a benefit of simulation, not a 
flaw. Real schools also only have a similarly ‘small’ capacity, and consequently the 
statistical abnormalities seen in our simulation no doubt also occur in the real world, 
which is not as statistically perfect as an equation. Thus, the model approaches the 
dynamics of real life trajectories more closely than the mathematical model, which takes 
a much more global view. 
5.3.2 Using an odd number of children 
It was postulated that using an odd number of children could potentially cause problems, 
since one school would have an empty place every year (if 401 children are used, each 
school is allocated 201 places). However, this was not found to be the case: when schools 
were not significantly differentiated, the empty place sometimes lay in one school, and 
sometimes in the other; otherwise, the less popular school would always have the lesser 
number of applicants. Having 201 middle-class applicants against 200 working-class 
applicants did not noticeably affect the results either. 
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6 Experimental Results: Extensions 
Having validated the basic Java prototype, and found it to correspond acceptably well to 
Room and Britton’s model, the prototype was extended using evolutionary development, 
to allow various scenarios of interest to be researched. Since these additions cannot be 
validated against the original model, they must instead be validated against experimental 
predictions where possible, and examined empirically in their low-level agent behaviour 
to see if the underlying processes are as expected. However, this reduced level of validity 
remains; and for the simulation to be viewed as more reliable, avenues such as 
comparisons against real field data should be explored. 
Stochastic shocks, using many schools and the introduction of children’s preference for 
class blind schools produced useful results, but the school specialisms did not appear to 
have a significant effect, on the whole. 
6.1 Stochastic shocks 
The first extension to be explored was the possibility of a ‘stochastic shock’ being applied 
to one or both schools, representing, say, a favourable news report. Questions of interest 
were: how strong such an effect would need to be to cause differentiation to emerge 
between schools where it would otherwise not appear; and how much differentiation 
could be present between schools before the stochastic shock would fail to switch their 
roles. 
6.1.1 Non-binary school strategies 
Class sensitive schools were not considered, because it would be exceptionally rare in 
real life to encounter a sufficiently stochastic shock to switch the 100%/0% middle-class 
roles of the schools. Instead, scenarios with only partial differentiation between schools 
were used. Rather than controlling the degree of inequity through the difference between 
the middle- and working-class preferences as previously in the class blind case, this was 
achieved through the introduction of a preference schools have for middle-class children. 
This replaced the previous binary class blind/class sensitive school strategies. A value of 
1 means that the school prefers middle-class children no more than working-class 
children, i.e. that it is class blind; a value of x > 1 means it prefers them x times as much. 
The maximum value Java allows for an integer (2147483647) was found to replicate the 
class sensitive behaviour exactly. Figure 9.6 in Appendix A shows the resultant 
exponential increase in inequity with increasing school preference for middle-class 
applicants.  
6.1.2 Stochastic shocks triggering differentiation 
Four cases were investigated to see whether a stochastic shock could trigger 
differentiation between schools, or exacerbate it. These were: 
a) No intrinsic inequity (school preference for middle-class of 1.08)  
b) Minimal, unstable intrinsic inequity (school preference of 1.16) 
c) Minimal but stable intrinsic inequity (school preference of 1.32) 
d) Clear intrinsic inequity of around 0.16 (school preference of 1.64) 
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Each of these cases was tested with a positive stochastic shock to the bottom school 
during a 500-year run, with the values 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 and 0.05
30
. (This is the 
temporary ‘bonus’ to the school’s league table rating; its effect decays over time.) 
Negative shocks to the leading school (representing e.g. bad press) were not considered in 
detail, since they were found to just be the mirror image of a positive shock to the bottom 
school. 
The results showed that a stochastic shock is not able to produce differentiation where 
none is naturally possible: none of the stochastic shocks were able to effect more than an 
almost undetectable increase in the affected school’s rating in case a). Even when the 
shock was increased to the unrealistic maximum possible value of 1, nothing happened.  
In case b), all shocks except 0.05 succeeded in switching the schools’ roles, but only 
temporarily; this must be due to the intrinsic instability of the system. In case c), again all 
shocks except the smallest succeeded in reversing the schools’ roles, but this time the 
resultant state was stable. Case d) is identical except that only shocks ≥ 0.3 are able to 
overcome the significant existing inequity. The crucial finding for experiments b, c and d 
was that the stochastic shock is at most able to produce a change in the schools’ roles; it 
cannot alter the degree of inequity between the schools. The inequity appears to be built 
in to the system defined by these preference parameters. One might have imagined that in 
a ‘weak differentiation’ case, given a sufficient head start, a school might be able to cling 
to the artificial advantage it was given; but this is evidently not the case. 
6.1.3 Stochastic shocks switching the roles of schools 
The second experiment undertaken on stochastic shocks was to determine the 
combinations of shock strength and existing inequity (set by the school preference 
parameter) under which the switch of school roles already seen in the previous 
experiment takes place. If the shock is too weak, or the inequity is too high, the transition 
will not occur. 
The following values of stochastic shock were investigated: 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.025, 0.005, 
0.001, and 0.0005. Values > 0.3 were not considered of interest since it is hard to imagine 
any realistic event having such a profound effect on a school’s reputation.  
Each of these stochastic shocks was applied to scenarios with school preferences for 
middle-class applicants of 1.0 to 2.6, in increments of 0.05. The upper limit of 2.6 was 
decided upon through informal experimentation: no change was observed for higher 
values. The experiment was initially performed over 500 years, but having noted that it 
makes no difference, subsequent re-runs used 200 years instead. 
The results were as expected: higher stochastic shocks were more likely to cause the 
schools to switch roles, as was a lower degree of inequity. However, the inequity also had 
to be high enough to allow differentiation to emerge between schools, so no effect was 
seen for school preferences from 1.0 to 1.10. 
The range of school preferences in which a stochastic shock of 0.3 caused the role 
reversal was 1.15 to 2.15, with an ‘uncertain zone’ from roughly 2.20 to 2.40, since the 
role reversal occurred unexpectedly at 2.25 and again at 2.35. The reason for this can be 
seen in the diagram for 2.25: 
                                                     
30 Good fortune meant that our usual random seed used in all the experiments happened to hit only the bottom school, 
in the middle of the run – the perfect scenario, but not guaranteed since which school(s) are affected, and when, is random 
– so we did not need to compromise comparability between experiments by using a different random seed (see section 
8.3.6). 
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Figure 6.1 – Stochastic shock of 0.3 applied to school 1 during year 84, when the schools’ 
preference for middle-class applicants is 2.25.  
Unlike in the simulations with lower school preferences (i.e. lower inequity between the 
schools), the shock does not cause an instant role reversal: there is a period where it could 
go either way. At the top end of school preferences, it is therefore impossible to predict 
whether this size of shock will cause a role reversal or not. 
A less powerful shock of 0.2 has a smaller ‘sensitive zone’ of role reversals when school 
preferences range from 1.15 to 1.55, with an ‘uncertain zone’ where the reversal might 
occur from 1.6 to 2.15, approximately. However, the upper limit of this zone is difficult to 
identify, because unexpectedly, we cannot even predict with certainty whether a local 
spike will occur or not. For example, the school preference of 2 aberrantly produces such 
a spike (similar to that of Figure 6.1, but with each school returning to its original 
position), despite the shock not having any perceptible impact on the run using a 
preference of 1.9. The lack of local spikes in those few instances such as 1.9 seemed 
suspicious, and so the agents’ behaviour was examined more closely in those cases. This 
showed that the numerous cases in which either no spike, or only a minor one occurs, are 
in fact due to slight statistical abnormalities. Even though the bottom school should 
suddenly have been preferred more than previously, the random choices made by 
applicants happened not to turn out that way in the year of the stochastic shock. Since the 
stochastic shock’s effect wears off over time, if it does not gain momentum in the year in 
which it occurs, it is even less likely to do so in the following year. Such abnormalities 
are more likely to occur when the increase in preference is slighter; this is why the 
phenomenon was not observed for the larger stochastic shock of 0.3. 
The next smallest shock, 0.1, again exhibited similar behaviour, with the school switch 
occurring for preferences of 1.15 to 1.25, as well as 1.35. The same explanation as above 
applies for the lack of a rigid cut-off point. 
The subsequent shock of 0.05 was not able to achieve a role reversal; all it accomplishes 
is temporary confusion, as shown below:  
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Figure 6.2 – Stochastic shock of 0.05 applied to school 1 in year 84 only causes local 
confusion; it cannot switch the schools’ roles permanently. Coincidentally, school 1 later emerges 
as the leading school around year 180 anyway, due to the instability of the system. 
However, the next two shocks of 0.025 and 0.005 are able to switch the schools’ roles 
again after all (although only for a school preference of 1.15), so some additional 
experiments were run using even smaller stochastic shocks to establish how large a shock 
must be to have an effect. Shocks of 0.000 5, 0.000 05 and 0.000 005 were still able to 
effect a role reversal, albeit only a temporary one, due to the unstable nature of the system 
when the school preference is so low. However, shocks of 0.000 000 5, 0.000 000 05 and 
0.000 000 005 could not achieve a lasting effect, although surprisingly they were still able 
to cause a small surge. These small surges were, however, smaller than others, routinely 
seen, that are due simply to randomness in this scenario. 
In summary, it is possible to identify zones of interest for a given strength of stochastic 
shock where, based on schools’ strategies (preferences), they are either immune to its 
effect, or in a ‘danger zone’ of being affected by it. Rather than taking a school preference 
scenario and seeing what shocks might affect it, we have taken a given shock and seen 
what scenarios it can affect, since the school preference is potentially under policy-
makers’ control, but stochastic shocks and their strength are in general not. This would 
allow an analysis to take a potential risk such as a high-profile crime at a school, and see 
under which school-level policies the stability of the system would remain unaffected.  
The analysis could easily be reversed to allow policy-makers to plan their own ‘stochastic 
shock’, e.g. a campaign spotlighting the positive qualities of a failing school, to tell them 
how powerful an effect they would need to generate in order to upset the balance of the 
system. Of course, this would only be of use when coupled with other strategies designed 
to reduce the intrinsic inequity of the system, such as those explored in the co-
evolutionary behaviour section (6.4); a simple role reversal would solve nothing. 
6.2 Rewriting the model to use decision rules 
Once the model had been rewritten to use production rules rather than only ordinary Java 
code, it had to be validated against the original Java model to ensure that it was 
equivalent. A summary of these tests is given in Appendix A, section 9.3. These tests 
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established that the models produce similar enough results to allow us to reasonably 
contrast experiments run in one model with those run in the other. Ideally, all of the 
preceding experiments should have been re-run in the Drools model and used above 
instead, to allow more accurate comparison when looking at the results of the extensions, 
but due to time constraints, this was not possible.  
All experiments described from this point onwards were run in the Drools model. 
6.3 More than two schools 
Note that as described in section 3.2.2, the Java model does not use application rounds, so 
the random order in which schools consider their applications can affect the results. This 
is because later schools will give equal precedence to first-round applicants and those 
who were rejected by earlier schools, and therefore just picked this school as their second 
choice. This can have a substantial impact on the results, most noticeably in the Java 
model’s version of the four-school class sensitive scenario: 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Time
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
 m
id
d
le
 c
la
s
s
 i
n
ta
k
e
School 0 School 1 School 2 School 3
 
Figure 6.3 – Java model’s version of four class-sensitive schools. It is incorrect because it does 
not use application rounds to order application precedence. 
This should be contrasted with Figure 6.5, the correct version. Due to this bug, all multi-
school experiments were run in the Drools model. 
Room and Britton’s model can be extended to cover any number of schools, as explained 
in section 3.2.2. Unfortunately, this alteration of the parental preference equations 
invalidates the use of their various predictive equations – Room and Britton restricted 
their model to only two schools for the very reason that the equations become 
unmanageable with arbitrary numbers of schools.  
We must therefore apply commonsense reasoning to validate the results. We first consider 
the class sensitive case, with a very high middle-class preference, to make it easier to 
make predictions. With three schools, it is obvious what is likely to occur: a three-tiered 
system where all the middle-class families first apply to the leading school; those who are 
rejected apply to the middle ground school; and those who remain, if any, must go to the 
bottom-rated school. Based on this reasoning, we could naïvely predict the following in 
the n school class sensitive case: 
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Top school: min{θn, 1} = F1, 
Second-highest school: min{θn – F1, 1} = F2, 
Third-highest school: min{θn – F1 – F2, 1} = F3, 
and so on, where Fx refers to the middle-class fraction of the intake of the school in 
leading position x.  However, this is too simplistic: the working-class parental preference, 
which had no significant effect in the two-school model, now affects the results as well. 
This is because working-class applicants applying in round 1 are given precedence over 
middle-class applicants applying in round 2. If some working-class pupils apply to the 
second-best school in round 1, there may not be sufficient places left for all the middle-
class applicants who were rejected from the top school in round 1 due to lack of space. 
This would only be prevented from occurring in a situation where the top school was 
preferred with 100% likelihood by both social classes. This would force a kind of 
repeated two-school scenario between the top school with places left and the rest, all 
massed together with a 0% likelihood of being chosen by either social class unless the 
child was rejected by the top school, when the next ‘top school’ would emerge from the 
mass. 
It also seems possible that the more schools are in play, the greater deviation from these 
predictions could be, since there will be less differentiation between schools, not just a 
100%/0% polarisation, and therefore the parental preferences will have less of an 
influence. This is predicted to be similar to the two-school cases with weak parental 
preferences, such as that shown in Figure 5.11. 
The multi-school experiments were only run for 200 years, because running 200n agents 
in the Drools model takes such a long time (see section 3.3.5). Each school was allocated 
200 places as before. 
6.3.1 Three class sensitive schools 
This experiment proceeded exactly according to our predictions: 
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Figure 6.4 – Three schools, class sensitive, with a middle-class and working-class preference 
of 20.48, and a 0.5 fraction middle-class population. 
Figure 6.4 shows the result of using a working-class preference identical to the middle-
class preference. This scenario is simple enough to correspond to our naïve equations 
exactly. If instead the working-class preference is set very low, to 0.01, the overall pattern 
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remains the same, but the middle school no longer receives an intake of precisely 0.5. 
Rather, on average, the intake is 0.49, falling as low as 0.4 in one particular year. This is 
because roughly 1/3 of working-class families now apply to the middle school in the first 
round (having little preference), which guarantees them a place there, since all middle-
class families apply instead to the leading school in the first round. When slightly more 
than 1/3 of working-class parents pick the middle school, due to chance, less than 100 
places will remain for the 100 second round middle-class applicants, and so some must 
attend the bottom school. 
Thus, our prediction that the working-class preference would have an interfering effect 
holds in the three-school case. 
6.3.2 Four class sensitive schools 
If the naïve formulae were correct, we would expect to see a pattern of two schools of 
100% middle-class, and two schools of 0% middle-class. However, as already 
established, this is too simplistic; and it already falls down when we move from three to 
four schools. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
 m
id
d
le
 c
la
s
s
 i
n
ta
k
e
School 0 School 1 School 2 School 3
 
Figure 6.5 – Four schools, class sensitive, with a middle-class and working-class preference of 
20.48, and a 0.5 fraction middle-class population. 
Examining the choices made by agents at run-time explains how this result is 
generated: 
• Round 1: During a typical year, only around 85% of families will choose school 3, 
the top school, as their first choice school, since there are other attractive options. 
However, the remaining 15% will all pick school 0, the second best school; it is as 
though the other two schools do not exist, like an ordinary two-school scenario. This 
still easily allows school 3 a 100% middle-class intake, since there are 400 middle-
class students in total, and 200 places per school. Around 60 parents of each social 
class apply instead to school 0, and so it fills circa 120 places. 
• Round 2: The only families remaining are now those who were rejected by school 3. 
This will be approximately 140 middle-class and 340 working-class families. With 
school 3 removed from consideration, a two-school scenario is again played out, this 
time between school 0 and school 2, with school 0 favoured by approximately 70% of 
applicants. The differentiation is less than that in the first round, because the two 
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schools are separated by less. School 0 receives around 98 middle-class applications; 
it can therefore fill its remaining 80 places with middle-class applicants, gaining a 
70% middle-class intake. School 2 receives around 42 middle-class applications, and 
around 102 working-class ones, so it fills 144 places. 
• Round 3: The 18 middle-class applicants who were rejected by school 0 in the last 
round remain, as well as 238 working-class applicants. We are again in a two-school 
scenario between the only remaining schools: school 2, favoured by 100% of 
applicants; and school 1, chosen by none. School 2 is able to accept all 18 middle-
class applicants, resulting in a middle-class intake of around 30%. 
• Round 4: School 1 receives all children who were rejected from the other three 
schools; they are all working-class. 
The most interesting thing to note from this walk-through of the agents’ decision process 
is that the problem has been reduced to an iterated two-school scenario; this is not readily 
apparent from merely looking at Figure 6.5. 
Using a working-class preference of 0.01 instead of one equal to the middle-class 
preference introduces more randomness into the outcome: 
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Figure 6.6 – Four class sensitive schools. Using a working-class preference of 0.01 with a 
middle-class preference of 20.48 results in more ‘randomness’ as more working-class families take 
up less desirable, yet not totally undesirable places in the first round, leaving some middle-class 
families who missed out on the most desirable places only the least desirable options. 
6.3.3 Five class sensitive schools 
Running a five-school simulation with both parental preferences set to 20.48 as before led 
to the same pattern as the three-school scenario, with two schools at 1, two schools at 0, 
and one school in the middle at 0.5. The only difference is that every so often, the middle 
school would obtain somewhat less than a 0.5 middle-class intake (0.44 in the most 
extreme case), and one or both of the two bottom schools would receive the ‘missing’ 
middle-class applicants.  
Delving into the details of agents’ decisions shows that they no longer reduce it to an 
iterated two-school scenario. In the first round, around 99% choose one of the two 
leading schools, but 1% picks the middle school. In the second round, 82% of those who 
were rejected from either of the leading schools will apply instead to the other leading 
school (a guaranteed rejection since it has no places left; the agents are not sophisticated 
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enough to reason that such a popular school is not a wise second choice). The other 18% 
apply instead to the middle school, and are all accepted – both middle- and working-class 
applicants, since there are sufficient places left. In the third round, those middle-class 
applicants who could not find a place in either of the leading schools all apply to the 
middle school, leaving it to fill the remaining places with working-class applicants. In 
round four, the remaining working-class applicants choose between either bottom school 
arbitrarily. 
The anomalous years where the bottom schools receive one or more middle-class pupils 
occur when an unusual number of working-class students pick the middle school in the 
first or second round, causing it to fill up earlier than usual. All this leaves the middle-
class applicants who could not get into either of the leading schools is one of the bottom 
schools. The reason we did not see this phenomenon in the equivalent three-school 
scenario (with equal working- and middle-class preferences) is that the leading school is 
preferred by every single agent in the first round; there is no room for statistical spikes in 
a 0% probability. 
Setting the working-class preference very low (0.01) causes the distinction between the 
middle school and the bottom two schools to blur to a much greater degree, even 
generating an extra level of differentiation where one of the ‘bottom’ schools is ranked 
higher than the other. This is due to the middle school’s intake being significantly 
‘diluted’ by working-class applicants in the first and second round every year, rather than 
just occasionally as above. Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17 in Appendix A provide a visual 
comparison. 
6.3.4 Six or more class sensitive schools 
Scenarios with six to ten schools are depicted in Appendix A,  Figure 9.18 to Figure 9.22. 
It is not the case that the ten-school scenario, for example, is the same as two five-school 
scenarios combined, but the general pattern remains the same, with a distinction found 
between odd and even numbers of schools. Of course, having, say, five or more schools in 
a single catchment area is probably generally unrealistic, save in a large metropolis. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the potential interactions. 
6.3.5 Three class blind schools 
We now consider multiple class blind schools. To make the diagrams easier to read, we 
focus on the most acute differentiation, where the middle-class preference is very high 
and the working-class preference is very low (20.48 and 0.01 respectively, as before). 
The situation here is much simpler, because only the choices of the agents representing 
the families need be considered. Each school simply accepts as many applicants as it has 
remaining places in every round, without preference. 
This results in the following three tiers: 
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Figure 6.7 – Three class blind schools, with a middle-class preference of 20.48 and a working-
class preference of 0.01. 
which are essentially a less pronounced version of the three-school class sensitive 
scenario. 
This outcome is readily explained by walking through the application process of a typical 
year: 
• Round 1:  98% of middle-class applicants apply to the top school, school 1, alongside 
34% of working-class applicants. School 1 therefore fills all its places in round 1, 
picking among its applicants at random, resulting in a middle-class intake of 
approximately 74%. The remaining 2% of middle-class applicants apply instead to the 
middle school, school 0, alongside 33% of working-class applicants, and are all 
accepted. School 2 accepts the remaining 33% of working-class pupils. 
• Round 2: All of the approximately 144 middle-class pupils who were rejected by 
school 1 now apply to their second choice, school 0, alongside 25 working-class 
applicants (50% of those who still seek a place). School 1 has only around 93 places 
left, so it can only accept around 75% of this round’s middle-class applicants. It now 
has a total middle-class intake of 43%. 
• Round 3: All those who were rejected from both other schools now apply to school 2, 
including 65 middle-class children. This gives school 2 a middle-class intake of 33%. 
Equivalently to the class sensitive case, this three-school scenario has been reduced to an 
iterated two-school scenario for the middle-class families. As always with such a low 
preference, the working-class families consider all schools at once. This is an advantage 
for them in the class sensitive case, since they would only be rejected from the leading 
school(s) anyway, so it makes more sense to aim straight for the second-best choice 
(although the agents are not as intelligent as this – they only avoid favouring any one 
school, rather than avoiding a school entirely). However, if they make the same choices 
as the middle-class applicants here, all inequity vanishes, just as in the two-school 
experiment 5.1.1. 
6.3.6 Four or more class blind schools 
Increasing the number of class blind schools does not reveal any new behaviour, and so 
those results are shown in Appendix A, Figure 9.23 to Figure 9.25. They lack even the 
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distinction between an odd and an even number of schools shown in the class sensitive 
case. 
6.4 Co-evolutionary behaviour 
The co-evolutionary behaviour, as described in section 3.2.6, was examined next. These 
were the most interesting experiments: each one built cumulatively on the results of the 
next, since the rules of the previous experiment were added to, not replaced. This led to 
interesting interactions. 
6.4.1 Preference for class blind schools  
Rules: none. 
The newly introduced preference of families for class blind schools, now competing with 
their preference for high-performing schools, was first tested without the addition of any 
‘co-evolutionary’ rules. The experiment looked at varying values of class blind preference 
mean: the logarithmically increasing sequence 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32 and 
0.64, as well as the maximum possible value of 1. Each preference mean was tested with 
standard deviations of 0 and 0.2. One class blind and one class sensitive school were 
used, to force children to choose between a class blind and a well-performing school (a 
class sensitive school will always dominate a class blind school in the absence of other 
factors, and assuming sufficiently high parental preferences). The weighting used for a 
school’s league table rating was set high to 0.8 (with a standard deviation of 0.2), since it 
was felt that this would still be the most significant parameter. This left a weighting of 0.2 
on average for class blind preferences. 
The predicted effect of this competing school attribute was to curtail the leading school’s 
trajectory to the top, preventing it from reaching a 100% middle-class intake. A larger 
class blind preference should result in a smaller mean inequity between the schools. 
Without the class blind preference, an inequity of 1.0 would usually result; it should 
equivalently be found now with a class blind preference of 0 and a standard deviation of 
0. The effect was as predicted, as seen below, where the result of not using the class blind 
factor is overlaid onto the outcome of using a class blind preference of 0.32: 
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Figure 6.8 – Two runs overlaid: In dotted red, the standard result of using one class blind and 
one class sensitive school with a high middle-class preference of 20.48, and a low working-class 
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preference of 0.01. In black, the same scenario using class blind preferences generated from a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0.32 and a standard deviation of 0.2. 
Whether a standard deviation of 0 or 0.2 was used did not make a significant difference to 
the stable state settled upon (measured by mean inequity between the schools): 
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Figure 6.9 Scatterplot showing how an increasing class blind preference mean parameter 
causes the average inequity to fall when using one class blind and one class sensitive school. 
What standard deviation was used for calculating each child’s class blind preference only 
had a significant impact when the class blind preference mean was close to 0. This is 
logical, since when the class blind preference is close to 0, very little impact would be 
seen; using a standard deviation of 0.2 would make many more parents care about class 
blind schools than sticking to a preference of 0, 0.01 or 0.02 exactly. Since all preferences 
< 0 are truncated to 0, this effect is not averaged out by values falling below the mean, as 
in the cases with a large class blind mean. 
The experiment was also run with four schools, two of which were class blind, and two 
class sensitive. For low class blind preferences (up to 0.32), the top class blind school 
assumed a leading position with a middle-class intake of around 75%, with one class 
sensitive school rated marginally above the two remaining schools. For higher class blind 
preferences, the two class blind schools both led with a middle-class intake of around 
65%, while the two class sensitive schools assumed differentiated positions of around 
45% and 25%. The class sensitive schools’ strategies were disapproved of too much to be 
preferred by children, and yet their league table positions still had an effect when given 
the choice of only those two. 
6.4.2 Children aiming to reduce polarisation 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a and 3.b are introduced here. 
The first rules to be tested were the ones used by children to attempt to curb a tendency 
towards total polarisation between schools. This was motivated by the reasoning that 
interest in a class blind school would be rather low when all schools were approximately 
equal in social class intake anyway, and that conversely it would be exaggerated if it was 
felt that social inequity was a severe problem in the community. 
The expected effect of the first rule, which decreases the children’s class blind preference 
by 20%, was to diminish the initial difficulty in beginning the trajectory towards 
polarisation compared to the previous experiment. This was exactly the case, as shown 
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below where we again see the class blind preference mean of 0.32 as in Figure 6.8, 
overlaid onto the result of using the child rules: 
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Figure 6.10 - Two runs overlaid: In dotted red, the result of using one class blind and one class 
sensitive school with a high middle-class preference of 20.48 with a low working-class preference 
of 0.01, and a class blind preference mean of 0.32 (0.2 standard deviation). In black, the same 
scenario using the child rules to adjust the class blind preference depending on the environment. 
The experiment used the same combinations of class blind preference mean and standard 
deviation as the previous one. One class blind and one class sensitive school were also 
used as in the previous experiment. 
As before, the inequity was diminished with increasing preference for class blind schools, 
and whether a standard deviation of 0 or 0.2 was used did not make a significant 
difference. 
Just as in the previous case, the second rule was also expected to freeze the polarisation 
trajectory once the threshold for the increased preference for class blind schools was 
passed. This was defined in the rule as a school having 170% of the population average as 
a middle-class intake. How low the inequity is capped should depend on the strength of 
families’ preferences for class blind schools. However, the inequity was expected to be 
somewhat reduced compared to the previous experiment, because the children perceive 
the near-polarisation and work against it
31
 by altering their preferences, increasing them 
by 20%. The difference was found to be less than intuitively expected (although of course 
no concrete value could be predicted); in Figure 6.10, the difference in mean inequity is 
only 0.01. On average, the mean difference in inequity between the two sets of runs was 
0.02. It therefore seems that the child rules did not succeed very well in their aim of 
reducing the inequity between schools; in fact, they accelerated the trajectory towards that 
stable state! Nevertheless, the rules were left in for the remainder of the experiments, in 
case any interesting interactions were found, and because it could still make sense for an 
individual household to reason in this way. 
6.4.3 Unsuccessful school adopts class blind niche 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a and 3.b as before; 4.a is introduced here. 
                                                     
31 Their individual motivation is not really to counteract the polarisation effect – rather, they do not wish to attend a 
completely polarised school, so they become more interested in other, more suitable schools – but as a strategy held by all 
children, it could still be said to be a collective ‘unconscious’ motivation. 
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Next, the rule that allows a class sensitive school performing poorly in the league tables 
to enter a class blind niche position to win middle-class applicants was added. This was 
tested with two class sensitive schools, again using the extreme 20.48 middle-class and 
0.01 working-class preferences to magnify the effects. Due to the Matthew effect (Room 
and Britton, 2006b), the school that gained an initial small advantage quickly moved up 
the league table rankings. Once the other school’s league table rating had fallen past the 
threshold of 90% of the population average, it would give up trying to compete with the 
other school in the league table, and instead change its strategy to class blind. The results 
were very similar to those of the previous experiment; a comparison is shown below: 
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Figure 6.11 – Comparison of the mean inequity measured between a class blind and a class 
sensitive school, and between a run starting with two class sensitive schools with the ‘failing’ 
school switching to a class blind strategy during year 3. 
Only the results for a standard deviation of 0.2 are shown, since a standard deviation of 0 
showed the same pattern. The mean inequity measured between the two schools was 
higher using the class blind niche rule than without it for high class blind preferences. 
Comparing the two runs reveals a very simple explanation for this: 
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Figure 6.12 – Two runs using a class blind preference of 0.64 are superimposed here; the solid 
black one uses the niche rule, and the dotted red does not (it is a result from experiment 6.4.2).  
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Because the middle-class preference for high-performing schools is so high (20.48), the 
downwards spiral experienced by the failing school happens so rapidly that the switch to 
a class blind strategy in year 3 cannot prevent a year in which total polarisation occurs. 
This initial spike before stabilisation causes the increase in measured inequity when using 
the class blind niche rule. It is not as noticeable with high values of inequity. 
6.4.4 Popular class blind school becomes class sensitive 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a, 3.b and 4.a as before; 4.b is introduced here. 
We now examine the rule that reasoned that a sufficiently high-performing class blind 
school could become class sensitive, thereby removing the cap on its league table rating 
as calculated in section 5.1 for class blind schools. This is effectively the other side of the 
coin from the previous rule we investigated. However, while no harm can be seen in the 
previous rule – if the school did nothing, the worst case scenario of 0% middle-class 
intake would be reached in any case, so adopting a class blind niche could only improve 
matters or at worst leave them the same – this rule could potentially backfire if the 
population preferred class blind schools so much that the school became unpopular. 
As before, an extreme middle-class preference of 20.48 and a working-class preference of 
0.01 were used, to ‘exaggerate’ the interactions, allowing easier identification of patterns. 
This time, two class blind schools were used to begin with, since this is the scenario 
where the rule would be applied. The same set of class blind preferences were used to 
initialise the normal distribution as previously. 
‘Backfiring’ of the strategy was only seen in the most extreme case, with a maximal class 
blind preference mean (1.0). Here, the same ‘game’ was played over and over again, with 
the schools switching roles each time: the popular school switches to a class sensitive 
strategy, but this makes it so unpopular that it loses favour and the other school becomes 
more popular instead. Eventually, it becomes so popular that it becomes class sensitive as 
well, whereupon the original leader immediate adopts a class blind niche, which allows it 
to ascend into popularity again, and so on. Below we see a graph of this, overlaid onto the 
result of not using the class sensitive rule: 
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Figure 6.13 – Two runs overlaid: In dotted red, the run using a middle-class preference of 
20.48 with a working-class preference of 0.01 and a class blind preference mean of 1.0 (standard 
deviation 0.2). In black and blue, the same parameters were used with the class sensitive rule. Note 
that the two runs follow the same trajectories until the end of year 5, when the leading school 
becomes class sensitive due to its popularity. 
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However, in every other case, the strategy switch was advantageous for the leading 
school, indicating that it is a sound rule to follow (since a class blind preference of the 
maximum value, 1.0, is probably not realistic). It resulted in a greater inequity between 
schools, as shown below: 
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Figure 6.14 – Two runs overlaid: In dotted red, the run using middle-class preference 20.48, 
working-class preference 0.01 and a class blind preference mean of 0.64 (standard deviation 0.2). 
In black, the same parameters were used with the class sensitive rule. As in Figure 6.13, the 
leading school switched to a class sensitive strategy at the end of year 5. 
The experiments were also run with three and four schools, again assigning all schools 
the class blind strategy at the start.  
For three schools, a clear leader immediately emerged, became class sensitive and 
maintained a 100% middle-class intake except for blips for a mean class blind preference 
of 0.64, and significant troughs for a mean preference of 1.0. The other two schools 
remained class blind and formed a local two-school class blind scenario for the remaining 
applicants. The inequity between those two lessened and then disappeared with increasing 
class blind preference means, because the league table position of a school became less 
important. An example is shown in Appendix A, Figure 9.27. 
In the four-school scenario, each parameter combination produced a similar result: the 
popular class sensitive school achieved 100% middle-class intake throughout, leaving the 
remaining three class-blind schools to share an equal intake of around ⅓ middle-class. 
However, the cases where the class blind preference was very low allowed a slight leader 
to emerge among those remaining three schools. This differentiation no longer occurred 
for class blind means of 0.32 and higher, for the same reason as in the three-school case. 
6.4.5 School becomes class sensitive to break out of stable, undifferentiated state 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a, 3.b, 4.a and 4.b as before; 4.c is introduced here. 
The final rule concerned with schools changing their strategy was one designed to upset 
the stable class blind state where the parental preference is insufficiently high to produce 
differentiation between schools. A middle-class preference of 1.28 with a working-class 
preference of 0.01 was used; this is not sufficient to generate differentiation between 
schools by itself. The simulation was initialised with two class blind schools, and then a 
random race condition determined which school took the risk of becoming class sensitive. 
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The rule only fires when no school’s middle-class intake is further than 10% away from 
the population average. 
As usual, the simulation was run with a logarithmically increasing class blind mean, from 
0 to 1. The rule fired at the end of year 1 in every case, as expected, but it only had an 
effect in the first case, with a class blind preference mean of 0. Even then, it took a while 
to take effect: 
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Figure 6.15 – School 0 applies the ‘risky’ rule in year 1, allowing it to ascend to near-
polarisation, but only after a relatively long time. The class blind preference mean is 0. 
This long delay before the change could take effect – since the class sensitive school first 
needed to be ‘lucky’ to build up a sufficiently large advantage to differentiate itself 
permanently – could explain why the other cases did not exhibit this outcome; the 
stronger class blind preference prevented the class sensitive school from gaining in 
popularity. In fact, with a mean preference of 0.64 and 1, the class sensitive school sees 
such a decline in popularity because of its strategy switch that it is forced to revert to a 
class blind strategy to save itself. However, the other school is no more aware of the 
children’s strong preferences than it is, and so it then falls into the same trap: its gain in 
popularity causes it to boldly become class sensitive, after which it is disfavoured in turn, 
and so on. A more intelligent set of rules would allow schools to recognise this extreme 
scenario and avoid using this strategy as it is obviously counter-productive in this case. 
With the somewhat lower class blind preferences 0.16 and 0.32, the class sensitive school 
merely takes on a slightly less popular role for the duration of the run. 
The range 0.01 – 0.08 therefore seemed like a grey area – would polarisation occur after 
all, if we waited long enough? The 0.01 case was re-run ten times with different random 
seeds, and the polarisation effect emerged at varying intervals in four cases, which 
supports this theory. The 0.04, 0.08 and 0.32 cases were also re-run ten times each in 
order to verify that no differentiation was emerge; this was confirmed.  
6.4.6 School specialisms 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b and 4.c as before; no new rules are introduced 
in this experiment. 
Adding a third attribute to schools, their specialist subject, adds much potential for 
interference between rules, so the effect of using specialisms was first investigated 
without the use of any additional rules. School specialisms are detailed in section 3.2.6, 
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but the key points are that each school may hold at most one specialism, and it cannot 
change specialism more than once every ten years.  
The case of schools having the same specialism was not examined in detail, since it does 
not do anything other than slightly weaken the effect of other differences, just as the 
addition of a class blind preference lessened the impact of school league table ratings. 
Therefore, each school was given a distinct specialism, and the only variable parameter 
was the number of class blind schools (0, 1 or 2). A class blind preference mean of 0.32 
was used, having been previously established as a non-extreme value, with the usual 
standard deviation of 0.2. As before, a league table weighting mean of 0.8 was used, also 
with a standard deviation of 0.2. The remaining weighting was divided equally between a 
school’s specialism and its strategy (class blind or not), which is somewhat arbitrary, but 
any division would merely be a guess in the absence of field data, The middle- and 
working-class preferences were left at 20.48 and 0.01 respectively. 
We would expect the effect of a high class blind preference to be lessened from now on, 
since it is now given a lower weighting. Apart from that, no difference is expected in this 
experiment from those found with the same rules, i.e. those of experiment 6.4.5. This is 
because children are not biased towards any particular specialism in the simulation (on 
average), so no specialism is really any better in the long term, even if it is significantly 
preferred by a particular year group due to a statistical anomaly.  
The results were as expected. In the 0-, 1- and 2- class blind school cases, the mean 
inequity was 0.0349, 0.0299 and 0.0295 less respectively than when school specialisms 
were not used. Additionally, when two class blind schools were used, the initial plunge 
towards polarisation that is later corrected became a gentler ascension when specialisms 
were introduced (see Appendix A, Figure 9.26). This explains the greater difference 
between the mean inequities in this scenario. It was not predicted by the experimenter, 
who failed to consider every condition, but this again illustrates the value of simulation, 
especially when so many behaviours are interacting and interfering with each other that 
prediction becomes demanding. 
6.4.7 School specialism rule to avoid duplicate specialisms 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b and 4.c as before; 4.d is introduced here. 
Next, a rule was added to encode the behaviour that a school should switch to another 
specialism if possible if another, higher-performing school shares the same one. 
Otherwise, it would not gain any advantage from its specialism: all the children who were 
interested in it would still favour the higher-performing school (unless perhaps it had a 
less preferred admissions strategy). 
The schools were both initialised with the same specialism to test the effects of the rule. 
As in the previous experiment, a class blind preference mean of 0.32 was used, with a 0.2 
standard deviation; the middle-class preference was 20.48 and the working-class 
preference was 0.01. Runs were performed with both two and three specialisms to choose 
from, and with 0, 1 and 2 class blind schools on initialisation. Three specialisms were not 
expected to produce a different effect from only two, since the schools do not give much 
thought to which specialism to switch to, only that it is not already taken. 
The simulation does not provide a way of specifying exactly which schools should have 
which specialisms (see section 8.3.6), but fortunately, the usual random seed produced the 
desired set-up in the two-specialism case. However, for three specialisms, a different 
random seed had to be used (3). Fortunately, whether two or three specialisms were used 
had no significant effect (as predicted), and so those results were not required to be 
compared against any other experiment’s. 
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The rule fired at the same point in each case (at the first available opportunity, i.e. in year 
11 since 10 years are required as a minimum duration for a specialism’s adoption). 
Surprisingly, no significant difference was found for the two-specialism runs when 
compared to simulations run with the same parameters but without this new rule. This 
indicates that the impact of giving each child linearly decreasing interest levels in the 
specialisms, so that year on year 50% of children preferred specialism 1 approximately to 
degree ‘1’, and the other 50% preferred it to degree 0.5, coupled with the small ~10% 
weighting given to specialisms, is to produce an even smaller end effect than previously 
assumed. However, the alternative explanation of there being an error in the program 
cannot be ruled out either, even though no individual behaviour observed during the 
simulation could be identified as anomalous. 
6.4.8 School specialism rule to sabotage competitors with duplicate specialisms 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 4.c and 4.d as before; 4.e is introduced here. 
Finally, the rule was added in which high-performing schools try to inflate their 
advantage even further by sabotaging their less well-performing competitors’ niche 
positions. They do not want to take away a class blind advantage because that would cap 
their maximum league table rating, but there is no real disadvantage to changing different 
specialism. Since the other school that shares the specialism has an inferior league table 
rating, the vast majority of children who previously would have chosen the specialist 
niche school due to their academic interests will now turn to the high-performing school 
instead. 
Again, two and three specialisms were examined, and 0-, 1- and 2-class blind school 
scenarios, with middle- and working-class preferences of 20.48 and 0.01 respectively. 
As in the previous experiment, the number of specialisms used had no significant effect: 
every 11 years the ‘failing’ school would switch specialism to try to adopt a niche as 
before, but the leading school now immediately followed suit, preventing it from gaining 
any advantage. Whether one or the other ‘unused’ specialism was used for this in the 
three-specialism case obviously made no difference. 
Compared to runs where the rule was not used, the ‘act of sabotage’ had only a very mild 
effect: an increase in inequity of 0.0013 on average. This was less than expected, but on 
further investigation, it seemed reasonable for school specialisms not to have a very 
strong effect: they only receive a weighting of 10% on average, and each child does not 
only foster a single interest: it has a linearly decreasing range of interests. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to put a value on the expected difference in inequity, and accordingly difficult 
to say whether this experiment conforms to expectation or not. The strongest statement 
that can be confidently made is that the reasoning made by the schools and the children 
can be followed. 
6.4.9 Children excluding irrelevant factors 
Rules: section 3.2.6 rules 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d and 4.e as before; 3.c, 3.d, and 3.e are 
introduced here. 
The last rules added were for children to exclude factors from consideration that were 
irrelevant, such as the class blind preference if all schools shared the same strategy, or 
their academic interests if all schools had the same specialist subject. 
This is arguably an implementation issue, but the effect on the results is so profound that 
it was included as an experiment. The new rules increased the ‘rush’ towards a stable, 
inequitable state even more so than the children’s rules for adjusting their league table 
preference (introduced in 6.4.2) alone. The experiment was run with 0, 1 and 2 class blind 
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schools to begin with; the effect was most pronounced in the 0-class blind school case, 
when the popular school switches to a class sensitive strategy: 
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Figure 6.16 – Two runs superimposed: In dotted red, two (initially) class blind schools, with 
two specialisms to choose between, and middle- and working-class preferences of 20.48 and 0.01 
respectively, alongside the usual 0.32 mean class blind preference, using all rules bar the child 
factor elimination ones. In black, the same experiment with the child rules to ignore irrelevant 
school choice factors. 
The significant increase in mean inequity seen above was also seen in the other 
simulation runs. 
In the three-school case, run with the usual increasing class blind preferences, the 
accelerated move towards the stable state was also very pronounced (compare Figure 9.27 
to Figure 9.29 in Appendix A). The acceleration was less obvious in the four-school 
scenario, because it already happened so quickly before (compare Figure 9.28 to Figure 
9.30 in Appendix A). 
6.4.10 Reducing initial inequity 
Having analysed our set of ‘co-evolutionary’ rules, we would like to see whether they 
help (or possibly even hinder) a reduction of initial inequity in a simulation.  
Using all the rules introduced here, an experiment was run using an initial inequity of 0.8, 
and one of 0.1 (the usual initial inequity is of course 0 – the schools begin as equals). This 
was tested with two class blind schools and a middle-class preference of 5.12, paired with 
working-class preferences of 0.01, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16 and 0.32 to produce varying degrees 
of intrinsic inequity. The league table rating was weighted at 0.8 with a standard deviation 
of 0.2 as usual; both the class blind preference mean and its standard deviation were set to 
0.2; and two possible specialisms were used. 
The same experiment was also run without using any rules or co-evolutionary behaviour 
at all. The results are shown below for the example case of a working-class preference of 
0.32; they were equivalent for the other working-class preferences: 
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Figure 6.17 – This figure shows four runs in total. The dotted lines are runs beginning with 
initial inequity 0.1, while the solid ones represent runs with an initial inequity of 0.8. The 
uppermost two and the corresponding lower two schools are the two runs that used co-
evolutionary behaviour. The four schools (i.e. two runs) in the middle are those that did not use 
any co-evolutionary rules. 
What Figure 6.17 clearly shows is that the initial inequity used is irrelevant; the system 
tends inexorably towards the stable state of its intrinsic inequity, described by the school 
strategies and parental preferences used. This is in line with Room and Britton’s 
predictions for the basic model; it is interesting that they hold for the more advanced 
model as well.  
Of course, this does not imply that the agents cannot alter the intrinsic inequity of the 
system: the main reason the co-evolutionary rules produce much greater differentiation 
between schools is that one school becomes class sensitive, enabling it to climb higher in 
the league tables. Instead, it indicates that the initial environmental conditions of a 
simulation are inconsequential. 
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7 Discussion of Results 
7.1 Validity of results 
In chapter 5, we showed that the simulation was essentially able to replicate Room and 
Britton’s results (2006b), if allowances are made for stochastic effects which would also 
be present in the real world. The simulation is perhaps a truer replica of the real life 
domain than the mathematical model is, since the equations only capture the macro-level 
effects, missing the fine detail such as local spikes in school league table ratings. We have 
noted that this type of local statistical anomaly, while probably occurring commonly in 
the small sample sizes found in the real world in a given catchment area’s population, can 
have a long-term impact on the macro effect, slowing the trajectory towards the 
inequitable state. However, the eventual stable state remains the same. 
Yet it is important to note that there is no proof that the micro-behaviour of the model is 
at all representative of the real world. We can say that it is probably similar to the type of 
behaviour that would be seen, but the exact details are undoubtedly incorrect. Of course, 
this was never a major aim of the project; rather, it focused on simulating the underlying 
mechanisms and trajectories, thereby improving understanding of the problem domain 
and of this type of system in general. The correspondence (or lack of it) to the real world 
system was outside the scope of this project. Without the necessary empirical data, it 
would be counter-productive to try to introduce additional parameters with the sole aim of 
adding ‘realism’: the experimenter would be forced to guess at appropriate values, 
thereby creating further room for error in the results. For example, how would one 
quantify the preference parents might have for sending all their children to the same 
school? A full parameter sweep of these new factors would be necessary, which would 
soon lead to a combinatorial explosion in the parameter space to be explored – and to no 
real gain.  
Of course, adding unnecessary complexity to the model would also make it much more 
difficult to understand, and require even more computing power. Even at its current 
modest level of complexity, it is no longer possible to look only at a graph of the league 
table ratings to infer what behaviours occurred when. Moreover, the model would risk 
becoming overspecialised: the intention was to look at general co-evolutionary 
mechanisms that are common to many domains. 
It could nevertheless be a valuable exercise to validate the model against empirical data. 
This should expose any fundamental flaws in the model’s behaviours, and would provide 
insight into how well the agents mimicked their real life counterparts. However,  
‘docking’ a model containing stochastic elements to empirical data is complicated, as 
discussed in section 2.6. 
Although the model’s basic features could be validated against Room and Britton’s 
model, the extensions investigated in chapter 6 could not really be validated at all, apart 
from against the predictions of the experimenter. The experimenter was biased both as the 
author of the code, and from having seen informal experiments while testing that would 
have created preconceptions. 
On a more fundamental level, the project also suffered a lack of repeated experiments: 
ideally, every single experimental case would have been run 100 times with different 
random seeds. Time and computing power constraints did not allow this, but it would be 
essential for a more ambitious project. 
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It would also have been preferable to check every experiment for replicability, just in case 
the model was perfectly replicable in all but a small number of aberrant cases; instead 
only approximately 10% were checked. This however brings with it again the problem of 
deciding when enough simulations have been run: a program might produce the same 
result 9 times out of 10 but deviate on the 10
th
 run, for example. For greater confidence, 
several different types of computer should be used for these tests, to ensure that the 
effects of uncontrolled factors, such as the order the JVM iterates through an unordered 
list, are not being masked by the particular system being used. This was already checked 
to some degree in this project by using seven different Windows machines, and a 
powerful Linux server. However, it is impossible to establish replicability with full 
certainty since we cannot run an infinite number of experiments. 
The parameter space could also have been explored more fully; this is especially true of 
the later, co-evolutionary experiments, when time was running out. It would have been 
interesting to run more multiple-school experiments with variants of the co-evolutionary 
behaviour. Stochastic shocks were not investigated for multiple schools at all either. 
These experiments would have been run, had time permitted. 
A finer point is that certain parameters were hard-coded into the model. Specifically, 
these were a) all ‘threshold’ values in rules, e.g. specifying that the rule should fire if the 
school’s league table rating rose 10% or more above the average; b) what value children 
should increase or decrease their class blind preference by, when the appropriate rules 
fired; and c) the half-life of a stochastic shock, allowing its decay rate to be specified. 
There was insufficient time to explore the parameter space of these variables, but the fact 
that this was not done further weakens the validity of the model’s results. We cannot 
claim that the model’s behaviour would not have differed significantly if any of these 
parameters had been different, since it was not tested. 
A policy-maker, upon seeing the experimental results, might find the hundreds, 
sometimes thousands of years simulated to be ridiculous. Firstly, of course schools as we 
currently know them can hardly be expected to exist in a thousand years’ time, or even in 
a hundred year’s time, due to local and national politics; and secondly, prediction of more 
than a few years or decades into the future is doomed to failure, as any error in the 
simulation is multiplied on every successive step.  
However, the experimental results are not really intended for prediction – rather, they 
were meant to aid understanding of the fundamental processes at work in the domain. 
Upon seeing a school’s rising trend in the league tables, it is of interest to know whether 
this will be capped at a certain point, or if it would in theory continue indefinitely, until it 
had reached a 100% middle-class intake. This helps us to understand the underlying 
mechanisms. Of course, with extreme parental preferences, such total polarisation can 
indeed be reached after only a few years, and no doubt, such schools do exist in the UK; 
but more commonly, the polarisation found in real life, and in the simulation after a 
‘realistic’ number of years, is only partial. 
7.2 Key findings 
The overarching finding of all the experiments run is that the school choice system 
always tends towards its intrinsic inequity. This is defined by the schools’ strategies and 
the children’s preferences – although these can be changed dynamically when co-
evolutionary behaviour is enabled. However, any initial inequity at the beginning of the 
simulation run is irrelevant; it cannot be sustained if the preferences and strategies do not 
support it naturally. Even the stochastic shocks could not alter the inequity present in a 
system; they could only switch the school’s roles. 
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The addition of rules to allow schools to change strategy made a huge difference: a school 
doing poorly on the league tables could ‘save’ itself by adopting a class blind niche, 
maintaining a certain level of middle-class intake that would otherwise have gradually 
disappeared. Conversely, a popular class blind school could now ‘abuse’ its position and 
change to a class sensitive admissions policy, allowing it to move from a relatively high 
to a 100% middle-class intake, completely excluding working-class applicants. On the 
whole, the co-evolutionary rules used tended to aid the leading school, increasing the 
inequity in the system: while they did provide a tool for a less successful school to form a 
niche, often this niche was only necessary because another school had ‘defected’ and 
become class sensitive, taking a huge lead. The general tendency of all the co-
evolutionary rules interacting together, in the two-school case, was for there to be one 
very successful class sensitive school, and one fairly (but not fully) unsuccessful class 
blind school. Admittedly, this is not as inequitable as the basic case of two class sensitive 
schools. However, it could be argued that different rules would have produced an entirely 
different effect, although the adoption of niche positions was at least observed in the field 
by Lauder and Hughes (1999). 
In contrast, specialisms were a disappointing extension. Being given a weighting of, on 
average, only 10%, and dividing the child’s interest levels between several specialisms, 
meant that the effect of a school’s specialism was much diluted. It seemed too weak to 
have any real effect of significance on the schools’ trajectories. It would perhaps have 
been preferable to give each child only a single subject of interest, just as each school can 
only have a single specialism. The specialism rules were not especially intelligent in any 
case: it would have been more advantageous for a school to consider all possible matches 
and take the most potentially profitable one, rather than being satisfied with the first one 
meeting the basic criteria. For example, an ethically questionable school could perhaps 
have sabotaged two of its competitors at once rather than just one. However, there was 
insufficient time to investigate many multi-school scenarios involving specialisms, which 
is where this would have come into play, since this was the last extension added to the 
simulation. Nor was there much time to investigate the effects of using varying numbers 
of specialisms; but initial results showed that their number was of little consequence, 
perhaps again due to the weak influence of specialisms in general. 
Another criticism that could be made of the school specialism rules is that it is unrealistic 
for schools to be happy to switch specialism every ten years. The rules should include 
some concept of the huge overhead involved in such a change: specialist equipment might 
become obsolete, and major staffing changes could be necessary. It is true that the 
Specialist Schools Programme devised by the DfES (2003a) requires a school’s 
specialism to be renewed every four years, but the school is expected to retain the old 
specialism. A second unrealistic aspect of the model is that in real life, the DfES might 
well reject a specialism proposal that was seen as an act of sabotage towards other 
schools, or that failed to add value to the community, being already well provided for by 
another school. 
It might also have been more interesting if negative levels of interest in a specialism were 
possible in a minority of cases. For example, a poor linguist or a dyslexic child might not 
wish to attend a specialist language school for fear their grades would suffer, having 
greater emphasis on languages. 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Evaluation of the project 
The overall aim of this project was to produce an agent-based model equivalent to Room 
and Britton’s equations (2006b), and then to build upon it to deepen understanding of the 
underlying processes, and to demonstrate the advantages of agent-based simulation. In 
this, the project was a success. 
The simulation was able to replicate all essential aspects of Room and Britton’s model; 
and moreover in doing so, it is claimed that it exposed an oversight in the original model. 
This was only detected after the initial prototype had been written, which gave the author 
a much deeper understanding of the trajectories and mechanisms in play than the original 
equations or textual descriptions had been able to. Thus, it was possible to identify the 
mechanism that Room and Britton’s model did not appear to account for. It would have 
been much more difficult to spot this by analysing only the equations, since the equations 
deal with macro effects and the adjustment suggested to the equations in section 5.1.1 
relates to the behaviour of individual agents, which then impacts the macro-level 
outcome. 
This finding demonstrates the value of the understanding gained merely by writing an 
agent-based model, let alone running it. It was also revealing to see that the simple 
introduction of more than two schools caused the working-class preference to suddenly 
take on significance in the class sensitive case (see section 6.3); in the two-school model 
investigated by Room and Britton, it has no effect. Thus, our understanding of the 
system’s dynamics was deepened further. 
Running the model also generated some interesting results; the key one being, as 
discussed in section 7.2, that the system has a built-in inequity defined by the school’s 
strategies and the children’s preferences, which cannot be permanently influenced without 
changing these intrinsic parameters. 
The expectation that it would be relatively easy to build a model that would generate rich 
results was confirmed; and it would not be difficult to add extensions to it that would 
produce more fruitful output yet. In contrast, describing the interactions seen here in 
equations would be almost impossible, and would certainly be a very difficult and error-
prone task. 
However, the project suffered under the model’s poor performance, which caused the 
entire schedule to be shifted forward to await the results of the final experiments. It was 
impossible to predict at the planning stage how long an experiment would take to run; and 
in analysing the results, additional experiments were often discovered to be of interest, 
and were therefore added to the list, further increasing the delay. However, it would 
perhaps have been better to add a greater ‘buffer’ to the project plan to account for this 
type of unpredictable delay. Nevertheless, the project’s evolutionary approach of 
developing the model and running experiments in parallel served it well; if a more 
traditional methodology had been chosen, it would have been impossible to run sufficient 
experiments in time. Moreover, the experiments served as tests of the model, and would 
have had to be run to some degree during development in any case. 
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8.2 Choice of technology 
Overall, it seems that appropriate technology was chosen for the project, despite the 
performance issues introduced by Drools. Once the new version of Drools is released, it 
should be possible to improve on the simulation’s performance significantly. 
Alternatively, the rules could be converted to JESS and profiling undertaken to see if a 
performance gain could be seen; but it seems most sensible to first assess the performance 
benefits brought by the new version of Drools. 
Repast was a very ‘friendly’ platform to use: there was plenty of documentation available 
online, and most problems encountered had already been discussed on the mailing list. It 
was also very stable; no Repast bugs were encountered. The only drawback was, as 
discussed in section 3.3.2, that the library classes could not be trusted to preserve 
replicability of experiments without first reading their source code. Repast was indeed 
very flexible as anticipated, and all of the extensions discussed below should be easy to 
implement in Repast. It is, however, unknown how suitable it would be for a distributed 
system, although no obvious problems are yet apparent. The design of using one Drools 
working memory per agent certainly lends itself very well to a distributed model; indeed, 
this was in part the motivation for adopting the design. 
8.3 Further work 
8.3.1 Catchment areas 
The idea of catchment areas follows on naturally from the consideration of more than two 
schools in a simulation. Children living in a particular school’s catchment area would be 
given precedence over children living outside the area. This would lead to house prices 
rising in the area surrounding a popular school, pricing working-class parents out of the 
market in this more ‘desirable’ area, thus giving schools an indirect mechanism to cherry-
pick middle-class students. 
This effect is, however, already one of the motivations for assigning middle-class parents 
a higher preference for high-performing schools than working-class parents. This 
‘preference’ is in part characteristic of middle-class parents’ greater willingness, but also 
their greater ability to move to the most popular catchment areas. (While the term 
‘preference’ is perhaps not quite the correct term, it is convenient to use in this context.) 
Catchment areas were not implemented in this model, because they are so domain-
specific. Even though the model does aim to capture the essence of the dynamics of the 
school admissions process, it was also important not to fall into Gilbert and Doran’s “trap 
of verisimilitude” (2005, p.12). It was felt that implementing something as domain-
specific as catchment areas would be straying too far from the project’s motivation of 
exploring the usefulness of agent-based modelling techniques applied to this type of 
complex system, compared to the original equation-based model. This could make it 
more difficult to adapt the basic model to other, similar domains, and would arguably not 
enable new types of insight into the value of the model. If the model were to be further 
specialised in the domain of school choice, catchment areas would certainly be a useful 
addition, but otherwise, they might only add unnecessary complexity. The same argument 
can be applied to the suggestion of families moving house during the academic year, and 
being compelled to join whichever school happens to have a free place. 
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8.3.2 Successful schools expanding, ‘failing’ schools closing down 
Another feature that could be added to the simulation would be to re-distribute places 
from a failing school to a more successful one. This eventuality is already provided for by 
the Java code; it would only require rules to be added to increase or decrease the number 
of places in a school. Inside a school’s own expert system is perhaps not the best place for 
such rules, since a failing school would hardly be expected to offer to gradually close 
down, but adding a ‘central authority’ responsible for imposing such punishments and 
rewards could be seen as adding unnecessary overheads. It could be argued that it is not 
inappropriate to place such rules inside a school’s expert system after all since they 
represent a constraint on its behaviour that a school would be aware of; and certainly, it 
would be a very cheap way to investigate this new aspect of the model. 
It would be interesting to see whether a successful school expanding would actually 
negatively affects its success, since it might need to accept more working-class applicants 
to fill those new places. 
8.3.3 More intelligent agents 
The child agents in particular are very primitive, and would benefit from increased 
intelligence. For example, a social influence mechanism could be added to pass on 
interest in the specialist subjects in a local community. For example, an area could be 
especially sports-oriented if it boasted a well-equipped sports centre, or sought after by 
linguists if there is a specialist language primary school in the vicinity. This would also 
allow the school specialisms/child interests levels to become more truly co-evolutionary: 
at the moment, the schools have no motivation to adapt to any skew in the children’s 
interest levels since they will be reset (without using any historic trends) in the next 
academic year. The schools therefore base their choice of specialism purely on the 
specialisms of the other schools. The children do not evolve at all – although they do 
shape their environment (the schools) for their successors. Since each child only has a 
one-year lifetime, it seems that the only way they could properly be said to co-evolve is if 
they also influenced their successors more directly. Their lifespan of interest could also be 
increased, giving them social influence throughout their time at school; perhaps their own 
preferences would also be affected dynamically by the dominant interests of their 
classmates during this time, and by the specialism of the school. 
On a more basic level, the child rules could also be adapted to include some of the 
strategies the author thought of while analysing the experimental results. If working-class 
children knew that they were undesirable to a class sensitive school, they could assume in 
a multi-school scenario that they would not be accepted to their first-choice school and 
instead apply directly to their second-choice school in the first application round. All of 
the middle-class children would probably have applied to the leading school in the first 
round, so there would be little competition for the second-best school, even if it was 
excellent. However, middle-class children might anticipate this, and, say, 15% of them, 
the most risk-averse ones, would apply to the second-best school in the second 
application round, to avoid the risk of being left only with the third-rated school due to 
insufficient places in the others. 
This would mean using different rule sets for working- and middle-class children. 
Similarly, rules might be added for children to anticipate which schools are so popular 
that they would be wasted as a second choice. If there are only two excellent schools, it 
makes sense to list one as a first choice, and perhaps the third-best school as a second 
choice, since both excellent schools can be expected to fill up in the first application 
round. The child should not waste its second choice on a school that it knows will not 
have any places left. 
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Children might also differentiate between two schools having an equal league table 
position, with one holding a stable position and the other being perceived as ‘on the 
slide’. Perhaps a highly rated school that was declining might even be passed over in 
favour of a less well-rated school that was improving, since the children will be attending 
the school for six years. 
The school agents could also benefit from increased intelligence: for example, when 
choosing a new specialism, they simply pick the first one which meets their basic criteria, 
rather than evaluating all possible options and ranking them by suitability. The (unethical) 
‘act of sabotage’ rule in which a school adopts a new specialism to destroy the niche 
position of a competitor, for example, could be made more effective by preferring a new 
specialism that destroyed the joint niche of two competitors at once. 
More significantly, the school agents could also learn from their mistakes by monitoring 
the effects of a strategy change. For example, if a school considers itself popular enough 
to become class sensitive but the children’s class blind preferences turn out to be so high 
that this move backfires and it starts slipping down the league tables, it could recognise 
the situation and revert to its previous strategy, remembering not to make the same error 
again. This would make the rules much more complex, but it would also stop ‘stupid’ 
runs from occurring where the schools take turns using the same bad strategy and 
switching roles, when any human could recognise the pattern and advise them to stop 
(e.g. Figure 6.13). An even more intelligent school could even learn from its competitors’ 
mistakes in this manner. 
8.3.4 Increased heterogeneity among agents 
Currently, there are only three distinct types of agent within a given simulation run: 
working-class children, middle-class children, and schools. It is true that these groups act 
differently when co-evolutionary behaviour is enabled, but even then, each group’s 
members follow homogeneous rules. They only differ in their attributes. Arguably, the 
middle- and working-class children differ only in attributes as well, so there are only two 
types of agent. However, this still produces heterogeneous behaviour, since different 
attributes lead to different rules being triggered.  
It would, however, be more interesting to sub-divide these groups, allocating, say, 10% of 
school agents a more aggressively competitive set of rules, and giving the remainder a 
more cooperative rule set. This could easily be done in Repast by defining a new subclass 
of School, in the same way that EvolutionarySchool was created and given its own rule 
set, and adding a simulation parameter that specified what percentage of agents should be 
of this type. This is already done via the FractionMiddleClassPopulation parameter for 
creating that percentage of middle-class child agents, making the remainder working-
class.  
8.3.5 More sophisticated league table calculations 
The league table ratings used in this project were kept relatively abstract throughout: they 
only consisted of a four-year moving average of the school’s middle-class composition. It 
could be interesting to examine more sophisticated league table mechanisms, such as the 
value-added tables used in real life (DfES, 2007). This could be calculated by allocating 
each child an ‘exam score’ on school entry that was on average lower for working-class 
children. Upon leaving the school, they would be given a ‘value-added’ exam score that 
was dependent both on their original exam score and on the social make-up of the school, 
since a child’s exam results are likely to be positively affected by a high percentage of 
middle-class children in its class (Lauder and Hughes, 1999). 
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An alternative view of league tables would be to abstract them even further, and instead 
of using raw ratings, to provide parents with only ranking information. This would 
probably significantly influence the simulation’s outcome, perhaps preventing any one 
school from gaining a fully polarised intake since its rising degree of success would be 
masked from view. Middle-class parents should view the difference between the top and 
second-highest ranked schools as larger than working-class parents do, analogous to 
middle-class parents’ current increased preference for high league table ratings. 
8.3.6 More flexible model parameters 
A trade-off has been present throughout the project between not wishing to over-
complicate the model’s parameters, and allowing for sufficient flexibility. Currently, some 
of the necessary flexibility requires the user to use a different random seed on occasion to 
obtain the precise starting configuration desired. This would clearly be unacceptable in a 
more rigorous research project, since it would compromise the validity of comparing 
simulation runs against each other directly. A useful extension would therefore be to write 
a custom parameter file reader that would overcome the constraints on expressiveness 
imposed by Repast. 
The constraints encountered by this project all followed the same format: we had a 
parameter describing a variable number of objects or events, such as the number of 
possible school specialisms, or the number of stochastic shocks; we then wished to 
further parameterise each of these objects, one by one. Repast does not allow a variable 
number of parameters, the number of which depends on another parameter. This could, 
however, easily be overcome by writing a custom parameter file, since Repast allows the 
desired reader to be specified within a parameter file; but this would have the 
disadvantage of no longer being compatible with Repast’s parameter GUI, so Repast 
could no longer be used to generate real-time graphs in its interactive mode.  
Since Repast is open-source, existing functionality could easily be adapted for the 
parameter file reader, and only this particular extra feature would need to be written. It 
was not implemented on this project due to time constraints, and because it only became a 
necessity at the end of the project, when using school specialisms; until then, we had been 
lucky and had not needed to use an alternative random seed. We were, however, not able 
to reliably compare the three-specialism cases in those experiments against the rest of the 
experiments. 
Another implementation adjustment that would be useful would be to turn the rule files 
used into parameters to the program. This would allow the simulation itself to be 
packaged as a JAR file, along with an appropriate script to run it, and the rules could be 
kept separately as text files. This would allow non-technical social scientists to edit the 
Drools rules, which are very human-readable (see Appendix C, sections 11.1-11.4), 
without having to compile or even see any Java code. It would also allow long batch runs 
to be created that used different rules for different runs. In this project, in order to run 
experiments on several different rule sets, such batch runs were separated into several 
sub-runs, one per set of rules.  
8.4 Predictive abilities 
The model does of course not even approach the level of realism required to make a 
prediction about the system it simulates with confidence. In fact, the system it models is 
arguably really that described by Room and Britton’s equations, rather than the real 
world. We have aimed more towards a “thought experiment” type of model than one 
aimed towards prediction: as noted in section 2.4, the two may be mutually exclusive. 
And even if it were a validated replica of the real world school admission domain, 
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prediction in the social sciences is notoriously poor, as discussed in section 2.4. However, 
it could nonetheless be used to make a generalised, abstract prediction about a real world 
scenario, with the caveat that its reliability is unknown. 
Brighton’s school admissions process has recently received much media attention (e.g. 
BBC News, 2007; The Observer, 2007). They are replacing the old system, which was 
based on the distance of a child’s home to the school, by a “lottery” system of random 
allocation that is equivalent to our ‘class blind’ school strategy. The changes are 
motivated by new government guidelines designed to reduce social exclusion by 
preventing wealthy families moving into the most popular catchment areas, pricing 
working-class families out of the market. 
We do not model catchment areas explicitly, but this is one of the factors that supports the 
higher preference for high-performing schools held by middle-class children, compared to 
working-class children. Our scenario of two class sensitive schools leading towards social 
polarisation of school composition therefore corresponds approximately to the original 
Brighton configuration. 
Our model does not enable us to force schools to change strategy at a particular point in 
time – the schools decide themselves if and when they wish to do so – but we can specify 
an initial configuration involving inequity. We could therefore ‘fast-forward’ to the 
current point in time and run a simulation with an inequity of, say, 80% between two 
schools
32
 and tell the schools to use class blind allocation policies. If co-evolutionary 
behaviour is disabled, then they are forced to remain in the Brighton scenario. In fact, we 
have already run this simulation, in experiment 6.4.10. It predicts that the inequity will 
decrease until it reaches the intrinsic inequity defined by the new school strategies. The 
magnitude of this new inequity cannot be predicted, since we lack the empirical data to 
decide upon appropriate middle- and working-class preferences for high-performing 
schools. 
In short, we predict that the inequity between the schools will be lessened, but only up to 
a point, after which it will stabilise at the level built in to the new scenario. The 
government will only succeed partially in its aim to reduce social exclusion, since it can 
only fully redefine the schools’ behaviour through social policy; it only has indirect 
influence on families’ preferences. However, it could be that middle-class parental 
preferences are also reduced because of the policy changes, since they lose their 
advantage of being able to move to a popular catchment area. This would reduce the 
resultant inequity further yet. But their preferences would still not be reduced to the level 
of working-class parents’ preferences, eliminating the inequity entirely, since there are 
many other factors that shape their preferences (Room and Britton, 2006a). 
As long as the class system exists in its current form, there will be social inequity; the 
government can only act to minimise the social exclusion as far as possible. 
 
                                                     
32 Unfortunately the model does not allow initial inequity to be specified between more than two schools. 
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9 Appendix A 
9.1 Validation of initial prototype against Room and Britton’s model 
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Figure 9.1 – Difference between z* (the inequity between the schools’ middle-class intakes) 
predicted by Room and Britton’s model, and that measured using the simulation, for varying 
middle-class fractions of the population. The differences appear to be acceptably low; we can 
conclude the model performs as expected. The runs used a middle-class preference of 2.56 and a 
working-class preference of 0.01. 
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Figure 9.2 – Predicted inequity produced by varying the fraction of the population that is 
middle-class, according to Room and Britton’s model. As previously, the intervals between bars 
are logarithmically spaced, centred around 0.5. The runs used a middle-class preference of 2.56 
and a working-class preference of 0.01. 
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Figure 9.3 – Two class sensitive schools: polarisation is observed much sooner with a 
relatively high middle-class preference of 1.64 (the working-class preference is 0.82). Note that 
this figure uses a smaller scale than its predecessors. 
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Figure 9.4 – Scatterplot of working-class preference against the mean inequity between the two 
schools, for middle-class preference 0.99. No relationship between the variables is found, as 
expected. 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
107 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Working class preference
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
y
e
a
rs
 t
o
 p
o
la
ri
s
a
ti
o
n
 
Figure 9.5 – Scatterplot of working-class preference versus number of years taken to reach 
total polarisation. No relationship can be identified. 
9.2 Stochastic shocks 
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Figure 9.6 – The average inequity between schools increases exponentially with the schools’ 
preference for middle-class applicants. Each run used an equally high middle- and working-class 
preference for middle-class schools of 20.48, and ran for 200 years using the same random seed. 
The first 5 years were excluded to allow the system to stabilise first. 
9.3 Validating the Drools model 
A number of tests were undertaken to validate the Drools model against the original Java 
model, to establish that it produces the same behaviour under the same conditions. The 
two models are far too different to be able compare two runs with the same parameters 
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and random seed and expect an identical result from each model, but the similarity 
between runs with the same parameters should be approximately that experienced when 
varying the random seed within the original prototype. 
Unfortunately, since the Drools model takes much longer to run than the Java model (see 
section 3.3.5), it was not possible to run every single test run on the Java model in the 
Drools model as well. Additionally, the evolutionary nature of the project meant that 
development was ongoing up until the end, and the regression tests had to be re-run every 
time the Drools model changed. Instead, a cross-section of representative experiments 
had to be chosen for replication. These are summarised here. It should, however, be noted 
that the lack of complete tests means that potentially, there could be a section of the 
parameter space left untouched which exhibits anomalous behaviour.  
9.3.1 Class blind schools 
Middle-class and working-class preference parameter sweep 
Due to time constraints, each run was only simulated for 200 years rather than the 500 the 
Java model used, so the Java model’s results had to be recalculated using only 200 years 
to allow for an accurate comparison. We now show the differences between the Java 
model's and the Drools model's average inequity for each run: 
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Figure 9.7 – Differences in average inequity (z*) between the Java and the Drools models’ 
results for a parameter sweep of the middle- and working-class preferences. As in previous 
diagrams of this type, each column shading represents a different category of middle-class 
preference as detailed in the legend, while the categories of working-class preference are shown 
along the horizontal axis. 
Figure 9.7 shows a close agreement in results, except for a middle-class preference of 
2.56. Examining the individual runs soon revealed why this was the case – the one with 
the most severe difference is shown below for both models:  
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Figure 9.8 – Class blind schools with a middle-class parental preference of 2.56 and a working-
class preference of 0.08, run in the Java model. 
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Figure 9.9 – Drools model version of Figure 9.8. 
These figures indicate that the overall pattern is still the same, but coincidentally in this 
case the Java model experienced a role swap during the first 200 years, while the Drools 
model did not. The same thing happened in the other severe discrepancy, when the 
working-class preference is 0.04. In other runs of the Drools model using different 
random seeds, a crossover like that of Figure 9.8 was seen – it is a random occurrence. It 
seems that when the systems are this unstable, it is preferable to compare the overall 
pattern rather than try to produce an ‘average inequity’ where the direction of inequity is 
not fixed. With that perspective, it seems that the Drools model successfully replicates the 
Java model in this experiment. 
To increase confidence in the Drools model, the Java model’s in-depth experiment on 
middle-class preferences ranging from 1.25 to 2.45 was repeated as well, as shown 
below: 
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Figure 9.10 – Difference in the inequity between the two schools for the Java and the Drools 
models, under various combinations of middle- and working-class preferences. Each shade of bar 
represents a different middle-class preference (see legend), while the horizontal axis describes 
categories of working-class preference. (Note the different scale to Figure 9.7.) 
A mean difference of 0.013 seems to be satisfactory, given that the standard deviation of a 
similar statistic between runs using different random seeds in the Java model was 0.011 
for a middle-class preference of 2.56 (with a working-class preference of 0.08; see 5.1.3).  
Sweep of middle-class fraction of the population 
This was varied using a middle-class preference of 20.48, and a working-class preference 
of 0.01, since this case had previously produced very little variance in the Java model, 
meaning it should be easier to compare results. 
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Figure 9.11 – Differences in inequity in the Java and the Drools models, for varying values of 
the fraction of the population that is middle-class, each of which is represented by a differently 
shaded bar. (Note that the intervals between bars are logarithmic, centred on 0.5, rather than being 
evenly spaced.) 
The differences found here were very small compared to the inequities actually found 
(see Figure 5.8), and are much smaller than the differences between the Java model and 
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Room and Britton’s model (see Figure 9.1) and so we can conclude that the models’ 
behaviour coincides. 
9.3.2 Class sensitive schools 
Middle-class preference sweep 
The same middle-class parameter as examined in the Java model was explored: 
preferences centred on the critical value of 1.0, increasing and decreasing logarithmically 
to get the sequence 0.84, 0.92, 0.96, 0.98, 0.99, 1, 1.01, 1.02, 1.04, 1.08, 1.16, 1.32, 1.64, 
2.28, 3.56, 6.12 and 11.24. This resulted in a close match to the Java model’s results: 
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Figure 9.12 – Comparison between the Java and the Drools model of number of years until 
total polarisation occurred. 
However, the Drools model is missing the first data point, for a middle-class preference 
of 1.0, since polarisation did not occur within the 1500 years tested with the usual random 
seed. Given that polarisation only occurred in year 1459 in the Java model, it is easy to 
imagine that polarisation could have been just around the corner in the Drools model – if 
it were not for the fact that the slow polarisation process began in the Java model around 
the year 600 (see Figure 5.12), and in the Drools model it subsides again: 
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Figure 9.13 – Drools model: two class sensitive schools with a middle-class preference of 1.0, 
the critical value for a middle-class population of 50%. This simulation case was re-run to see if 
the point of polarisation could be identified, but we were forced to give up after 7000 years, due to 
lack of time. While the potential for polarisation is there, we could continue indefinitely and never 
hit it. 
Nevertheless, it appears as though the potential for polarisation is still there in Figure 
9.13, but in a very unstable sense. This is consistent with our assumption that we cannot 
predict whether polarisation will occur at the critical value, and so the discrepancy 
between the two models does not seem very serious. 
What is more serious is that in the early cases immediately following the critical value, 
with a middle-class preference of 1.01 and 1.02, the Drools model reaches polarisation 
significantly sooner than the Java model. However, this concern is lessened in the light of 
the huge variation found within the Java model for a middle-class preference of 1.01, 
where results ranged from 369 to 1449 years (see section 5.2.2). No ‘representative run’ 
can be identified for the Java model in these borderline cases, and so these individual runs 
here cannot really be compared either. If the Drools model were also run with 100 
different random seeds for a middle-class preference of 100, for 1500 years each, then a 
more reasonable comparison would be possible; unfortunately, there was no time for this 
in this project. All this experiment can tell us is that the results here are within the range 
covered by the Java model; it could, however, be that the Drools’ models range overlaps 
with that of the Java model, but is not identical to it. 
Middle-class/working-class preference sweep 
The purpose of these tests was to confirm that, as before, the working-class preference 
has no significant impact on class sensitive results.  
a) Middle-class preference of 0.99 
As in the Java model, no polarisation between the schools' middle-class intakes occurred, 
yet very volatile behaviour was exhibited. In the Java model, a marked inequity between 
the schools was observed in 9/11 of the cases; the same ratio was found in the Drools 
model, but not in the same cases.  
Again, no relationship was found between the working-class preference and the mean 
inequity between schools:  
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Figure 9.14 – Scatterplot illustrating the lack of relationship in the Drools model between the 
working-class preference and the mean inequity between the schools’ middle-class intake, for two 
class sensitive schools and a middle-class preference of 0.99. 
Since no relationship is expected between the two variables, one would not expect any 
relationship between the Java and the Drools model either, except that polarisation does 
not occur. The fact that this is the case is further support for the claim that the working-
class has no impact on any aspect of the outcome (rather than it having a complex effect 
that is not easily apparent). However, it is a concern that the inequities found were overall 
lower than in the Java model, which reached 0.43 and 0.32 in two cases (see Figure 9.4). 
b) Middle-class preference of 1.64 
This preference was identified in the Java model as one that is guaranteed to produce 
polarisation. The Java model coupled this middle-class preference with the working-class 
preferences 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64, 1.28, 2.56, 5.12 and 10.24, and found 
no significant relationship between the working-class preference and the years taken to 
reach total polarisation. The Drools test replicated these findings fully. The Java model 
found that polarisation was reached on average after 40.5 years, with a high standard 
deviation of 9.6. Repeating one of the test cases while varying the random seed 11 times 
instead of the working-class preference resulted in a mean of 32.4 years, with a standard 
deviation of 11. The Drools result was extremely similar to this latter result: it found a 
mean of 32.8, with a standard deviation of 11. Therefore, the Drools behaviour appears to 
be correct in this experiment, and to have a very similar level of variability as previously. 
c) Middle-class preference of 11.24 
Finally, the extreme case of 11.24 was re-run. Being very far from the borderline case, 
very little variance was exhibited, as expected. As before, total polarisation occurred 
during year 5 in every case. Again, the trajectory differed only slightly in the first five 
years: a low standard deviation of 0.0023 was found among the mean intakes of the 
leading schools, centred on a mean of 0.727. This exhibits an almost identically low 
variability as the Java model does, which has a standard deviation of 0.0049; however, 
the mean is somewhat higher than the Java model’s mean of 0.691, which is significant 
given the very low variance from the means within each model’s runs. Thus, the test was 
not entirely successful: while the time taken to polarise was approximately the same, the 
Drools model took a slightly steeper trajectory to get to this state. However, this slightly 
steeper path cannot be very significant, since it only made itself noticeable in this 
borderline test: if it were a serious problem, then one would expect the more ‘normal’ test 
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cases to have exhibited polarisation occurring sooner than in the Java model, but this was 
not found. 
Sweep of the middle-class fraction of the population 
The same parameter space was investigated as originally in the Java model in experiment 
5.2.1, varying the fraction of the population that is middle-class. This allowed a direct 
comparison between results: 
Java Drools Java Drools Java Drools Java Drools Java Drools
0.1 / / / / 1038 / 105 / 19 10
0.2 / / / / 1358 1181 77 53 7 7
0.3 / / / / 527 / 92 35 5 4
0.4 / / / / unstable / 30 26 10 5
0.5 / / / / / / 43 37 5 5
0.6 / / / / unstable / 23 23 4 4
0.7 / / / / / / 15 14 3 3
0.8 / / / / unstable unstable 15 20 3 4
0.9 / / / unstable unstable unstable 9 (blips) 14 (blips) 3 4
1/(2*theta) + 10.24
Theta
1/(2*theta) - 0.16 1/(2*theta) - 0.01 1/(2*theta) 1/(2*theta) + 0.64
 
Table 9.1 – Comparison of the number of years taken to polarisation in the Java model, and in 
the Drools model. Each row represents a different fraction of the population that is middle-class 
(θ); while the column pairs show the middle-class preference, where 1/(2θ) is the critical value as 
described in section 5.2.1. ‘/’ means that no polarisation occurred, and ‘unstable’ means that 
polarisation was reached for at least four consecutive years, but was then lost again. Table 5.1 
compares the Java model’s results against the results predicted by Room and Britton. 
In the middle column pair, where the middle-class preference for high-performing schools 
is equal to the critical value, the predicted behaviour is essentially undefined, so it seems 
acceptable to find this type of discrepancy there, especially when the outcome is so varied 
within the Java model alone. The unstable polarisation reached for the middle-class 
population fraction of 0.9 for a middle-class preference of the critical value - 0.01 is, 
however, more of a cause for concern. A plot of the run itself sheds some light on the 
cause: 
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Figure 9.15 – Drools model run of a middle-class preference of the critical value - 0.01, using a 
middle-class fraction of the population of 0.9. ‘Unstable polarisation’ was reached in two 
instances: years 780-784, and years 787-790. Also note that from year 609 to year 610, there is a 
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complete role reversal, with the top school going from a value of 1.0 to the bottom fraction of 0.8 
from one year to the next, showing how unstable the system is. 
Because our definition of what counts as an unstable polarisation (at least four 
consecutive polarised time steps) is relatively lenient, this is relatively likely to occur in 
this type of situation, where the 1.0 mark is much more easily reached than in other cases, 
simply because there is such a small bracket, 0.8-1.0, in which to move. It seems that this 
extreme type of situation requires a different definition; perhaps it would be better to 
define different measures depending on the context, for future experiments. 
Since it seems there is not much difference between this case of unstable ‘polarisation’ 
and the Java model’s lack of polarisation, it is argued that this discrepancy is not evidence 
that the Drools model fails to replicate the Java model sufficiently well. The Drools 
model appears to be stricter about avoiding polarisation when the middle-class preference 
is exactly the critical value, but with such a small sample, the results are inconclusive. 
Certainly, the models appear to agree closely with the two higher values of middle-class 
preference. 
9.4 Multiple schools 
The following figures show a comparison of multiple-school scenarios ranging from five 
to ten schools.  
Class sensitive schools 
Most cases are depicted once with a working-class preference equal to the middle-class 
preference, and then with a minimal working-class preference of 0.01, to illustrate the 
additional complexity added by the low preference. 
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Figure 9.16 – Five class sensitive schools, with an equal middle- and working-class preference 
for middle-class schools of 20.48 
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Figure 9.17 – Five class sensitive schools, with a middle-class preference for middle-class 
schools of 20.48, and a working-class preference of 0.01 
The five-school scenario is discussed in section 6.2. 
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Figure 9.18 – Six class sensitive schools, with an equal middle- and working-class preference 
for middle-class schools of 20.48. This is essentially a more complicated version of the four-
school scenario, as discussed in section 6.2. 
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Figure 9.19 - Six class sensitive schools, with a middle-class preference of 20.48, and a 
working-class preference of 0.01. The additional randomness resulting from the more or less 
arbitrary choices by working-class families makes it more difficult for the non-leading schools to 
distinguish themselves above the rest of the pack than in Figure 9.18. 
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Figure 9.20 - Seven class sensitive schools, with an equal middle- and working-class 
preference for middle-class schools of 20.48. School 3’s fall from popularity (along with related 
fluctuations in other schools) is worth noting; this is the greatest instability we have observed so 
far in these multi-school scenarios. It is, however, not surprising, given how little separated it from 
other schools to begin with. 
Eight schools are not shown because the pattern is so similar to that of six schools; 
similarly, nine schools are of little interest because they follow the seven-school pattern 
shown above. The ten-school scenario also adds nothing new, but is shown below for 
completeness. Twenty schools are again similar, with six schools in the 1.0 position, 
rather than the ten-school scenario’s four leading schools. This is interesting because the 
pattern is clearly not simply the ten-school scenario ‘doubled’.  
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Figure 9.21 – Ten class sensitive schools, with both middle-class and working-class 
preferences set to 20.48. Four schools are superimposed on the 1.0 line. 
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Figure 9.22 - Ten class sensitive schools, with a middle-class preference of 20.48, but a 
working-class preference of 0.01. Four schools are again superimposed on the 1.0 line, but the 
remainder of schools have had so much ‘randomness’ introduced by the working-class families’ 
arbitrary choices that no differentiation can emerge. 
Class blind schools 
Increasing numbers of class blind schools are shown below, each with a middle-class 
preference of 20.48 and a working-class preference of 0.01, in order to maximise the 
differentiation between schools. 
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Figure 9.23 – Four class blind schools, with a middle-class preference of 20.48 and a working-
class preference of 0.01 
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Figure 9.24 – Five class blind schools, with a middle-class preference of 20.48 and a working-
class preference of 0.01 
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Figure 9.25 - Six class blind schools, with a middle-class preference of 20.48 and a working-
class preference of 0.01 
9.5 Co-evolutionary behaviour 
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Figure 9.26 – Two runs superimposed. The simulation is initialised with two class blind 
schools, and a mean class blind preference of 0.32 (standard deviation 0.2). In dotted red, the only 
rules are the ones introduced up to experiment 6.4.5, i.e. all rules relating to schools changing their 
admissions strategy. In black, these rules are used as well, but school specialisms have been added 
to the mix as well. This softens the effect of school strategy and league table position. 
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Figure 9.27 – Three schools run using the rules of experiment 6.4.4. Initially the three schools 
are class blind, and middle- and working-class preferences are 20.48 and 0.01 respectively. The 
mean class blind preference is 0.16, with a standard deviation of 0.2. 
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Figure 9.28 - Four schools run using the rules of experiment 6.4.4. Initially all schools are class 
blind, and middle- and working-class preferences are 20.48 and 0.01 respectively. The mean class 
blind preference is 0.32 (unlike Figure 9.27), with a standard deviation of 0.2. 
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Figure 9.29 – Three schools run using the rules of experiment 6.4.9, i.e. all rules, and the 
parameters of Figure 9.27. 
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Figure 9.30 – Four schools run using the rules of experiment 6.4.9, i.e. all rules, and the 
parameters of Figure 9.28. 
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10 Appendix B 
10.1 How to run the model 
The model requires the Java 1.5 run-time environment to be installed. 
Assuming that a JAR file named schoolChoice.jar has been generated from the source 
code, the following directory structure should be used: 
drools-lib
33
  
 drools-compiler-3.0.5.jar 
 drools-core-3.0.5.jar 
 drools-decisiontables-3.0.5.jar 
 drools-jsr94-3.0.5.jar 
 lib 
  antlr-2.7.6.jar 
  antlr-3.0ea8.jar 
  commons-collections-3.1.jar 
  commons-io-1.1.jar 
  commons-jci-core-1.0-406301.jar 
  commons-jci-eclipse-3.2.0.666.jar 
  commons-jci-janino-2.4.3.jar 
  commons-lang-2.1.jar 
  commons-logging-api-1.0.4.jar 
  core-3.2.0.666.jar 
  janino-2.4.3.jar 
  jsr94-1.1.jar 
  junit-3.8.1.jar 
  jxl-2.4.2.jar 
  stringtemplate-2.3b6.jar 
  xml-apis-1.0.b2.jar 
  xpp3-1.1.3.4.O.jar 
  xstream-1.1.3.jar 
lib
34
  
 asm.jar 
 beanbowl.jar 
 colt.jar 
 commons-collections.jar 
 commons-logging.jar 
 geotools_repast.jar 
 ibis.jar 
 jakarta-poi.jar 
 jep-2.24.jar 
 jgap.jar 
 jh.jar 
 jmf.jar 
 jode-1.1.2-pre1.jar 
 joone.jar 
                                                     
33 Drools library files – download from http://labs.jboss.com/jbossrules/downloads (accessed 30 April 2007) 
34 RepastJ library files – download from http://repast.sourceforge.net/download.html (accessed 30 April 2007) 
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 JTS.jar 
 junit.jar 
 log4j-1.2.8.jar 
 OpenForecast-0.4.0.jar 
 openmap.jar 
 plot.jar 
 ProActive.jar 
 trove.jar 
 violinstrings-1.0.2.jar 
repast.jar
35
  
schoolChoice.jar (the model) 
SchoolChoiceParams.txt (Repast parameter file – only necessary for batch mode) 
Then, the mammoth command  
java -cp schoolChoice.jar;repast.jar;drools-lib\drools-jsr94-3.0.5.jar;drools-lib\drools-
compiler-3.0.5.jar;drools-lib\drools-core-3.0.5.jar;drools-lib\drools-decisiontables-
3.0.5.jar;drools-lib\lib\antlr-2.7.6.jar;drools-lib\lib\antlr-3.0ea8.jar;drools-
lib\lib\commons-collections-3.1.jar;drools-lib\lib\commons-io-1.1.jar;drools-
lib\lib\commons-jci-core-1.0-406301.jar;drools-lib\lib\commons-jci-eclipse-
3.2.0.666.jar;drools-lib\lib\commons-jci-janino-2.4.3.jar;drools-lib\lib\commons-lang-
2.1.jar;drools-lib\lib\commons-logging-api-1.0.4.jar;drools-lib\lib\core-
3.2.0.666.jar;drools-lib\lib\janino-2.4.3.jar;drools-lib\lib\jsr94-1.1.jar;drools-lib\lib\junit-
3.8.1.jar;drools-lib\lib\jxl-2.4.2.jar;drools-lib\lib\stringtemplate-2.3b6.jar;drools-
lib\lib\xml-apis-1.0.b2.jar;drools-lib\lib\xpp3-1.1.3.4.O.jar;drools-lib\lib\xstream-1.1.3.jar 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.SchoolChoiceModelBatch 
runs the batch model using the parameter file, and replacing 
‘uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.SchoolChoiceModelBatch’ with 
‘uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.SchoolChoiceModelInteractive’ runs the model in interactive 
GUI mode. 
Drools requires every library JAR file to be specified on the classpath, but Repast expects 
to find its library classes in the lib subdirectory so this is not necessary.  
The old Java model can be run in an identical manner, or the drools-lib subdirectory can 
be left out and the command shortened to 
java -cp schoolChoice.jar;repast.jar uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.SchoolChoiceModelBatch 
or to run the GUI model, 
java -cp schoolChoice.jar;repast.jar 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.SchoolChoiceModelInteractive as before. 
An example parameter file is shown below. It iterates through the six combinations:  
NumSpecialisms: 2 
 1. NumSchoolsClassBlind: 0 
 2. NumSchoolClassBlind: 1 
 3. NumSchoolsClassBlind: 2 
NumSpecialisms 3 
 4. NumSchoolsClassBlind: 0 
 5. NumSchoolClassBlind: 1 
 6. NumSchoolsClassBlind: 2 
                                                     
35 RepastJ framework itself – download from http://repast.sourceforge.net/download.html (accessed 30 April 2007) 
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while the other parameters remain fixed. The Repast parameter tutorial 
(http://repast.sourceforge.net/how-to/params.html) gives more detail on parameter file 
formats. 
runs: 1 
NumSpecialisms { 
  set_list: 2 3 
  { 
    runs: 1 
    NumSchoolsClassBlind { 
      set_list: 0 1 2 
    } 
  } 
} 
ClassBlindPreferenceMean { 
  set: 0.32 
} 
ClassBlindPreferenceStdDeviation { 
  set: 0.2 
} 
MiddleClassPreference { 
  set: 20.48 
} 
FractionMiddleClassPopulation { 
  set: 0.5 
} 
WorkingClassPreference { 
 set: 0.01 
} 
RngSeed { 
  set: 1171139146239 
} 
NumChildren { 
  set: 400 
} 
NumSchools { 
  set: 2 
} 
NumSteps { 
  set: 200 
} 
NumStochasticShocks { 
  set: 0 
} 
Coevolutionary { 
  set_boolean: true 
} 
 
- Multi-agent simulation of the dynamics of social exclusion in school choice - 
126 
10.2 Java model’s actions on each step 
 shuffleChildren(); 
 for (int i = 0; i < childList.size(); i++) { 
  Child child = childList.get(i); 
  shuffleSchools(); 
  child.applyForPlace(schoolList); 
 } 
 /* 
  * Later schools' rejections can add applications back into the 
  * queues of earlier schools 
  */ 
 while (existPendingApplications()) { 
  for (int i = 0; i < schoolList.size(); i++) { 
 School school = schoolList.get(i); 
   school.processApplications(); 
  } 
 } 
/* 
  * Only advance the year once all applications have been 
 * resolved 
  */ 
 for (int i = 0; i < schoolList.size(); i++) { 
  School school = schoolList.get(i); 
  school.advanceYear(); 
 } 
10.3 Drools audit logging 
A snippet of the output produced by the Drools working memory logger is shown below, 
to illustrate that it is not very human-readable: 
<object-stream> 
  <list> 
    <org.drools.audit.event.ActivationLogEvent> 
      <activationId>Decrease preference for class blind schools due to 
typical distribution [2, 1]</activationId> 
      <rule>Decrease preference for class blind schools due to typical 
distribution</rule> 
      <declarations>fracMiddleClass=0.5(1); 
applicant=uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.child.EvolutionaryChild@1458dcb(2); 
env=uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.Environment@116318b(1)</declarations> 
      <type>4</type> 
    </org.drools.audit.event.ActivationLogEvent> 
    <org.drools.audit.event.ActivationLogEvent> 
      <activationId>Remove class blind factor if no schools are class 
blind [0, 2]</activationId> 
      <rule>Remove class blind factor if no schools are class 
blind</rule> 
<declarations>applicant=uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.child.EvolutionaryChil
d@1458dcb(2)</declarations> 
      <type>4</type> 
    </org.drools.audit.event.ActivationLogEvent> 
    <org.drools.audit.event.ActivationLogEvent> 
      <activationId>Research school place application [2]</activationId> 
      <rule>Research school place application</rule> 
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11 Appendix C 
The following pages give a selection of program code for the final, Drools-based model. 
The program is split into packages containing classes and rule files as follows (subclasses 
are indented below their superclasses where possible): 
 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice 
 SchoolChoiceModel.java 
  SchoolChoiceModelBatch.java 
 SchoolChoiceModelInteractive.java 
 Agent.java 
 Environment.java 
 StochasticShock.java 
 YearGroup.java 
 SocioEconomicStatus.java 
 Output.java 
 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.child 
 Child.java (subclass of Agent) 
 child.drl 
  EvolutionaryChild.java 
 evolutionaryChild.drl 
 SchoolFactor.java 
  LeagueTableFactor.java 
 SchoolStrategyFactor.java 
  SpecialismFactor.java 
 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.school 
 School.java (subclass of Agent) 
 school.drl 
 EvolutionarySchool.java 
  evolutionarySchool.drl 
 Specialism.java 
 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.ontology 
 Message.java 
  Application.java 
 SchoolPlaceAcceptance.java 
  SchoolPlaceRejection.java 
 
uk.ac.bath.cs.schoolchoice.deterministic 
 DeterministicProbabilityRule.java 
 
The four Drools .drl files, and Agent.java, School.java and EvolutionarySchool.java are 
shown on the following pages; the remaining Java code can be found on the CD enclosed 
with this submission. 
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b
l
i
n
d
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
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u
e
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p
o
l
a
r
i
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#
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o
t
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
i
s
 
r
u
l
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
f
i
r
e
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c
h
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l
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h
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n
c
e
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n
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t
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r
i
b
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t
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f
 
C
h
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d
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l
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c
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w
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c
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:
 
E
v
o
l
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t
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r
y
C
h
i
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(
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
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R
o
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i
g
n
o
r
e
C
l
a
s
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B
l
i
n
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a
l
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e
n
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:
 
E
n
v
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n
m
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f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
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:
 
f
r
a
c
t
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M
i
d
d
l
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C
l
a
s
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/
/
 
E
x
t
r
e
m
e
 
p
o
l
a
r
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s
a
t
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d
e
t
e
c
t
e
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c
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e
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c
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x
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c
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.
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i
f
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o
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u
l
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t
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/
/
 
m
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d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
f
r
a
c
t
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o
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i
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0
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5
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t
h
a
t
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
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/
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B
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t
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n
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y
 
t
a
k
e
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
f
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
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r
e
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d
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c
l
a
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l
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/
/
 
-
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t
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h
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n
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h
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r
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o
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o
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n
c
r
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/
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r
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r
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c
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c
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a
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o
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a
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e
c
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r
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c
i
n
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/
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p
o
l
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o
l
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t
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n
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S
c
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o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
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*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
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C
l
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r
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n
c
e
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r
M
i
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R
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/
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y
 
p
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i
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c
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c
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p
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/
 
k
n
o
w
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
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i
l
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m
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c
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l
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c
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D
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)
 
=
=
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v
.
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S
c
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u
t
p
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p
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(
"
c
h
i
l
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n
 
i
n
c
r
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s
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n
g
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r
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f
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r
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c
e
 
f
o
r
 
c
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b
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t
h
i
s
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c
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n
c
r
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a
s
e
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r
e
f
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c
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C
l
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B
l
i
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e
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u
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D
e
c
r
e
a
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e
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r
e
f
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r
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n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
c
l
a
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l
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c
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u
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i
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c
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c
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c
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p
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c
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p
l
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c
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l
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l
i
n
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n
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r
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c
M
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d
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r
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c
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M
i
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l
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c
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c
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o
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l
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c
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v
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u
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a
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i
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d
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u
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e
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a
b
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a
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i
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d
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l
a
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n
l
y
 
p
r
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a
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t
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c
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r
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c
h
i
l
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h
a
p
p
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h
a
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c
h
i
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a
r
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m
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c
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i
f
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p
p
l
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c
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g
e
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=
=
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n
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.
g
e
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S
c
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M
u
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ag
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m
u
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d
y
n
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o
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so
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x
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u
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o
n
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n
 s
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o
o
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o
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1
3
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O
u
t
p
u
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p
r
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t
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"
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h
i
l
d
r
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D
E
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
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c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
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s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
t
h
i
s
 
y
e
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r
"
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}
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
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.
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
C
l
a
s
s
B
l
i
n
d
(
)
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e
n
d
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u
l
e
 
"
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
f
a
c
t
o
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i
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a
l
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s
c
h
o
o
l
s
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r
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c
l
a
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b
l
i
n
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#
 
I
n
s
t
e
a
d
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p
l
a
c
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
h
a
s
i
s
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t
h
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o
t
h
e
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f
a
c
t
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r
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a
l
l
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r
e
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d
i
f
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r
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t
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n
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e
m
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r
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h
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r
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c
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w
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e
n
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E
v
o
l
u
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i
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n
a
r
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S
c
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o
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p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
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r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
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L
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I
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N
e
e
d
 
t
h
i
s
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o
 
t
h
a
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t
h
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r
u
l
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d
o
e
s
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o
t
 
k
e
e
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f
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r
i
n
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
 
:
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
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o
n
a
r
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C
h
i
l
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(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
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R
o
u
n
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i
g
n
o
r
e
C
l
a
s
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B
l
i
n
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=
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f
a
l
s
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t
h
e
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/
/
 
O
n
l
y
 
p
r
i
n
t
 
a
 
n
o
t
i
f
i
c
a
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o
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
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f
i
r
s
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c
h
i
l
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-
 
w
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h
a
p
p
e
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/
/
 
k
n
o
w
 
t
h
a
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c
h
i
l
d
r
e
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a
r
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
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t
e
r
 
s
c
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o
l
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
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g
e
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=
=
 
E
n
v
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g
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a
n
c
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g
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S
c
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O
u
t
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u
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p
r
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t
l
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"
I
g
n
o
r
i
n
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c
l
a
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b
l
i
n
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f
a
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a
l
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c
l
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s
s
 
b
l
i
n
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a
p
p
l
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c
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i
g
n
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C
l
a
s
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B
l
i
n
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F
a
c
t
o
r
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e
n
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u
l
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R
e
m
o
v
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c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
f
a
c
t
o
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i
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n
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s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
a
r
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c
l
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l
i
n
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I
n
s
t
e
a
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p
l
a
c
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m
o
r
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e
m
p
h
a
s
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t
h
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t
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c
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E
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o
l
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c
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a
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e
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a
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p
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c
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o
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p
l
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c
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l
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O
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p
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c
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c
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p
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c
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n
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b
l
i
n
d
"
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
.
i
g
n
o
r
e
C
l
a
s
s
B
l
i
n
d
F
a
c
t
o
r
(
)
;
 
e
n
d
 
  r
u
l
e
 
"
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
i
f
 
a
l
l
 
s
c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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e
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c
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c
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;
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c
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c
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n
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l
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n
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c
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c
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c
l
a
s
s
 
 
*
/
 
 #
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
j
a
v
a
.
l
a
n
g
.
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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:
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c
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c
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c
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p
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p
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c
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/
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c
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c
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A
p
p
l
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c
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p
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c
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l
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n
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l
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c
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(
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p
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
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n
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c
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p
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c
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c
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c
e
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
"
 
s
a
l
i
e
n
c
e
 
1
0
 
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
c
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n
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c
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c
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S
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c
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c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
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c
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p
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c
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c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
 
 
/
/
 
h
a
v
e
 
e
v
e
n
 
a
p
p
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c
e
 
y
e
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
C
h
i
l
d
(
 
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
P
l
a
c
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s
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c
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c
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c
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c
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/
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
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a
p
p
l
i
c
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A
p
p
l
i
c
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h
i
l
d
I
n
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o
l
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c
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n
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p
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c
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s
c
h
o
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l
I
n
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o
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)
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c
c
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p
p
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c
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p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
)
;
 
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
.
r
e
c
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v
e
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e
s
s
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S
c
h
o
o
l
P
l
a
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A
c
c
e
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c
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(
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n
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p
p
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c
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r
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r
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n
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p
p
l
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c
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t
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(
a
p
p
l
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c
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(
s
c
h
o
o
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g
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t
P
l
a
c
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L
e
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s
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p
p
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c
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c
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c
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p
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p
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c
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
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p
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p
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e
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c
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p
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c
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c
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p
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c
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p
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c
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c
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.
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p
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c
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n
c
e
 
#
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
x
 
+
 
1
 
q
u
e
r
y
 
"
a
l
l
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
"
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
:
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
)
 
 
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
(
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
R
o
u
n
d
 
:
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
)
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
:
 
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
 
=
=
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
R
o
u
n
d
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
I
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
=
=
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
 
:
 
c
h
i
l
d
I
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
)
 
 
e
n
d
 
 1
1
.4
 
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
a
ry
S
ch
o
o
l.
d
rl
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
u
t
i
l
.
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
*
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
c
h
i
l
d
.
C
h
i
l
d
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
o
n
t
o
l
o
g
y
.
*
;
 
 /
*
*
 
 
*
 
M
u
l
t
i
-
a
g
e
n
t
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
 
 
 
*
 
P
e
r
d
i
t
a
 
R
o
b
i
n
s
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
 
*
 
 
 
*
 
c
h
i
l
d
.
d
r
l
 
-
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
*
/
 
 #
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
j
a
v
a
.
l
a
n
g
.
I
n
t
e
g
e
r
 
m
y
I
D
;
 
 /
/
 
A
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
*
m
a
j
o
r
i
t
y
*
 
o
f
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
3
 
/
/
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
?
 
C
a
n
'
t
 
d
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
v
i
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
 
 
/
/
 
o
f
 
'
m
a
j
o
r
i
t
y
'
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
w
e
l
l
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
3
.
0
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
b
o
o
l
e
a
n
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
M
o
s
t
l
y
C
l
a
s
s
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
(
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
B
l
i
n
d
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
S
c
h
o
o
l
>
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
=
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
.
g
e
t
S
c
h
o
o
l
s
(
)
;
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
.
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
 
:
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
)
 
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
i
f
 
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
!
=
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
&
&
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
.
g
e
t
L
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
(
)
 
>
=
 
1
.
1
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
.
g
e
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
 
=
=
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
)
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
n
u
m
B
l
i
n
d
+
+
;
 
 
 
 
}
 
e
l
s
e
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
n
u
m
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
+
+
;
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
>
 
n
u
m
B
l
i
n
d
;
 
}
 
 
 
#
 
R
e
-
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
u
l
e
 
"
A
d
o
p
t
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
n
i
c
h
e
"
 
s
a
l
i
e
n
c
e
 
1
2
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
 
"
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
"
 
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
n
v
 
:
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
(
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
:
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
w
 
o
v
e
r
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
:
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
 
=
=
 
0
,
 
 
 
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
<
 
(
0
.
9
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
,
 
 
 
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
!
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
v
a
l
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
=
=
 
m
y
I
D
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
v
a
l
(
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
M
o
s
t
l
y
C
l
a
s
s
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
)
)
 
 
t
h
e
n
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
t
o
 
a
d
o
p
t
 
n
i
c
h
e
"
)
;
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
s
e
t
S
c
h
o
o
l
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
(
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
)
;
 
e
n
d
 
 r
u
l
e
 
"
P
o
p
u
l
a
r
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
t
o
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
"
 
s
a
l
i
e
n
c
e
 
1
2
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
 
"
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
"
 
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
n
v
 
:
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
(
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
:
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
 
t
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
 
w
e
l
l
 
i
n
 
 
/
/
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
 
h
a
v
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
1
0
%
 
o
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
a
n
 
'
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
'
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
:
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
 
=
=
 
0
,
 
 
 
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
,
 
 
 
 
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
,
 
 
 
 
 
i
d
 
:
 
I
D
)
 
/
/
 
O
n
l
y
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
 
t
o
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
i
f
 
w
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
g
i
v
i
n
g
 
u
p
 
 
/
/
 
a
 
n
i
c
h
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
;
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
w
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
 
/
/
 
b
e
 
g
i
v
i
n
g
 
u
p
 
w
h
a
t
 
m
i
g
h
t
 
b
e
 
o
u
r
 
r
e
a
s
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
 
 
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
E
i
t
h
e
r
 
w
e
 
h
a
v
e
 
n
o
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
,
 
I
D
 
!
=
 
i
d
)
 
 
 
o
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
O
r
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
 
i
s
 
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
 
 
e
x
i
s
t
s
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
 
 
 
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
D
 
!
=
 
i
d
)
 
 
 
 
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
v
a
l
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
=
=
 
m
y
I
D
)
 
 
 
t
h
e
n
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
r
"
)
;
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
s
e
t
S
c
h
o
o
l
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
(
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
)
;
 
e
n
d
 
 r
u
l
e
 
"
E
v
e
r
y
o
n
e
 
e
l
s
e
 
i
s
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
 
a
r
e
 
a
l
l
 
d
o
i
n
g
 
r
o
u
g
h
l
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
"
 
 #
 
s
o
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
h
o
p
e
 
o
f
 
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
d
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
4
 
#
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
a
 
g
a
m
b
l
e
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
t
h
i
s
 
 
#
 
w
i
l
l
 
i
n
s
t
a
n
t
l
y
 
m
a
k
e
 
u
s
 
e
v
e
r
y
o
n
e
'
s
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
u
n
l
e
s
s
 
 
#
 
w
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
 
t
o
 
r
a
i
s
e
 
o
u
r
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
s
t
r
a
i
g
h
t
 
a
w
a
y
,
 
 
#
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
t
h
e
 
l
u
c
k
 
o
f
 
h
a
v
i
n
g
 
m
o
r
e
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
 
#
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
.
 
 #
 
I
f
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
n
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
i
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
i
s
 
r
u
l
e
,
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
n
e
s
s
 
d
e
c
i
d
e
s
 
 
#
 
w
h
o
 
g
e
t
s
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
-
 
o
n
l
y
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
e
n
d
 
u
p
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
n
g
 
i
t
.
 
 
s
a
l
i
e
n
c
e
 
1
2
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
 
"
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
"
 
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
n
v
 
:
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
(
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
:
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
 
t
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
 
w
e
l
l
 
i
n
 
 
 
/
/
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
 
h
a
v
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
1
0
%
 
o
r
 
 
 
/
/
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
a
n
 
'
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
'
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
:
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
 
=
=
 
0
,
 
 
 
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
,
 
 
 
 
i
d
 
:
 
I
D
)
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
!
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
)
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
,
 
I
D
 
!
=
 
i
d
)
 
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
<
 
 
(
0
.
9
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
,
 
I
D
 
!
=
 
i
d
)
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
v
a
l
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
=
=
 
m
y
I
D
)
 
 
t
h
e
n
 
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
"
)
;
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
s
e
t
S
c
h
o
o
l
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
(
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
)
;
 
e
n
d
 
 
 r
u
l
e
 
"
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
t
o
 
g
a
i
n
 
e
d
g
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
"
 
s
a
l
i
e
n
c
e
 
1
2
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
 
"
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
"
 
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
:
 
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
(
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
w
 
o
v
e
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
:
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
 
=
=
 
0
,
 
 
 
 
y
e
a
r
s
S
i
n
c
e
L
a
s
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
>
 
1
0
,
 
 
 
 
m
y
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
:
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
,
 
 
 
 
m
y
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
:
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
-
>
 
 
(
m
y
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
!
=
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
)
 
 
/
/
 
A
 
m
o
r
e
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
a
s
 
u
s
,
 
/
/
 
s
o
 
i
t
'
s
 
n
o
t
 
d
o
i
n
g
 
u
s
 
a
n
y
 
g
o
o
d
 
 
 
 
 
e
x
i
s
t
s
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
m
y
R
a
t
i
n
g
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
=
 
m
y
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
 
/
/
 
N
o
-
o
n
e
 
m
u
c
h
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
u
s
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
i
s
 
n
e
w
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
w
e
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
 
/
/
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
 
t
o
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
m
y
R
a
t
i
n
g
)
,
 
 
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
=
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
v
a
l
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
=
=
 
m
y
I
D
)
 
 
 
t
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
(
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
;
 
e
n
d
 
 r
u
l
e
 
"
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
t
o
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
f
 
l
e
s
s
e
r
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
t
o
 
t
a
k
e
 
a
w
a
y
 
i
t
s
 
e
d
g
e
"
 
s
a
l
i
e
n
c
e
 
1
2
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
-
g
r
o
u
p
 
"
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
"
 
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
e
x
i
s
t
s
 
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
(
)
 
/
/
 
i
f
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
 
a
r
e
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
u
s
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
w
 
o
v
e
r
 
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
:
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
 
=
=
 
0
,
 
 
 
 
y
e
a
r
s
S
i
n
c
e
L
a
s
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
>
 
1
0
,
 
 
 
 
m
y
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
:
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
,
 
 
 
 
m
y
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
:
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
 
/
/
 
A
 
l
e
s
s
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
 
h
a
s
 
a
 
u
n
i
q
u
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
–
 
 
/
/
 
s
o
 
w
e
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
t
a
k
e
 
i
t
 
a
w
a
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
m
!
 
T
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
y
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
/
/
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
n
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
 
l
o
s
e
 
n
o
t
h
i
n
g
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
<
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
m
y
R
a
t
i
n
g
)
,
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
:
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
-
>
 
(
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
!
=
 
m
y
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
)
 
/
/
 
C
h
e
c
k
 
n
o
-
o
n
e
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
u
s
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
i
s
 
n
e
w
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
w
e
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
/
/
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
 
t
o
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
o
t
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
 
(
1
.
1
 
*
 
m
y
R
a
t
i
n
g
)
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
=
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
 
 
 
 
e
v
a
l
(
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
=
=
 
m
y
I
D
)
 
 
 
t
h
e
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
(
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
;
 
e
n
d
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
5
 
1
1
.5
 
A
g
en
t.
ja
v
a
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
i
o
.
I
O
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
a
u
d
i
t
.
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
F
i
l
e
L
o
g
g
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
r
.
D
r
o
o
l
s
P
a
r
s
e
r
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
r
.
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
r
.
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
C
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
c
h
i
c
a
g
o
.
s
r
c
.
s
i
m
.
e
n
g
i
n
e
.
S
t
e
p
a
b
l
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
o
n
t
o
l
o
g
y
.
M
e
s
s
a
g
e
;
 
 /
*
*
 
 
*
 
M
u
l
t
i
-
a
g
e
n
t
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
 
 
 
*
 
P
e
r
d
i
t
a
 
R
o
b
i
n
s
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
 
*
 
 
 
*
 
A
g
e
n
t
.
j
a
v
a
 
-
 
S
u
p
e
r
c
l
a
s
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
y
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
 
 
*
 
h
a
n
d
l
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
a
g
e
n
t
'
s
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
r
u
l
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
 
A
n
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
 
 
*
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
e
n
t
i
t
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
a
k
e
s
 
i
t
s
 
o
w
n
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
 
*
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
t
a
k
e
.
 
 
*
/
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
A
g
e
n
t
 
{
 
  
/
/
 
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
g
i
v
e
 
e
a
c
h
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
a
 
u
n
i
q
u
e
 
I
D
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
i
d
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
 
=
 
0
;
 
  
/
/
 
U
n
i
q
u
e
 
I
D
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
t
 
i
d
;
 
  
/
/
 
A
g
e
n
t
'
s
 
o
w
n
 
c
o
p
y
 
o
f
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
a
c
t
s
 
i
t
 
k
n
o
w
s
 
o
f
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
;
 
  
/
/
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
c
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
C
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
n
f
;
 
 
/
/
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
F
i
l
e
L
o
g
g
e
r
 
d
r
o
o
l
s
L
o
g
g
e
r
;
 
-
 
T
o
o
 
c
u
m
b
e
r
s
o
m
e
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
A
g
e
n
t
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
i
d
 
=
 
i
d
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
+
+
;
 
/
/
 
W
e
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
J
a
v
a
 
1
.
5
 
 
 
c
o
n
f
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
C
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
(
)
;
 
 
 
c
o
n
f
.
s
e
t
J
a
v
a
L
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
L
e
v
e
l
(
"
1
.
5
"
)
;
 
  
 
/
/
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
f
r
e
s
h
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
 
 
t
r
y
 
{
 
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
 
=
 
g
e
t
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
(
)
.
n
e
w
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
c
a
t
c
h
 
(
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
e
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
.
e
r
r
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
"
U
n
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
l
o
a
d
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
b
a
s
e
"
)
;
 
 
 
 
e
.
p
r
i
n
t
S
t
a
c
k
T
r
a
c
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
/
/
 
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
 
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
)
;
 
 /
/
d
r
o
o
l
s
L
o
g
g
e
r
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
F
i
l
e
L
o
g
g
e
r
(
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
 
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
e
n
t
'
s
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
l
l
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
o
r
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
 
 
*
 
d
o
n
e
 
-
 
n
o
t
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
o
i
d
 
i
n
i
t
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
a
s
s
e
r
t
O
b
j
e
c
t
(
t
h
i
s
,
 
t
r
u
e
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
/
/
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
o
i
d
 
a
u
d
i
t
(
)
 
/
/
 
{
 
/
/
 
 
/
/
 
 
w
r
i
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
e
v
e
n
t
.
l
o
g
 
/
/
 
 
d
r
o
o
l
s
L
o
g
g
e
r
.
w
r
i
t
e
T
o
D
i
s
k
(
)
;
 
/
/
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
b
a
s
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
6
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
 
f
i
n
d
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
l
o
a
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
a
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
g
e
t
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
(
)
 
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
;
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
T
e
l
l
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
c
h
e
c
k
 
f
o
r
 
r
u
l
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
u
n
 
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
e
m
.
 
I
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
t
 
d
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
p
o
n
t
a
n
e
o
u
s
l
y
,
 
b
u
t
 
i
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
 
 
 
*
 
k
e
e
p
 
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
y
 
n
e
w
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
i
t
s
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
n
o
n
e
 
a
r
e
 
t
r
i
g
g
e
r
e
d
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
f
i
r
e
A
l
l
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
f
i
r
e
A
l
l
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
f
a
c
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
h
a
n
d
l
e
 
-
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
b
y
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
w
h
e
n
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
e
 
f
a
c
t
 
w
a
s
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
e
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
o
i
d
 
r
e
t
r
a
c
t
(
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
 
h
a
n
d
l
e
)
 
{
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
r
e
t
r
a
c
t
O
b
j
e
c
t
(
h
a
n
d
l
e
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
A
s
s
e
r
t
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
 
i
n
t
o
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
a
s
 
a
 
f
a
c
t
;
 
 
 
 
*
 
t
e
l
l
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
t
o
 
s
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
'
s
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
 
 
 
*
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
e
v
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
c
a
s
e
 
i
t
s
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
i
e
s
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
.
 
T
h
e
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
 
 
 
 
*
 
m
u
s
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
 
J
a
v
a
 
b
e
a
n
-
l
i
k
e
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
l
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
,
 
 
*
 
a
s
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
1
.
6
.
4
.
5
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
m
a
n
u
a
l
,
 
 
 
*
 
a
t
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
l
a
b
s
.
j
b
o
s
s
.
c
o
m
/
f
i
l
e
-
a
c
c
e
s
s
/
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
/
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
/
 
 
 
*
 
j
b
o
s
s
r
u
l
e
s
/
f
r
e
e
z
o
n
e
/
d
o
c
s
/
3
.
0
.
5
/
h
t
m
l
/
 
 
 
 
*
 
c
h
0
1
s
0
6
.
h
t
m
l
#
d
0
e
7
0
8
.
 
(
I
t
 
i
s
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
e
d
 
t
o
 
u
s
e
 
 
 
*
 
o
r
e
i
l
l
y
.
h
c
j
.
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
.
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
 
*
 
t
h
a
n
 
j
a
v
a
.
b
e
a
n
s
.
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
;
 
i
t
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
 
 
 
*
 
s
u
f
f
e
r
 
f
r
o
m
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
l
e
a
k
s
.
)
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
o
b
j
 
-
 
f
a
c
t
 
t
o
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
-
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
f
a
c
t
;
 
t
h
i
s
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
r
a
c
t
 
i
t
 
a
t
 
a
 
l
a
t
e
r
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
O
b
j
e
c
t
 
o
b
j
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
a
s
s
e
r
t
O
b
j
e
c
t
(
o
b
j
,
 
t
r
u
e
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
A
s
s
e
r
t
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
 
i
n
t
o
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
a
s
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
f
a
c
t
;
 
 
 
 
*
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
i
m
m
u
t
a
b
l
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
t
 
 
 
 
*
 
c
h
e
c
k
 
i
t
 
f
o
r
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
o
b
j
 
-
 
f
a
c
t
 
t
o
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
-
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
f
a
c
t
;
 
t
h
i
s
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
r
a
c
t
 
i
t
 
a
t
 
a
 
l
a
t
e
r
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
(
O
b
j
e
c
t
 
o
b
j
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
a
s
s
e
r
t
O
b
j
e
c
t
(
o
b
j
,
 
f
a
l
s
e
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
S
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
n
a
m
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
i
n
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
m
u
s
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
 
 
*
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
f
i
l
e
.
 
N
o
t
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
 
 
 
 
*
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
m
m
u
t
a
b
l
e
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
n
a
m
e
 
-
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
a
m
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
-
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
e
t
G
l
o
b
a
l
(
S
t
r
i
n
g
 
n
a
m
e
,
 
O
b
j
e
c
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
)
 
{
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
s
e
t
G
l
o
b
a
l
(
n
a
m
e
,
 
v
a
l
u
e
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
e
r
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
n
a
m
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
e
n
t
'
s
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
.
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
*
 
T
h
i
s
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
u
n
f
o
r
t
u
n
a
t
e
l
y
 
h
a
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
m
a
d
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
t
o
 
g
i
v
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
e
n
g
i
n
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
 
 
 
*
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
u
s
e
 
i
t
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
q
u
e
r
y
 
-
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
a
m
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
e
r
y
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
i
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
7
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
g
e
t
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
S
t
r
i
n
g
 
q
u
e
r
y
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
g
e
t
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
q
u
e
r
y
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
u
n
i
q
u
e
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
I
D
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
i
d
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
T
h
i
s
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
o
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
 
 
 
*
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
u
n
,
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
r
e
s
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
 
 
 
*
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
r
e
s
t
a
r
t
 
a
t
 
0
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
x
t
 
r
u
n
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
 
 
*
 
m
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
m
o
r
e
 
l
e
g
i
b
l
e
,
 
b
u
t
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
y
 
 
 
*
 
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
r
e
s
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
i
n
g
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
i
d
C
o
u
n
t
e
r
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
 
a
 
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
 
s
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
 
a
g
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
i
t
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
m
s
g
 
-
 
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
M
e
s
s
a
g
e
(
M
e
s
s
a
g
e
 
m
s
g
)
 
{
 
 
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
(
m
s
g
)
;
 
 
 
f
i
r
e
A
l
l
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
 
 
 
 
*
 
c
o
n
f
i
g
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
f
o
r
 
l
o
a
d
i
n
g
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
s
 
i
n
t
o
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
 
 
 
*
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
 
 
*
 
@
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
P
a
r
s
e
r
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
@
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
I
O
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
 
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
P
a
r
s
e
r
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
,
 
 
 
 
I
O
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
e
w
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
c
o
n
f
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
l
e
a
n
 
u
p
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
f
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
.
 
 
 
 
*
 
T
h
e
 
a
g
e
n
t
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
i
s
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
i
s
 
 
 
*
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
.
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
M
e
m
o
r
y
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
}
 
}
 1
1
.6
 
S
ch
o
o
l.
ja
v
a
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
*
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
b
e
a
n
s
.
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
i
o
.
I
O
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
i
o
.
I
n
p
u
t
S
t
r
e
a
m
R
e
a
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
i
o
.
R
e
a
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
u
t
i
l
.
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
u
t
i
l
.
H
a
s
h
t
a
b
l
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
u
t
i
l
.
I
t
e
r
a
t
o
r
;
 
 /
/
 
U
s
e
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
s
a
f
e
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
-
 
j
a
v
a
.
b
e
a
n
s
 
o
n
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
!
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
e
i
l
l
y
.
h
c
j
.
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
.
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
F
a
c
t
o
r
y
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
r
.
D
r
o
o
l
s
P
a
r
s
e
r
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
r
.
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
r
u
l
e
.
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
c
h
i
c
a
g
o
.
s
r
c
.
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
R
a
n
g
e
M
a
p
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
c
h
i
c
a
g
o
.
s
r
c
.
s
i
m
.
e
n
g
i
n
e
.
S
t
e
p
a
b
l
e
;
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
8
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
c
h
i
c
a
g
o
.
s
r
c
.
s
i
m
.
u
t
i
l
.
R
a
n
d
o
m
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
c
h
i
l
d
.
C
h
i
l
d
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
s
t
i
c
.
 
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
s
t
i
c
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
R
u
l
e
;
 
 /
*
*
 
 
*
 
M
u
l
t
i
-
a
g
e
n
t
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
 
 
 
*
 
P
e
r
d
i
t
a
 
R
o
b
i
n
s
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
 
*
 
 
 
*
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
j
a
v
a
 
-
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
a
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
 
 
*
 
 
 
*
 
I
t
 
u
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
o
r
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
p
a
t
t
e
r
n
,
 
s
o
 
t
h
a
t
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
c
a
n
 
 
*
 
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
 
 
*
 
s
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
 
t
o
 
i
t
s
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
s
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
u
s
 
h
a
v
i
n
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 
t
o
 
t
e
l
l
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
l
y
 
e
v
e
r
y
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
 
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
 
*
/
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
s
 
A
g
e
n
t
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
S
t
e
p
a
b
l
e
 
{
 
/
/
 
M
a
y
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
a
k
e
 
t
h
i
s
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
,
 
i
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
c
a
n
 
o
p
e
n
 
/
/
 
p
a
r
t
w
a
y
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
O
p
e
n
e
d
 
=
 
0
;
 
/
/
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
o
f
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
t
o
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
=
 
1
;
 
/
/
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
o
f
 
u
n
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
y
 
f
a
v
o
u
r
i
n
g
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
/
/
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
o
n
e
s
.
 
/
/
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
.
M
A
X
_
V
A
L
U
E
 
i
s
 
t
o
o
 
h
i
g
h
 
f
o
r
 
o
u
r
 
l
i
b
a
r
y
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
c
o
d
e
 
t
o
 
 
/
/
 
c
o
p
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
 
=
 
I
n
t
e
g
e
r
.
M
A
X
_
V
A
L
U
E
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
h
a
s
 
f
o
r
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
/
/
 
(
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
,
 
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
 
o
r
 
s
o
m
e
w
h
e
r
e
 
 
/
/
 
i
n
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
)
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
t
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
w
a
s
 
 
/
/
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
.
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
,
 
i
.
e
.
 
h
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
y
e
a
r
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
 
/
/
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
a
r
e
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
Y
e
a
r
s
 
=
 
6
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
a
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
s
 
 
/
/
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
i
n
t
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
Y
e
a
r
s
 
=
 
4
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
y
 
f
i
l
l
e
d
 
y
e
a
r
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
L
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
,
 
s
o
 
w
e
 
c
a
n
 
r
e
m
o
v
e
 
t
h
e
m
 
f
r
o
m
 
 
/
/
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
>
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
>
(
)
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
x
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
 
 
/
/
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
m
a
p
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
N
u
m
b
e
r
F
o
r
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
=
 
-
1
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
L
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
t
o
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
,
 
f
r
o
m
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
a
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
/
/
 
m
a
p
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
d
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
s
t
i
c
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
R
u
l
e
 
c
h
i
l
d
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
m
a
p
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
h
o
w
 
l
i
k
e
l
y
 
w
e
 
a
r
e
 
t
o
 
 
/
/
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
m
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
R
a
n
g
e
M
a
p
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
A
n
y
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
 
s
h
o
c
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
S
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
>
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
s
 
=
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
S
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
>
(
)
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
Y
e
a
r
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
h
a
s
h
e
d
 
b
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
e
n
t
r
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
H
a
s
h
t
a
b
l
e
<
I
n
t
e
g
e
r
,
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
>
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
H
e
l
p
e
r
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
 
a
n
y
o
n
e
 
w
h
o
 
h
a
s
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
/
/
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
h
a
s
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
=
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
3
9
 
 
 
n
e
w
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
(
 
t
h
i
s
 
)
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
R
u
l
e
 
b
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
u
s
e
s
 
t
o
 
m
a
k
e
 
i
t
s
 
 
/
/
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
.
 
S
h
a
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
l
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
.
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 /
/
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
f
o
r
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
u
p
 
a
 
r
u
l
e
 
b
a
s
e
 
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
h
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
*
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
,
 
i
.
e
.
 
i
t
s
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
 
 
*
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
.
 
 
 
*
 
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
a
n
d
 
 
 
 
*
 
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
-
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
 
*
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
t
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
(
)
;
 
t
h
i
s
.
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
=
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
;
 
t
h
i
s
.
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
s
e
t
u
p
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
h
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
*
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
s
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
,
 
i
.
e
.
 
i
t
s
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
 
*
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
.
 
 
 
*
 
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
a
n
d
 
 
 
 
*
 
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
-
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
(
)
;
 
t
h
i
s
.
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
=
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
;
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
.
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
;
 
 
 
s
e
t
u
p
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
S
e
t
 
u
p
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
,
 
f
i
n
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
 
 
*
 
M
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
o
r
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
e
t
u
p
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
H
a
s
h
t
a
b
l
e
<
I
n
t
e
g
e
r
,
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
>
(
)
;
 
 
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
(
y
e
a
r
O
p
e
n
e
d
,
 
 
 
 
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
i
t
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
a
g
e
n
t
'
s
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
o
i
d
 
i
n
i
t
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
s
e
t
G
l
o
b
a
l
(
"
m
y
I
D
"
,
 
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
)
;
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
.
i
n
i
t
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
l
l
 
i
t
s
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
e
t
 
u
p
,
 
 
 
*
 
s
o
 
i
t
 
c
a
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
 
f
u
l
l
y
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
(
)
 
 
{
 
/
/
 
N
o
t
h
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
d
o
 
-
 
d
o
n
'
t
 
c
a
r
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
e
t
 
u
p
 
t
o
o
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
0
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
 
*
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
,
 
a
k
a
 
i
t
s
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
g
e
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
y
 
f
i
l
l
e
d
 
y
e
a
r
g
r
o
u
p
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
 
*
 
u
p
c
o
m
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
g
e
t
P
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
l
e
f
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
P
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
!
=
 
n
u
l
l
)
 
 
 
{
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
-
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
e
l
s
e
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
a
p
p
R
o
u
n
d
 
-
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
(
i
n
t
 
a
p
p
R
o
u
n
d
)
 
{
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
;
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
 
=
 
a
p
p
R
o
u
n
d
;
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
;
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
"
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
u
n
d
"
,
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
,
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
R
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
l
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
,
 
a
d
d
i
n
g
 
i
t
 
 
 
*
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
w
i
s
h
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
n
y
 
 
 
*
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
l
 
-
 
l
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
 
t
o
 
a
d
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
a
d
d
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
(
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
 
l
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
a
d
d
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
(
 
l
 
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
l
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
 
 
*
 
l
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
s
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
l
 
-
 
l
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
 
t
o
 
d
e
-
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
r
e
m
o
v
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
(
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
 
l
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
r
e
m
o
v
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
L
i
s
t
e
n
e
r
(
 
l
 
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
-
 
t
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
a
 
m
o
v
i
n
g
 
 
 
*
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
f
o
u
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
1
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
g
e
t
L
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
(
)
 
 
{
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
=
 
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
y
e
a
r
)
;
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
;
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
 
=
 
1
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
w
h
i
l
e
 
(
c
o
u
n
t
 
<
=
 
l
e
a
g
u
e
T
a
b
l
e
Y
e
a
r
s
)
 
 
 
{
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
=
 
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
y
e
a
r
 
-
 
c
o
u
n
t
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
>
=
 
0
 
)
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
+
=
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
}
 
e
l
s
e
 
 
 
 
{
 
/
/
 
W
e
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
y
e
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
t
o
 
l
o
o
k
 
a
t
 
p
a
s
t
 
4
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
 
 
 
 
b
r
e
a
k
;
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
c
o
u
n
t
+
+
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
=
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
/
 
c
o
u
n
t
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
a
k
e
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
 
s
h
o
c
k
s
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
i
n
t
 
i
 
=
 
0
;
 
i
 
<
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
;
 
i
+
+
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
M
a
y
 
b
e
 
a
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
a
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
 
 
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
+
=
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
s
.
g
e
t
(
i
)
.
 
g
e
t
S
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
I
m
p
a
c
t
A
t
(
y
e
a
r
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
a
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
s
o
 
t
r
u
n
c
a
t
e
 
 
/
/
 
a
n
y
 
e
x
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
 
s
h
o
c
k
s
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
>
 
1
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
=
 
1
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
<
 
0
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
c
a
l
c
Y
e
a
r
 
-
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
k
i
d
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
a
s
 
i
t
 
w
a
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
 
i
n
t
 
c
a
l
c
Y
e
a
r
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
c
a
l
c
Y
e
a
r
 
=
=
 
y
e
a
r
O
p
e
n
e
d
)
 
/
*
 
n
o
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
*
/
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
c
a
l
c
Y
e
a
r
 
>
 
y
e
a
r
)
 
 
 
{
 
/
/
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
  
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
-
1
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
t
o
t
a
l
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
g
r
o
u
p
;
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
i
n
t
 
i
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
1
 
–
 
 
(
y
e
a
r
 
-
 
c
a
l
c
Y
e
a
r
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
o
n
l
y
 
l
o
o
k
 
a
t
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
w
h
o
 
h
a
v
e
n
'
t
 
y
e
t
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
>
=
0
 
&
&
 
i
 
>
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
n
u
m
Y
e
a
r
s
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
-
-
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
g
e
t
(
i
)
;
 
 
 
 
t
o
t
a
l
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
+
=
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
)
;
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
+
=
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
 
 
 
S
o
c
i
o
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
t
a
t
u
s
.
s
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
.
M
I
D
D
L
E
_
C
L
A
S
S
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
)
m
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
/
 
 
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
)
t
o
t
a
l
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
;
 
 
}
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
2
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
 
*
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
f
r
a
c
 
=
 
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
y
e
a
r
)
;
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
f
r
a
c
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
s
o
c
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
 
 
*
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
O
f
C
l
a
s
s
(
 
S
o
c
i
o
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
t
a
t
u
s
.
s
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
 
s
o
c
C
l
a
s
s
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
g
r
o
u
p
;
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
i
n
t
 
i
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
1
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
o
n
l
y
 
l
o
o
k
 
a
t
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
w
h
o
 
h
a
v
e
n
'
t
 
y
e
t
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
>
=
0
 
&
&
 
i
 
>
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
n
u
m
Y
e
a
r
s
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
-
-
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
g
e
t
(
i
)
;
 
 
 
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
+
=
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
s
o
c
C
l
a
s
s
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
,
 
o
f
 
a
n
y
 
 
 
*
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
A
n
y
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
=
 
0
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
g
r
o
u
p
;
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
i
n
t
 
i
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
1
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
o
n
l
y
 
l
o
o
k
 
a
t
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
w
h
o
 
h
a
v
e
n
'
t
 
y
e
t
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
>
=
0
 
&
&
 
i
 
>
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
n
u
m
Y
e
a
r
s
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
-
-
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
g
e
t
(
i
)
;
 
 
 
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
+
=
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
 
 
*
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
O
f
C
l
a
s
s
(
 
 
 
 
S
o
c
i
o
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
t
a
t
u
s
.
s
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
.
M
I
D
D
L
E
_
C
L
A
S
S
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
 
 
*
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
g
e
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
O
f
C
l
a
s
s
(
 
 
 
 
S
o
c
i
o
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
t
a
t
u
s
.
s
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
.
W
O
R
K
I
N
G
_
C
L
A
S
S
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
g
e
t
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
I
n
t
a
k
e
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
y
e
a
r
 
=
=
 
y
e
a
r
O
p
e
n
e
d
)
 
/
*
 
n
o
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
*
/
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
g
e
t
(
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
1
)
;
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
3
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
t
o
t
a
l
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
=
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
)
;
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
=
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
g
e
t
N
u
m
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
(
 
 
 
 
S
o
c
i
o
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
t
a
t
u
s
.
s
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
.
M
I
D
D
L
E
_
C
L
A
S
S
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
)
m
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
/
 
 
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
)
t
o
t
a
l
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
A
c
c
e
p
t
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
c
h
i
l
d
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
 
 
*
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
t
h
i
s
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
o
n
l
y
 
e
v
e
r
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
;
 
 
 
 
*
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
u
n
f
o
r
t
u
n
a
t
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
t
 
n
e
e
d
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
(
C
h
i
l
d
 
c
h
i
l
d
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
=
 
g
e
t
P
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
(
)
;
 
i
n
t
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
C
h
o
s
e
n
 
=
 
g
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
r
y
 
{
 
 
 
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
.
a
d
d
(
c
h
i
l
d
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
c
a
t
c
h
 
(
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
e
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
e
.
p
r
i
n
t
S
t
a
c
k
T
r
a
c
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
c
h
i
l
d
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
r
e
m
o
v
e
N
o
d
e
(
c
h
i
l
d
)
;
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
N
u
m
b
e
r
F
o
r
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
=
 
-
1
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
=
 
g
e
t
P
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
(
)
;
 
i
n
t
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
C
h
o
s
e
n
 
=
 
g
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
(
)
;
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
"
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
"
,
 
 
 
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
P
l
a
c
e
s
,
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
P
l
a
c
e
s
)
;
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
 
"
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
"
,
 
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
C
h
o
s
e
n
,
 
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
C
h
o
s
e
n
)
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
 
 
*
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
/
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
D
o
u
b
l
e
 
g
e
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
(
C
h
i
l
d
 
c
h
i
l
d
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
b
a
s
e
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
=
 
1
;
 
i
f
 
(
c
h
i
l
d
.
g
e
t
S
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
(
)
 
=
=
 
S
o
c
i
o
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
t
a
t
u
s
.
s
o
c
i
a
l
C
l
a
s
s
.
M
I
D
D
L
E
_
C
L
A
S
S
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
*
 
 
 
 
 
b
a
s
e
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
;
 
 
 
}
 
e
l
s
e
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
b
a
s
e
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
T
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
i
s
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
 
 
*
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
 
 
*
 
T
h
e
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
i
s
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
 
 
 
*
 
i
t
s
 
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
t
a
k
e
S
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
s
.
a
d
d
(
n
e
w
 
S
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
(
y
e
a
r
)
)
;
 
 
 
l
o
g
(
"
R
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
s
h
o
c
k
 
o
f
 
"
 
 
 
 
+
 
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
s
.
g
e
t
(
s
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
S
h
o
c
k
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
 
1
)
.
g
e
t
S
t
o
c
h
a
s
t
i
c
I
m
p
a
c
t
A
t
(
y
e
a
r
)
 
 
 
+
 
"
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
"
 
+
 
y
e
a
r
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
L
o
g
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
m
s
g
 
-
 
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
o
i
d
 
l
o
g
(
S
t
r
i
n
g
 
m
s
g
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
"
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
"
 
+
 
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
:
 
"
 
+
 
m
s
g
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
4
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
P
r
e
p
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
u
p
-
c
o
m
i
n
g
 
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
 
 
*
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
w
 
a
c
a
d
e
m
i
c
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
p
r
e
S
t
e
p
(
)
 
 
{
 
c
h
i
l
d
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
s
t
i
c
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
R
u
l
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
g
e
t
P
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
(
)
;
 
 
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
(
y
e
a
r
,
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
)
;
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
"
p
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
"
,
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
,
 
 
 
 
g
e
t
P
l
a
c
e
s
L
e
f
t
(
)
)
;
 
 
 
 A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
C
h
i
l
d
>
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
=
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
.
g
e
t
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
(
)
;
 
 
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
.
c
l
e
a
r
(
)
;
 
 
 
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
 
h
a
n
d
l
e
;
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
C
h
i
l
d
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
:
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
h
a
n
d
l
e
 
=
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
c
h
i
l
d
)
;
 
 
 
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
.
a
d
d
(
h
a
n
d
l
e
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
'
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
t
e
p
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
f
i
r
e
A
l
l
R
u
l
e
s
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
l
e
a
n
 
u
p
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
a
c
a
d
e
m
i
c
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
p
o
s
t
S
t
e
p
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
s
.
p
u
t
(
y
e
a
r
,
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
u
p
)
;
 
 
 
y
e
a
r
+
+
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
F
a
c
t
H
a
n
d
l
e
 
h
a
n
 
:
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
r
a
c
t
(
h
a
n
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
l
l
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
w
h
o
 
h
a
v
e
 
m
a
d
e
 
a
n
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
,
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
n
g
 
a
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
 
 
 
*
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
o
n
e
 
b
y
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
C
h
i
l
d
>
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
=
 
g
e
t
P
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
)
;
 
/
/
 
A
s
s
i
g
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
a
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
i
t
 
c
h
i
l
d
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
s
t
i
c
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
R
u
l
e
(
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
;
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
C
h
i
l
d
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
 
:
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
 
 
 
{
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
=
 
g
e
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
R
a
t
i
n
g
(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
)
;
 
c
h
i
l
d
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
u
p
d
a
t
e
(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
,
 
(
f
l
o
a
t
)
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
s
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
L
i
s
t
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
 
w
h
o
 
w
a
s
 
l
a
s
t
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
 
 
*
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
 
=
=
 
n
u
l
l
 
|
|
 
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
N
u
m
b
e
r
F
o
r
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
<
 
0
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
-
1
;
 
 
 
}
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
(
(
C
h
i
l
d
)
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
.
g
e
t
(
 
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
N
u
m
b
e
r
F
o
r
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
)
)
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
5
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
l
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
C
h
i
l
d
>
 
g
e
t
P
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
C
h
i
l
d
>
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
=
 
 
n
e
w
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
C
h
i
l
d
>
(
)
;
 
 
 
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
=
 
g
e
t
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
 
"
a
l
l
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
"
)
;
 
 
 
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
;
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
I
t
e
r
a
t
o
r
 
i
t
 
=
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
.
i
t
e
r
a
t
o
r
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
t
.
h
a
s
N
e
x
t
(
)
;
)
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
=
 
(
Q
u
e
r
y
R
e
s
u
l
t
)
i
t
.
n
e
x
t
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
 
=
 
 
(
C
h
i
l
d
)
r
e
s
u
l
t
.
g
e
t
(
"
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
"
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
a
d
d
(
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
A
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
h
a
s
 
j
u
s
t
 
b
e
e
n
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
e
d
,
 
s
o
 
r
e
m
o
v
e
 
i
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
i
s
t
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
x
t
 
o
n
e
 
b
y
 
 
 
*
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
r
e
s
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
L
i
s
t
(
)
 
 
{
 
 
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
C
h
i
l
d
>
 
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
=
 
 
g
e
t
P
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
)
;
 
  
 
i
f
 
(
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
>
 
0
)
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
 
g
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
R
a
n
g
e
M
a
p
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
 
=
 
 
 
 
 
c
h
i
l
d
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
m
a
k
e
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
M
a
p
(
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
M
a
p
)
;
 
 
 
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
N
u
m
b
e
r
F
o
r
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
 
=
 
 
 
 
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
.
u
n
i
f
o
r
m
.
n
e
x
t
D
o
u
b
l
e
F
r
o
m
T
o
(
0
,
 
1
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
 
g
e
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
 
"
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
B
y
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
"
,
 
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
,
 
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
u
s
e
 
b
y
 
t
h
i
s
 
c
l
a
s
s
,
 
i
f
 
i
t
 
 
 
 
*
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
 
e
x
i
s
t
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
P
a
r
s
e
r
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
,
 
I
O
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
=
=
 
n
u
l
l
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
=
 
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
a
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
b
u
t
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
s
e
t
 
i
t
 
f
o
r
 
u
s
e
 
b
y
 
t
h
i
s
 
 
 
*
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
P
a
r
s
e
r
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
,
 
I
O
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
{
 
 
 
R
e
a
d
e
r
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
I
n
p
u
t
S
t
r
e
a
m
R
e
a
d
e
r
(
 
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
c
l
a
s
s
.
g
e
t
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
A
s
S
t
r
e
a
m
(
 
 
 
 
 
"
/
s
c
h
o
o
l
.
d
r
l
"
 
)
 
)
;
 
 
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
=
 
s
u
p
e
r
.
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
t
h
i
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
p
a
r
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
 
i
n
 
o
n
e
 
s
t
e
p
 
 
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
.
a
d
d
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
F
r
o
m
D
r
l
(
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
)
;
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
;
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
i
s
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
g
e
t
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
(
)
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
=
 
n
u
l
l
)
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
s
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
6
 
 
 
/
/
g
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
(
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
s
e
r
i
a
l
i
z
a
b
l
e
)
 
 
 
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
p
k
g
 
=
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
.
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
/
/
a
d
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
t
o
 
a
 
r
u
l
e
b
a
s
e
 
(
d
e
p
l
o
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
)
.
 
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
F
a
c
t
o
r
y
.
n
e
w
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
.
a
d
d
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
(
 
p
k
g
 
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
;
 
 
}
 
 
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
D
i
s
p
o
s
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
w
h
e
n
 
w
e
 
a
r
e
 
f
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
 
 
 
*
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
t
 
 
 
*
 
@
s
e
e
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
A
g
e
n
t
#
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
@
O
v
e
r
r
i
d
e
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
.
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
;
 
 
/
/
 
N
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
 
t
o
 
e
n
s
u
r
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
 
r
u
n
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
n
e
x
t
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
b
l
a
n
k
 
s
h
e
e
t
 
 
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
}
 
}
 
 1
1
.7
 
E
v
o
lu
ti
o
n
a
ry
S
ch
o
o
l.
ja
v
a
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
i
o
.
I
n
p
u
t
S
t
r
e
a
m
R
e
a
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
i
o
.
R
e
a
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
j
a
v
a
.
u
t
i
l
.
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
F
a
c
t
o
r
y
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
r
.
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
o
r
g
.
d
r
o
o
l
s
.
r
u
l
e
.
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
;
 
 i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
c
h
i
c
a
g
o
.
s
r
c
.
s
i
m
.
u
t
i
l
.
R
a
n
d
o
m
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
;
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
k
.
a
c
.
b
a
t
h
.
c
s
.
s
c
h
o
o
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
.
O
u
t
p
u
t
;
 
/
*
*
 
 
*
 
M
u
l
t
i
-
a
g
e
n
t
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
 
 
 
*
 
P
e
r
d
i
t
a
 
R
o
b
i
n
s
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
 
*
 
 
 
*
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
j
a
v
a
 
-
 
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
 
*
 
a
d
a
p
t
i
v
e
/
c
o
-
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
.
 
 
*
/
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
s
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
{
 
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
h
e
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
(
i
f
 
a
n
y
)
 
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
  
/
/
 
W
h
a
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
h
i
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
l
a
s
t
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
 
i
t
s
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
i
n
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
t
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
 
-
1
;
 
  
/
/
 
C
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
r
u
l
e
b
a
s
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
l
l
 
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
c
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
h
e
l
d
 
 
 
 
*
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
.
 
O
n
l
y
 
t
h
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
a
n
d
 
 
 
*
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
-
 
h
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
h
a
s
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
 
 
*
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
h
a
s
 
 
 
*
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
*
 
@
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
i
n
v
a
l
i
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
{
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
(
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
)
;
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
!
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
&
&
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
!
=
 
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
)
 
{
 
t
h
r
o
w
 
n
e
w
 
R
e
p
a
s
t
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
(
"
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
s
 
n
o
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
l
l
y
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
"
)
;
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
7
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
"
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
"
 
+
 
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
i
s
 
"
 
 
 
+
 
(
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
?
 
 
"
"
 
:
 
"
n
o
t
 
"
)
 
+
 
"
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
.
"
)
;
 
 
 
s
e
t
u
p
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
r
e
a
t
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
 
 
*
 
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
-
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
h
e
l
d
 
 
 
 
*
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
s
.
 
O
n
l
y
 
t
h
e
 
 
 
 
*
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
a
n
d
 
 
 
*
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
 
a
r
e
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
 
-
 
h
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
h
a
s
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
 
 
*
 
@
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
i
n
v
a
l
i
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
,
 
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
)
 
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
{
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
(
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
,
 
n
u
m
P
l
a
c
e
s
)
;
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
!
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
 
 
 
&
&
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
!
=
 
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
)
 
{
 
 
 
t
h
r
o
w
 
n
e
w
 
R
e
p
a
s
t
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
(
"
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
s
 
n
o
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
"
 
 
 
+
 
"
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
l
l
y
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
"
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
"
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
"
 
+
 
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
i
s
 
"
 
 
 
+
 
(
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
?
 
 
"
"
 
:
 
"
n
o
t
 
"
)
 
+
 
"
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
.
"
)
;
 
 
 
s
e
t
u
p
(
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
t
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
g
e
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
;
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
S
e
t
 
u
p
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
g
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
e
t
u
p
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
A
r
r
a
y
L
i
s
t
<
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
>
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
 
=
 
 
 
 
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
.
g
e
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
(
)
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
P
i
c
k
 
a
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
>
 
0
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
=
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
.
u
n
i
f
o
r
m
.
n
e
x
t
I
n
t
F
r
o
m
T
o
(
0
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
.
s
i
z
e
(
)
 
-
 
1
)
;
 
 
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
.
g
e
t
(
i
n
d
e
x
)
;
 
 
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
M
y
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
i
s
 
 
"
 
+
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
.
g
e
t
T
y
p
e
(
)
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
/
/
 
T
e
l
l
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
a
l
l
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
 
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
s
p
e
c
 
:
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
s
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
(
s
p
e
c
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
d
 
o
n
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
-
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
t
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
(
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
!
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
.
e
q
u
a
l
s
(
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
 
g
e
t
Y
e
a
r
s
S
i
n
c
e
L
a
s
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
 
y
e
a
r
;
 
 
 
 
i
n
t
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
 
g
e
t
Y
e
a
r
s
S
i
n
c
e
L
a
s
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
 
"
y
e
a
r
s
S
i
n
c
e
L
a
s
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
C
h
a
n
g
e
"
,
 
 
 
 
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
  
 
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
;
 
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
=
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
;
 
t
h
i
s
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
"
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
"
,
 
 
 
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
,
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
)
;
 
 
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
.
p
r
i
n
t
l
n
(
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
+
 
"
 
M
y
 
n
e
w
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
i
s
 
"
 
+
 
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
.
g
e
t
T
y
p
e
(
)
)
;
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
l
a
s
t
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
 
i
t
s
 
 
- 
M
u
lt
i-
ag
en
t 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
am
ic
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 e
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 i
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ch
o
ic
e 
- 
1
4
8
 
 
*
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
t
 
g
e
t
Y
e
a
r
s
S
i
n
c
e
L
a
s
t
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
 
<
 
0
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
y
e
a
r
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
y
e
a
r
 
-
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
m
;
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
l
l
 
i
t
s
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
e
t
 
u
p
,
 
 
 
*
 
s
o
 
i
t
 
c
a
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
 
f
u
l
l
y
.
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
i
s
e
(
)
 
{
 
 
/
/
 
T
e
l
l
 
D
r
o
o
l
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
o
u
r
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
 
s
o
 
i
t
 
c
a
n
 
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
 
/
/
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
d
a
p
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
m
 
 
f
o
r
 
(
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
s
c
h
 
:
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
g
e
t
I
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
)
.
g
e
t
S
c
h
o
o
l
s
(
)
)
 
 
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
s
c
h
.
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
 
!
=
 
g
e
t
I
D
(
)
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
a
s
s
e
r
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
s
c
h
)
;
 
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
G
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
 
 
*
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
 
 
*
 
@
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
e
d
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
g
e
t
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
(
)
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
=
 
n
u
l
l
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
 
=
 
 
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
B
u
i
l
d
e
r
(
)
;
 
  
 
/
/
 
A
d
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
o
n
t
o
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
 
o
n
e
s
 
 
 
 
R
e
a
d
e
r
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
=
 
n
e
w
 
I
n
p
u
t
S
t
r
e
a
m
R
e
a
d
e
r
(
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
c
l
a
s
s
.
g
e
t
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
A
s
S
t
r
e
a
m
(
"
/
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
d
r
l
"
)
)
;
 
 
 
/
/
 
t
h
i
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
p
a
r
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
 
i
n
 
o
n
e
 
s
t
e
p
 
 
 
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
.
a
d
d
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
F
r
o
m
D
r
l
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
;
 
  
 
/
/
 
g
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
s
 
(
t
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
f
i
n
e
 
a
s
 
l
o
n
g
 
/
/
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
y
 
u
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
n
a
m
e
s
p
a
c
e
)
 
 
 
 
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
p
k
g
 
=
 
b
u
i
l
d
e
r
.
g
e
t
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
(
)
;
 
  
 
/
/
 
a
d
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
t
o
 
a
 
r
u
l
e
b
a
s
e
 
(
d
e
p
l
o
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
/
/
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
)
 
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
 
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
F
a
c
t
o
r
y
.
n
e
w
R
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
.
a
d
d
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
(
p
k
g
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
;
 
 
}
 
 
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
S
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
o
n
e
 
 
 
*
 
@
p
a
r
a
m
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
-
 
n
e
w
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
 
 
*
 
@
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
i
n
v
a
l
i
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
:
 
o
n
l
y
 
 
 
 
*
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
a
n
d
 
 
 
*
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
 
a
r
e
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
s
e
t
S
c
h
o
o
l
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
(
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
)
 
 
t
h
r
o
w
s
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
{
 
 
 
i
f
 
(
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
=
=
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
C
L
A
S
S
_
B
L
I
N
D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
|
|
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
=
=
 
 
 
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
.
A
B
S
O
L
U
T
E
_
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
_
F
O
R
_
M
I
D
D
L
E
)
 
{
 
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
;
 
 
 
 
d
o
u
b
l
e
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
 
=
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
;
 
 
 
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
 
=
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
;
 
 
 
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
f
i
r
e
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
(
 
"
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
F
o
r
M
i
d
d
l
e
C
l
a
s
s
"
,
 
 
o
l
d
S
t
a
t
e
,
 
 
 
 
 
n
e
w
S
t
a
t
e
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
e
l
s
e
 
{
 
 
 
 
t
h
r
o
w
 
n
e
w
 
R
e
p
a
s
t
E
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
(
 
 
 
 
"
E
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
 
o
n
l
y
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
y
 
"
 
 
 
+
 
"
c
l
a
s
s
 
b
l
i
n
d
 
o
r
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
y
 
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
.
"
)
;
 
 
 
}
 
 
}
 
  
/
*
*
 
 
 
*
 
D
i
s
p
o
s
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
'
s
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
;
 
w
e
 
a
r
e
 
f
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
 
 
 
*
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
 
 
 
 
*
/
 
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
v
o
i
d
 
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
 
{
 
 
 
s
u
p
e
r
.
d
i
s
p
o
s
e
(
)
;
 
 
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
 
=
 
n
u
l
l
;
 
 
}
 
}
 
 
